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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
CREED VS. DEED: 
SECESSION, LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
The use of child soldiers has troubled human rights activists, policy-makers, and 
local communities for decades. Although rebellions around the world routinely use 
children in their activities, many do not. Despite its overwhelming importance for conflict 
resolution, the topic of child soldiers remains understudied. My research blends classic 
rational choice and constructivist themes to develop an explanation for when child 
soldiers will be used, and when they will be avoided.   
 
The likelihood of child recruitment is influenced by the value of international 
opinion; this is determined by the groups' long-term goals. Secessionist rebellions desire 
to have their own state. However, statehood is jealously guarded by the international 
community and is only granted under extreme circumstances. The use of child soldiers 
has been condemned around the world as a crime against humanity, and it can curtail 
international support. Thus, secessionists should be the least likely rebel type to use child 
soldiers out of a concern to appear legitimate.  
Opportunistic rebellions face few constraints in their recruitment efforts. They do 
not desire international support because their long-term goal is the same as their short 
term goal: profit. Instead of refraining from using children in order to curry favor with 
external parties, they will abduct, adopt, and abuse children because they are cheaper to 
employ than adults. Opportunists are unconcerned with losing legitimacy or reducing the 
chances of victory. Therefore, they should be the most likely to use child soldiers.  
Concern for costs can affect all rebels. As duration grows, constraints over long-
term legitimacy diminish. Therefore, all rebellions should be more likely to use child 
soldiers as duration increases.  
 I test my theory quantitatively by looking at 103 rebel groups active between 
1998-2008. I explore rebellions in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sudan to further 
elucidate the causal mechanisms. There is considerable empirical support for the theory. 
 
 
These results offer policy-relevant conclusions in the areas of rehabilitation and conflict 
resolution. More importantly, they offer a workable strategy to curb the use of child 
soldiers in civil war.    
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PART ONE: 
THEORY 
 
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Three years after braving the horrors of war, William Johnston was awarded the 
Medal of Honor by President Abraham Lincoln. He won this by showing bravery during 
a seven day retreat from a battle in Southeastern Virginia during the Civil War. At his 
rank, he was the only soldier to complete his duties as assigned. He was a drummer boy; 
he was 11 years old (Wisler 1997).1 On the opposing side, the Confederacy deployed 247 
underage cadets in 1864 (Singer 2010:93). These stories are not unique. Child soldiers 
have been used in many conflicts throughout history. They marched at the head of 
Napoleon's armies when he moved across Europe, and saw extensive action as the Hitler 
Youth in the final days of World War II. During the Boer Wars, lieutenant-general Robert 
Baden Powell was impressed with the youths of the Mafeking Cadet Corps and their 
ability to stand guard, carry messages, and complete other auxiliary duties. Based on this 
experience, he launched the modern scouting movement, from which the Boy Scouts 
emerged (Jeal 1989). While child soldier use is not uncommon in the history of conflict, 
their use in previous large-scale conflagrations was restricted to roles as aides-de-camp, 
transporters, and spies. Today, children are routinely armed and ordered to engage fully 
trained and fully equipped soldiers against whom they have little chance of success. Their 
                                                 
1 He was 13 when he received the Medal of Honor, 11 when performing the duties that earned him that 
award.  
 2 
stories are widely discussed in NGO, aid, and development communities, and 
increasingly gain attention from ordinary citizens.    
In March 2012, the charity Invisible Children released a video known simply as 
“Kony 2012.” It was viewed by more than 80 million people within two weeks, and 
evoked outrage across the Western world. The half-hour production recounts the various 
crimes of Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.2 The kidnapping, 
mutilation, and forced recruitment of children in Central Africa left millions of American 
Facebook users shocked and calling for action. In modern times, despite the ease with 
which so many groups like the LRA abruptly end childhoods, such stories still bring out 
the inner humanitarian in all of us. In a unified voice, rare for the denizens of the internet, 
Kony's crimes are appropriately labeled as horrendous. Yet, he and so many like him, 
ignore this sentiment altogether. Between 200,000 and 400,000 child soldiers are used 
around the world. They fight with national armies in Bahrain (15 years old), Great Britain 
(16 years old), and the United States (17 years old). Most commonly, paramilitary and 
armed opposition groups use children in combat, and there appears to be no lower-bound 
age threshold. The usage of child soldiers has been observed in at least 45 conflict zones 
in the past decade alone. They are known as moryaan (maggots) on the streets of 
Mogadishu and abejitas (little bees) in Colombia. Units of kadogos (little ones) no older 
than 15, routinely see combat in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, despite 
the disregard that so many groups show to the rights of children, there are a number of 
rebel commanders that do not. For example, while the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
was notorious for employing thousands of children in combat, the Ogaden National 
                                                 
2 The LRA was largely out of Uganda by 2008, mostly operating out of bases in the north of DRC and 
South Sudan.  
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Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia provides no evidence of similar behavior. Even 
insurgencies that are condemned for acts of terror show variation in their recruitment 
practices. The Taliban regularly employs children as suicide bombers and in other roles, 
while Al-Gamaa al Islamiya in Egypt does not. Though it is not unheard of for them to 
use underage fighters, the Palestinian liberation forces often shy away from egregiously 
young suicide bombers in favor of more effective and less morally troublesome adults. 
As seen in Figure 1, the 45 conflict zones show variation in groups that use and refrain 
from using child soldiers. Still, others are driven to stop using child soldiers even though 
they once used them with disregard. In 2010, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army 
made headlines when they announced that they were abruptly demobilizing all of their 
child soldiers. Thus, instead of asking why child soldiers are being used, the better 
question might be why some rebel groups refrain. 
--Figure 1 here-- 
This research considers long-term costs facing rebel leaders, and explores their 
rationality with respect to international norms. Supply explanations of child soldier use 
offer theories of opportunity, while demand explanations primarily explore short-term 
costs and benefits of using underage troops. Rebel leaders have been shown to consider 
the long-term consequences of their actions as well (Mason and Fett 1996). I build on the 
demand-side theories and consider how these factors influence the decision to recruit 
children. We know that rebels are aware of international opinion (e.g., Bob 2005), and 
that some desire external support more than others (e.g., Salehyan, Gleditsch and 
Cunningham 2011). The use of child soldiers is condemned worldwide. Therefore, 
understanding when rebel groups use them allows insight into the strategy of rebel 
 4 
commanders. By exploring the use of child soldiers through the rationalist-normative 
framework, we will better understand the motivations of rebel leaders.  Thus, my research 
question is to determine when rational rebel leaders will consider the long-term costs 
associated with child soldiering compared to the short-term benefits. I consider how the 
desires of the group and the beliefs about their behavior lead to their decision on whether 
or not to use child soldiers. In short, when do rebel leaders forgo international opinion 
and the limitations in capabilities and use child soldiers?  
 Any list of atrocities associated with civil war inevitably includes heartbreaking 
descriptions of child involvement. There are three states of being for children affected by 
armed conflict: those vulnerable to being drawn in (at risk), those in the post-conflict 
period (demobilized), and those active in the conflict (child soldiers) (Pederson and 
Sommerfelt 2007). Anthropologists and health-care professionals have primarily focused 
on at-risk children (e.g., Honwana 2006). Conflict scholars in political science also 
consider vulnerable populations in intrastate conflict (e.g., Lai and Thyne 2007). 
Demobilization remains a top concern for social-psychologists. The third category 
receives considerable attention worldwide in both the nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) communities, and even Hollywood has 
explored the issue. Social scientists are only beginning to explore the causes and 
consequences of child soldiering with systematic, empirical research.  
Scholarly research on the causes of child soldiersing generally falls into two 
categories: systemic influences and recruitment decisions. Systemic influences are 
described as supply-side theories and propose that an excess in available children leads to 
high rates of recruitment. These explanations can be broken into two sub-categories: 
 5 
volunteers and abductees. Poor family conditions and child unemployment can push 
children to seek active involvement in an armed group (Høiskar 2001; Brett and Specht 
2004). Others suggest pools of vulnerable youths represent ripe targets for ambitious 
recruiters. Child soldier use will be more common in areas with large populations of at-
risk children, such as refugee or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that lack 
adequate protection (Achvarina and Reich 2006). The second category explores the 
motivations of the recruiters themselves, and focuses on the costs and benefits of using 
underage troops based on their strengths and weaknesses. Groups that value effectiveness 
will use fewer children. If the scale of fighting is small, the child to adult ratio will be 
higher. This approach suggests that features of the organization offer better explanations 
than structural features of the conflict alone (Andvig and Gates 2010). My argument 
builds on the demand-side literature by extending the time-horizon and considers the 
long-term consequences of using child soldiers. Before this, I next briefly consider why 
this research is important both in terms of theory, empirics, and moral imperative.  
 This project is an ambitious attempt to build on the substantive conclusions of 
past work on child soldiers, and to improve upon the empirical limitations of prior 
studies. I extend the literature theoretically by further exploring the motivations of rebel 
leaders, by considering the full range of consequences for using child soldiers. Based on 
multiple accounts of child soldiering, we know that their abilities on the battlefield are 
limited. In the academic literature, the role of the international community has been 
relegated to background discussions of the legal framework designed to curb child soldier 
use. Thus far, overlooked is the signal this sends for rebel leaders and would-be recruiters 
of children. In the tradition of Fearon and Wendt (2002), my work will take a rationalist 
 6 
perspective and offer a recipe for how to explain rebel actions. They are calculating 
individuals and recruitment decisions are a product of desires and beliefs. From the 
constructivist school, I conclude that international norms or "principled ideas" provide 
the belief system to the commanders. They believe rightly or wrongly that there are 
consequences for recruiting child soldiers. Rebel leaders that desire an independent state 
will value the legitimacy constraint may bring. Rebel leaders that do not desire to have 
their own independent state will value international opinion less. For some, the desire to 
maintain conflict will devalue the constraining power of principled ideas. They will be 
the least constrained in their recruitment decisions by international norms. In this sense, 
my work represents the compatibility between rationalist and constructivist conceptions 
of conflict.  
Methodologically, my project addresses specific limitations encountered by past 
researchers. Four general methods have been used to study child soldiers. First, reports of 
ex-combatants offer personal accounts of a child soldiers' conscription. From these 
stories, scholars have identified sets of factors that lead to higher instances of child 
soldiering. Stories from former combatants inevitably appear at the forefront of almost 
any UN report about child soldiers, and are only just beginning to be less commonplace 
in mainstream political science research. These anecdotes are important, but often 
represent only a starting point in the research process. They provide individual, on-the-
ground insight, but their generalizability is in doubt, and the concern over selection 
effects cannot be ignored. Second, qualitative, single-country studies offer a treasure-
trove of information about experiences and motivations. These studies produce valuable 
theories that are, however, limited in applicability outside of the specific case. A third 
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approach explores a single-country, but uses quantitative, survey-based data. This 
approach offers considerable depth, but with the added benefit of being able to rule out 
alternative causal factors. However, the question of external validity remains. Are the 
factors that make children in Afghanistan volunteer to be suicide bombers the same as 
those that induce forced recruitment by a rebellion in Eastern DRC? Finally, large-n, 
cross-national analysis has seen limited use in recent years (Høiskar 2001, Achvarina and 
Reich 2006, Beber and Blattman 2010). This represents the current apex of child soldier 
research, but it is unfortunately fraught with difficulties given the nature of the 
phenomenon (Ames 2010, Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007). Still, methods that identify 
factors influencing child recruitment rates worldwide that are both generalizable and 
guard against spuriousness are very important. Statistical analysis is a much needed 
addition to the methodological repertoire for social scientists. At the same time, 
considering the complexity of the phenomenon, one cannot rely on statistics alone. 
Detailed case studies that go beyond snapshot summaries of complex characteristics are a 
necessary part of the process. In conclusion, a thorough exploration of child soldiers must 
consider a variety sources to uncover the empirical record.  
 
1.2 Understanding Rebel Motivations 
 In classic studies of rebel behavior, three considerations are often identified as 
important for leaders. Tse-Tung (1956) offers a succinct summary. "The fundamental 
problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, 
spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the 
enemy" (90). Leading counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen (2010) identifies a 
 8 
fourth "unity" in the growing importance of the "influential spectators' gallery of the 
international community" (103). I extend this point in two ways. First, far from being a 
new development, international audiences have been important to various groups for 
centuries. Throughout history, separatist rebellions sought to win over reticent 
international actors with displays of camaraderie. Revolutions largely adhered to the 
international policy of government recognition, whereby demonstrated strength resulted 
in diplomatic ties. For newly created states, however, they had to convince the audience 
through means other than force alone that they deserved to be seen as equals. Modern 
separatists, like their independence-movement forbearers in Brazil and the United States, 
need international support for statehood. Without it, they might never achieve their 
ultimate goal: independence. 
As a second extension, I argue that the value of this fourth unity varies depending 
on the type of rebellion. Rebellions aimed at creating their own state are absolutely 
dependent on the audience because, without their support, the rebellion will never 
achieve their ultimate goal (e.g., East Timor, Kosovo vis-á-vis Somaliland, Kurdistan). 
Rebellions that are largely greed-based are not dependent on the international community 
because their goal, profit, is gained independently of external forces. Instead, they rely on 
conflict perpetuation to maintain a steady flow of resources. External intervention would 
be bad for business, but oftentimes overtures for peace will bring a series of failed 
negotiations (e.g., RUF). Rebellions aimed at overthrow are aware of the international 
audience and should seek their support to some degree. However, due to the difficulty of 
reinstating an ousted leader, revolutionary rebellions can succeed (change of government) 
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and after demonstrating their ability to rule they garner support from a reticent global 
community (e.g., Egypt, Libya).  
Most rebellions seek military victory, but for some this alone is not enough to 
achieve their goal. Secessionist rebellions aim to have their own state. Unfortunately for 
them, new state formation through unilateral secession is rare. Even if they are victorious 
in their struggle, without legitimacy recognition will remain forever elusive. It is true 
however, that behavior itself may not be as influential to veto-players in the global 
community as geopolitical and domestic security concerns. At the same time, evidence 
supports the notion that separatist claims that are seen as legitimate benefit from 
international support and suffer from international condemnation. Therefore, rebels 
whose ultimate goal is to join the international community should be least willing to 
break the norm against the use of child soldiers because they have the most to lose if they 
are seen as illegitimate. 
Sources of funding can alter or obscure the professed goals of the rebellion. 
Recent work on the link between natural resources and conflict identifies a number of 
mechanisms that influence civil war onset, duration, and intensity. The most compelling 
of these findings is that the type of resource can affect conflict differently. Resource 
endowments can alter the motivational structure of the organization, flooding self-styled 
ideological movements with opportunists (Weinstein 2005). A high proportion of these 
fighters within a rebel army reduces the utility of victory (Collier 2000, Cornell 2005). 
Where ideologues are replaced by loot-seekers, rebellions will be more likely to use child 
soldiers because they are cheaper and can keep costs low. In addition to the reduced 
concern for long-term goals, illicit funding may put a premium on conflict perpetuation, 
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such that the capability of one’s troops is undervalued. Thus, cheaper child soldiers are 
preferable.  
Additional factors influence how difficult or easy it is to abide by international 
norms. The longer the rebellion, the more costs will accrue. Rebel leaders are then faced 
with a tradeoff between lowering expenditures or risk losing the war. To avoid the worst-
case scenario of total defeat, they will adopt cost-cutting strategies. One way to reduce 
expenses is to lower recruitment costs by supplementing the forces with children because 
they command lower wages and are cheaper to outfit. Thus, as conflict continues, 
rebellions should be more likely to break the norm against child soldier use. This should 
be less evident for those groups that have strong incentives to avoid under-age troops in 
the first place. Therefore, I maintain that duration has independent effects on the 
likelihood of child soldier use, but is itself conditioned by rebel goals.  
Scholars are only just beginning to disaggregate the concept of civil conflict and 
recognize that rebel behavior is not constant (e.g., Cederman and Gleditsch 2009, 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). For example, Cederman, Buhaug and Rød (2009), and 
Weidmann (2009) explore ethnic actors within a country in an effort to better understand 
contentious relationships with the state. Likewise, subnational processes are worth 
exploring to reveal the spatial distribution of rebellions within a state (e.g., Hegre, Østby 
and Raleigh 2009; Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). Finally, recent breakthroughs have 
been made by using geographic data to explore the role of natural resources and instances 
of conflict (Lujala 2010) and duration (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009). One motivation 
for the current project is to add to this body of literature by developing theoretical 
expectations about disaggregated recruitment behavior. The dyadic nature of civil war is 
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just as important to consider as it is in interstate conflict (Cunningham, Gleditsch and 
Salehyan 2009). Ames (2010) reminds us that in the study of child soldiers, the unit of 
analysis is of great importance. In past research the nation-state has been used most often, 
but this is "almost always a mistake" (16). Here, I will use the group as the level of 
analysis and the individual rebellion as the unit of analysis (45 conflict zones, 103 
rebellions). Using the nation-state would risk losing a set of cases where some rebels 
refrained from using child soldiers while others did not. Thus, using the state, or conflict 
as the unit of analysis would conflate the use of child soldiers and lose the crucial 
variation that allows for comparison among groups.  
It is also valuable to consider the international element in the study of rebel 
behavior. Past research on international norms and treaty compliance have only 
considered the behavior of states as signatories. However, Simmons (2010) leaves open 
the possibility that non-ratifiers may also be subject to the same overarching human 
rights regime and its accompanying norms and signals (274). Furthermore, there is 
growing evidence that rebels are responding to signals of condemnation and threat for 
using child soldiers (Chikukwa 2010). By bringing in the international element to the 
study of rebel behavior, I build on the work of many scholars in the field that consider the 
role of external actors in intrastate conflict (e.g., Moore 1995; Carment, James and 
Taydas 2006; Salehyan 2009; Thyne 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). 
I also build on the strong constructivist tradition of international relations research as well 
(e.g., Wendt 1992;  1994; Tannenwald 1999).   
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1.3 Child Soldier Definitions and Trends 
This definition of a child soldier is debated in the international advocacy and 
research communities. Here, I will use the most recent, and currently the most widely 
accepted definition proposed. There are many definitions from which to choose and there 
is considerable overlap. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with 
Armed Forces or Armed Groups are sponsored by UNICEF and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict 
(CAAC). They define a child soldier as, "any person below 18 years of age who is, or 
who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies 
or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking, or has taken, a 
direct part in hostilities" (UNICEF 2007). This definition is the culmination of a debate 
that has been ongoing at least since international organizations began recognizing 
children's rights. It is theoretically exhausting by considering a wide range of 
components. It is also consistent with other definitions used by international advocates 
for child protection.  
The definition of a child soldier contains at least three debatable points. First, 
CAAC includes children used in any capacity by an armed group. This includes the 
obvious category of active combatants, but also includes porters and cooks, which is 
questionable. For example, if a child works for the group but does not actively take part 
in the conflict is it fair to equate their actions with those that do? However, it is not safe 
to dismiss liability for adult military cooks, chaplains, or medics just because they are not 
active. Therefore, not limiting the role of the child is necessary to capture participation in 
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general. The inclusion of "sex slaves" or "army wives" is another debatable issue. Again, 
if these were adults that were captured by an armed group or military and forced into this 
role, would they have earned the same label of "soldier?" It is doubtful. This question 
would be important if the philosophy of child protection condemned child volunteers, and 
only spared sympathy for forced recruits. Fortunately, it does not. Instead, the recruiters 
are the violators and the target of condemnation, not the child soldiers. Therefore, 
children observed in the ranks are evidence of abrogating child rights, regardless of the 
role they serve. This position is consistent with the current project and leads to the second 
questionable aspect of the proposed definition.  
The second aspect of the definition that is questionable is the failure to delineate 
between volunteers and forcibly recruited child soldiers. While Pederson and Sommerfelt 
(2007) and almost every other researcher on the topic recognizes the difference between 
volunteers and forcible recruits, this distinction is not always necessary or useful. Here, I 
take the approach that armed group leaders operate in conflict environments of relatively 
fixed (and high) supply of children (Andvig and Gates 2010). In these situations, their 
own decision to use children is the more important issue. Regardless of the individual 
soldier’s motivations, it is almost always possible to find some children willing to 
volunteer. I do not consider the direct motivations of children, because, like the 
ideological foundation of age of consent laws, children are unable to make such large 
decisions by themselves. All cultures identify distinct adult and child decisions. In the 
United States, different ages bestowing adult decision making vary for a driver's license 
(avg. 16), to buy tobacco (18) and alcohol (21).3 Thus, even where 8, 9, or 10 year olds 
                                                 
3 The actual age of consent in the US varies considerably by state from 16 to 18 years old.  
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are able to volunteer to fight for the liberation of their country, or fight to help provide 
food for their family, this decision cannot rightfully be made by the child and it takes a 
rebel leader who is willing to make the conscious decision to accept. Thus, it is more 
important to look at the motivations of the recruiter rather than those of the individual 
child. 
The third and perhaps most contentious issue regarding the definition of a child 
soldier is the age threshold. The most common cutoff is anyone under the age of 18. 
Using this definition, however, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom 
employ child soldiers in violation of international law. The age-threshold was less than 
15 years old in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), but the definition of 
a child in the same document was less than 18. The Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict OPCAC 
(2001) and subsequent documents using the higher threshold simply extend the definition 
of a child to the concept of a child soldier. Furthermore, there is a trend towards this 
cutoff whereby most states are now refusing to use those less than 18 (Simmons 2009). 
At the same time, it is valuable to consider the lower age threshold as something with 
wide support.  It offers two advantages. Younger than 15 years old matches what is 
commonly envisioned when thinking of child soldiers (Andvig 2006) and it clears some 
of the error in documentation associated with the measure at the higher age threshold 
(Andvig 2006). People in conflict zones often lack comprehensive birth records and 
estimates on age are often calculated visually by NGO observers. Furthermore, 
international norms are subject to ambiguity in compliance. Even in legally-binding 
treaties, some level of deviation is often overlooked (Chayes and Chayes 1993). A rebel 
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leader, wanting to comply with international norms and still facing attractive low-cost 
soldiers, may do the best they can. This results in older children being used who are 
young, but not obviously so. Using the lower age threshold prevents reliance on strict 
compliance for gauging the effect of international norms. For this project I will consider 
both cutoffs, while regarding the higher threshold as most appropriate, but questionable.  
Other definitions for identifying children have been offered in the literature 
(Andvig 2006). These include mental capacity, psychological maturity, and cultural 
considerations. The first two can be dismissed as wholly impractical for large-n research, 
or even any empirical research beyond individual psychological profiles. Such 
distinctions undermine the very nature of child rights. Some persons at very low ages are 
more mature than older compatriots. This does not excuse those that wish to take 
advantage of them. Others may be immature at older ages, but should not be protected 
under the same international laws used to provide protection for a distinct group of 
vulnerable persons. Cultural considerations can be important. However, I do not take this 
approach for several reasons. First, it would again limit any ability to engage in cross-
national analysis. Second, not only would conclusions across states be impossible, but 
"cultural" traditions within states also vary. Such an exercise would inevitably involve 
infinite reductionism where I would chase ever smaller groups down to individual 
families (at best) or even individual perceptions of when a person reaches adulthood and 
is ready for military service. Third, it is largely unnecessary to consider cultural 
distinctions. With the exception of six countries,4 18 years old is by far the modal 
category for voting age. Several countries have even higher age thresholds. Finally, once 
                                                 
4 This group includes North Korea and Cuba.  
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again, this approach defies the very idea of international child protection laws. By setting 
an age threshold, the international community is offering protection to a distinct group. 
Cultural considerations, like psychological approaches rob them of this protected status.  
 
1.4 Why We Should Care 
There are a number of reasons why this study is worth pursuing. Children are 
often among the most vulnerable groups during war because, by definition, they lack 
peer-advocates (Simmons 2009). This is true for children rights in general and is perhaps 
more problematic during conflict conditions. Conflict adds to the situation of helplessness 
or lack of options. Rehabilitation efforts are noble, but the lasting psychological, social, 
and physical scars of exposure and participation often last a lifetime. In addition to 
individual suffering, child soldiering can impede development following cessation of 
hostilities. This can come about by a destruction of the human capital in terms of 
education or professional development. It can also increase the likelihood of future 
conflict because of the high number of uneducated youths that have only known combat. 
Below I underscore the consequences of child soldiering by further exploring a number 
of factors including the high rates of child soldiering in recent years, the threat of conflict 
recurrence, the connection to other rebel behavior and finally, as a general human rights 
issue.   
Child soldier use is an unfortunate and undeniable fact of modern warfare. Civil 
wars represent the modal category of conflict in the 21st century, and academics and 
policy makers cannot ignore the presence of underage recruits. Since the end of the Cold 
War through 2007, there have been at least 124 conflicts in 80 locations (Harbom, 
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Melander and Wallensteen 2008). Of these, 91 were civil wars involving the government 
and at least one domestic opposition group.  Child soldiering is most common in the 
context of civil war. Of the 50 civil wars ongoing from 1994-1998, child soldiers under 
the age of 15 were used in at least 31 of these conflicts. More recently, of the 103 
rebellions active from 1998-2008 that met traditional thresholds for civil war, evidence 
exists that 31 of these used children under the age of 15, while 75% used children under 
18. The current number of child soldiers worldwide is estimated to be between 200,000 to 
400,000. However, this number itself is difficult to verify. Regardless of exact figures, 
child soldiering is represented on every continent5 and in a majority of intrastate conflicts 
worldwide.  
A second reason this research is valuable is for concerns over conflict recurrence. 
Demobilization represents an important step in the network of human rights advocating 
for child protection. However, a large pool of unemployed former-combatants raises 
serious concerns about instability and the renewal of violence (Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik 2002). Due to atrocities witnessed and committed, child soldiers are often difficult 
to rehabilitate. For example, in an initiation strategy used by the RUF in Sierra Leone, 
children were forced to perform public violence in their home communities in order to 
sever communal bonds (Honwana 2006, Singer 2005). In fact, one appealing feature of 
child soldiers is how easy it is to remove those bonds to instill loyalty with the group. 
After a conflict, the children are often more connected to their military unit than they 
were with their families. While (Pugel 2010) notes that a majority of child soldiers that 
participated in Liberia's civil wars were able to return to their home territories, there was 
                                                 
5 Except Antarctica.  
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considerable variation among the factions. Further, in all cases, adults were more easily 
reintegrated into their pre-war networks than children. Such displacement can lead to a 
growing presence of landless, disaffected youth, and increase the risk for new or renewed 
conflict (Heinsohn 2007). Former child combatants who have few other skills are perhaps 
more at risk because they also lack the social networks to provide basic necessities, 
leading to an especially large pool of desperate fighters. 
Child soldiering is just one of many possible international norms governing 
behavior. Women's rights, protection of refugees, and other concerns could be explored 
in a similar way as this project on child soldiers. The norm against child recruitment 
stands out as particularly important because of its near universal acceptance (Simmons 
2009). Unlike individual crimes that are sporadic by nature, such as rape and torture, 
child recruitment is a characteristic of the group and is therefore more systematic and 
widespread.6 Furthermore, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find that crimes of this 
nature reflect an absence of discipline rather than a well-executed method of plunder. 
Furthermore, the clear signal against using children in combat emphasizes its potential 
impact on rebel behavior. While bans on practices such as torture exist, there are 
inevitably qualifications for times of crisis -rationalizations for when it would be 
appropriate. Considerable definitional debates are seen as well.7 The condemnation on 
using child soldiers, on the other hand, recognizes when the phenomena occurs (during 
                                                 
6 Genocide, or mass killing, is also a group-level characteristic to which my theory would apply. 
Secessionists should be less likely to commit such undeniable atrocities than non-secessionists for the same 
reason that they are less likely to use child soldiers. At the same time, opportunistic rebellions would not 
necessarily commit such crimes because it might bring on more international attention, perhaps leading to 
some kind of intervention. This is beyond the focus of my project, though it still falls under the rubric of 
goal driven behavior. 
7 It is true that, like torture, child soldiering also has ambiguity in terms of definitions. It is also difficult to 
know if and when children are being used. However, these are empirical coding issues that I address in 
Chapter 4. 
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war) and explicitly says that such behavior is unjustifiable. Compared to nuclear non-
proliferation and even a ban on torture, child soldiering is something that few countries 
could credibly argue to the UN General Assembly that should be allowed in times of war. 
Instead, those prominent countries that fail to follow the letter of the law as it is written 
(e.g., Britain, France, and the United States), argue that the soldiers they use are merely 
trained and not deployed. Finally, in some cases, the rebel groups are adhering to other 
international norms, not just refraining from child soldier use. However, while I would 
argue that my theory could extend to some of these issues as well, child soldiering has a 
direct link to security concerns and is thus the one that is most relevant to rebel behavior.  
Drawing mostly from case studies and anecdotal evidence, social work and 
education policy researchers identify a fourth reason that child soldiering is a valuable 
topic of research. At its core, the child protection is a human rights issue. Children 
recruited into armed forces are denied the right to life, education, development, and 
protection recognized by the international community. Child soldiers have high rates of 
physical and mental abuse, the effects of which last into adulthood (Pearn 2003, 
Somsundaram 2002). Furthermore, coupled with those lost to disability and death, 
countries with prolific child soldiering are likely to suffer economic impediments as a 
result of the removal of an entire generation of workers. This suggests that child 
soldiering can hinder both individual and state development.  
For these reasons and more, I aim to bring the tools of modern social science and 
contribute to a more thorough understanding of one of the worst tragedies of 
contemporary intrastate conflict. It goes without saying that eradication of the practice 
remains on the agenda of many NGOs around the world. However, it has suffered from 
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an excess of normative concerns, paucity of theoretical work, and a deficiency of 
empirically-grounded policy recommendations. My work will add to a general body of 
knowledge on one of the worst contemporary forms of human rights abuses and show 
that child soldiers are not invisible to conflict scholars.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Project 
Child soldier use is common in rebellions throughout the world. At the same time, 
international norms protecting children's rights exist, and are shown to exert influence on 
state and non-state actors alike. Therefore, it is valuable to explore the role of 
international norms in rebel decisions to use child soldiers. In the next chapter, I offer a 
survey of the relevant literature on child soldiers and related abuses. I go on to explain 
the importance of international norms and review a brief history of international state-
recognition policies. 
In Chapter 3, I outline the argument of the project.  I propose a theory of 
calculated decisions regarding when to use child soldiers. I build my argument within the 
norm-compliance literature and the existing scholarly work on rebel behavior, funding, 
and war duration. I offer a rationalist characterization of rebel behavior and the power of 
international influence on military behavior, and propose that separatist rebellions should 
be less likely to use child soldiers in their efforts. By considering funding profiles of rebel 
groups, I argue that opportunistic rebellions are more likely to use child soldiers. Finally, 
considering the costs of war, and the low-costs of child labor, duration should increase 
the use of child soldiers, but should be conditioned by separatist group goals.  
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 Part two of the project presents a cross-national, large-n analysis of child 
soldiering. Chapter 4 walks through the data collection and coding rubric used to gather 
the empirical evidence necessary to test the research question. The dataset includes the 
use of child soldiers, rebel goals, funding profiles, duration estimates, as well as relevant 
control variables. In this chapter, I review the specific coding rules I followed and 
provide a detailed description of the source material. In Chapter 5, I engage in 
quantitative analysis. I use logistic regression and ordinary least squares regression 
clustered by country to specify models of rebel action.  
 In part three, I begin with a brief justification for the case selection used as 
qualitative, empirical tests of my theory. Here, I outline the goals I intend to accomplish, 
and review the findings uncovered thus far. In Chapter 6, I adopt a most-similar systems 
design to explore how international norms influence actors in the ongoing civil war in 
Somalia. I explore the causal mechanisms at work by consulting official statements and 
published secondary material on the groups involved, as well as original interviews 
conducted with representatives of the Somaliland government. In this case, I find that a 
theory of legitimacy constraints helps explain the behavior of the Somali National 
Movement (Somaliland) when compared to other active armed groups like the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (Puntland), Al-Shabaab insurgents, and other parties to the 
conflict.  
 Chapter 7 outlines my use of a most-different systems design, comparing the 
limitations of international norms to change the behavior of FARC in Colombia and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Both rebellions, while near opposites in most aspects, enjoy 
strong incentives to maintain the conflict status quo. Both groups have poor track records 
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regarding child protection, while at the same time enjoy the gains of active involvement 
in the illicit economies of their respective regions. This chapter explores how concerns 
about international legitimacy are minimal in these cases, and, therefore, legitimacy 
constraints are ineffectual in altering motivations and action.  
The final case study is a thorough exploration of why one high profile separatist 
group, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, failed to adhere to international norms. 
In this deviant case analysis, I uncover the motivations of the SPLM leadership and more 
accurately characterize their goals and tactics for victory. Here, too, I rely on first-hand 
interviews with the South Sudanese Ambassador to the EU and Belgium. The case 
research is supplemented with secondary source material.  
In the final chapter, I provide a summary of the conclusions implied by my 
research. Concerns for international legitimacy can constrain behavior. Child soldier use 
is near-universally condemned throughout the world. Therefore, those actors that wish to 
become part of the global community will be more likely to show restraint. 
Consequently, IOs and major powers can justify a carrot-based approach to conflict 
resolution and target certain groups with incentives. This is dependent on the group's 
characteristics and their ultimate goals.  
   
 
 
23
Rebel Use of Child Soldiers 1998-2008
Single Rebellion- No/ Little Evidence
Single Rebellion- CS use
2+ Rebellions- No/Little Evidence
2+ Rebellions- Mixed CS use
2+ Rebellions- CS use
No Active Rebellions
Figure 1: Rebel Use of Child Soldiers 1998-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map generated using Stata: Statistical Analysis Software version 11. 
C
opyright ©
Trace C
ody Lasley 2012
 24 
Chapter Two: 
Historical and Scholarly Background 
2.1 Introduction 
The topic of child soldiers is explored in many fields, but the empirical literature 
with the goal of proposing a causal relationship is still in its infancy. Drawing mostly 
from case studies and anecdotal evidence, social work and education policy researchers 
have explored the developmental problems that come about as a result of participation 
(Kimmel and Roby, 2007)  Somasundaram 2002; Volker 2002). This work examines the 
problem as a human rights issue. Children recruited into armed forces are denied the right 
to life, education, economic development, and protection recognized by the international 
community (McMahan 2010). Child soldiers also prove very difficult to rehabilitate, 
making renewed conflict more likely (Odeh and Sullivan 2004).  Having unemployed 
former-combatants raises serious concerns about instability and the renewal of violence 
(Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2002). Former child combatants who have few other skills 
are perhaps more at risk because they also lack the social networks to provide basic 
necessities, leading to an especially large pool of desperate fighters. Beyond these 
fundamentals, causal stories represent a new and very important step in the study of child 
soldiers.  
In this chapter, I present the building blocks of my theory by reviewing the 
literature in four main categories. First, I discuss the evolution of child protection 
throughout history. This section establishes children's rights as one important influential 
norm governing combatant behavior.  This is followed by a thorough exploration of the 
recent research on child soldier use. I go on to ground the current study within the wider 
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area of civilian abuse. This is followed by a discussion of the importance of international 
norms as an influence on political behavior. Finally, I offer a brief history of international 
state-recognition beginning with the American Revolution and the diplomatic efforts that 
accompanied recognition. With these building blocks, I lead into the next chapter where I 
propose a theory of constrained behavior.  
 
2.2 Establishing Children's Rights as an International Norm 
In the absence of global governance international norms help shape expectations 
of state behavior. For example, military intervention is increasingly used in dealing with 
humanitarian disasters even where there is no evident political interest other than a stated 
commitment to humanitarian norms (Finnemore 1996). Further, the non-use of nuclear 
weapons after World War II regardless of the military value is indicative of a view of 
appropriate actions not grounded in military victory (Tannenwald 1999). Norms are 
established through a three-stage process. First, they emerge after the principles are 
championed by norm entrepreneurs who hold strong views about desirable behavior in 
their community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Second, a cascading process takes place 
whereby these ideas are institutionalized through international rules and adopted by 
important states. Finally, internalization occurs where norm come to represent the 
environment, the social reality in which state actors operate. They signal to states how 
they are supposed to act and states use compliant behavior to signal they are doing so 
(Hyde 2011).  The norm against child soldier use has gone through these stages and now 
represents an established principle of appropriate behavior. The process of establishing 
children's rights took nearly 70 years, but as the millennium approached, child protection 
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norms, including proclamations against child recruitment, were established and entered 
the cascading process as many legal agreements entrenched expectations and provided 
strong social incentives for compliance. Since the turn of the century, child protection is 
accepted by nearly all states. Nested within the larger notion of child protection, the norm 
against child soldier use is an established, accepted, and internalized norm.  
 
Stage 1: Norm Emergence 
The process by which child protection became an international norm was slow at 
first with large gaps between events. The notion of children's rights is an altogether recent 
phenomenon. Child abuse laws did not even exist in the US until after 1874. When such 
cases were tried in court the crime was cruelty to animals (Simmons 2009). In the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, legislation began to appear in national constitutions, but it 
tended to be more ideological rather than practical. The first major international effort 
was the foundation of Save the Children in England in 1919. It began as an attempt to 
ease the suffering of children caught in the Blockade of Berlin in World War I and, in 
general, the war orphans that might otherwise have been neglected. The second major 
development was the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924). This 
document was rhetorically substantial, especially for the time, but it still did not offer 
clear obligations or guidelines on how states needed to act. In 1946, the United Nations 
founded the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) as an inter-
governmental institution devoted to child welfare. It was the most important global 
institution for children's issues up to that point. The UN Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child in 1959 defined children rights to protection, education, healthcare, shelter, and 
nutrition. However, it did not explicitly define what a child was. While this seems like a 
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simple fix, the definition of a child still poses a problem when determining international 
obligations -a topic to which I will return in Chapter 4. The important point is that 
establishing children's rights was a gradual process (Simmons 2009). 
In the mid-1980s, the norm reached a tipping point with the concentrated effort of 
norm entrepreneurs within UNICEF. 1979 marked the International Year of the Child. 
The Polish delegation to the UN proposed a new, more substantial agreement that would 
offer clear support to children's rights. Throughout the early 1980s, their effort met with 
typical Cold War resistance wherein the US worried about the document being too 
specific, and the Eastern Powers worried that it was too vague in terms of state 
obligations (Oestreich 2007). The proposal languished until a concentrated effort by norm 
entrepreneurs. Individual agents within the NGO community strongly believed in the 
need for child protection to be recognized in specific UN provisions. They tapped into 
their professional relationship with UNICEF to take their goals to the international arena. 
Marjorie Newman-Black was a mid-level staffer with UNICEF and was an early "true 
believer" in the push for child rights. She succeeded in convincing the Executive 
Director, James Grant, to support the rights-based approach to child advocacy. Prior to 
this, UNICEF had been responsible for child development through provisions of 
healthcare and education. By the mid-1980s, Grant was thoroughly convinced that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was a proposed expansion to the 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, was worth fighting for. The organization had been 
reluctant to politicize their operations, and risk tarnishing their image as one of the most 
highly visible and trusted UN organization (Oestreich 2007).  However, Grant was 
convinced that the CRC conformed to the mission and values of UNICEF and began a 
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strong public relations push. His initial drive included printing handbooks on child rights 
to be distributed to all UNICEF field offices around the world (Smyke 1990). He also met 
with senior government officials for a number of states throughout 1987-1988. Grant was 
an individual norm entrepreneur that used the organizational resources of UNICEF to 
bring the norm of child rights to the center stage. He pushed for universal ratification of 
the CRC and in 1989, he largely succeeded.  
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) offered a substantial break with 
past efforts. As a superficial comparison, The Declaration on the Rights of the Child 
(1954) consisted of 10 principles and contained about 800 words. The CRC outlines 54 
principles and is approximately 8000 words in length. The main ideas include protection 
from punishment based on parent's beliefs, maintaining the best interests of the child, 
recognizing civil rights and obligating states to maintain a standard of living. Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998) recognize that after norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical 
mass of states to become norm leaders, the norm reaches a tipping point from which it 
becomes part of the international cultural-institutionalist context. The CRC is the most 
widely adopted HR convention with 192 parties and 140 signatories (Simmons 2009: 
312).8 After 1989, a cascade of child protection agreements and reports were completed. 
As a result, it is fair to characterize 1989 as the tipping point, after which, child 
protection entered stage 2 in the life cycle, acceptance.  
 
Stage 2: Norm Acceptance 
                                                 
8 All UN members except South Sudan, Somalia and the United States have ratified the CRC.  
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After the passage of the UN CRC, international child protection entered a phase 
where support was strong enough that countries began adopting a rapid succession of 
new mechanisms by which children's rights were secured. The African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) was passed by the Organization of African 
Unity in 1990, and later readopted by the African Union (AU) in 1999. This document 
was designed to address issues not covered in the CRC that are particularly problematic 
for children in Africa. For example, the document prohibited child marriages, and offered 
protection to children in IDP and refugee camps. The ACRWC fixed the age of a child as 
any person under 18 years old. This is important because while the CRC defines children 
as less than 18, child soldiers are persons under the age of 15. Thus, Africa was more 
consistent with its definition of a child than was the UN. The World Declaration on the 
Survival, Protection and Development of Children, passed in September 1990 as part of 
the World Summit for Children. This NGO agreement included 10-point program for 
improving the lives of children around the world. The year 1996 saw the release of Graça 
Machel's landmark report on the plight of children in armed conflict. The UN General 
Assembly unanimously welcomed the report and consistently uses its recommendations 
on new provisions addressing children's rights. At this time, the UN also established the 
position of "Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict" (UNGA A/62/228 2007: 15). In 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
adopted the Rome Statute. This document reiterated the CRC's proscription against child 
recruitment under the age of 15. Convention 182 of the International Labor Organization 
targeted the "worst forms of child labor" which included prostitution, drug trafficking and 
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slavery. Among these practices, child soldiering was also expressly forbidden. In this 
document, anyone under the age of 18 was considered a child.  
At the close of the century, legal provisions against child soldiering entered into 
force. A series of UN Security Council Resolutions, beginning with 1261 in 1999, 
promoted a strong monitoring, reporting and compliance framework to enforce 
provisions against child soldiering. Resolution 1314 (2000) proposed including child 
protection staff in field operations and allocated specific resources for the benefit of 
children. Resolution 1379 empowered the Secretary General to list violators and 1612 
(2000) enhanced his monitoring powers. Children's issues began to be reflected in peace 
negotiations, including the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Lome Peace 
Agreement (1999). The next major milestone took place in 2001 and represents the height 
of the norm against child recruitment.  
The Optional Protocol on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
(OPCAC) was a concentrated effort to narrow the CRC to the specific problem of child 
soldiers. This was the second major UN-wide child rights treaty since the CRC in 1989. 
While the CRC addressed the issue of child recruitment, OPCAC was more focused on 
the issues involving children in conflict conditions. Importantly, this agreement raised the 
age limit of child recruitment from 15, in the CRC, to 18. This change is not surprising 
because in the CRC, a child is defined as anyone less than 18 years old. Thus, OPCAC 
simply adjusts the age of child soldiers to conform to the general definition of a child. 
The optional protocol was more slowly ratified, but it has increased its signatories 
considerably in recent years. By 2012, 142 parties had signed and 119 of these had fully 
ratified the agreement.  
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At this point in the discussion, three things should be clear. Child soldiering was 
increasingly becoming identified as problematic and worthy of targeted action. Second, 
debate on the definition of a child soldier centered on the 15/18 age-threshold but this did 
not inhibit widespread eradication efforts for child recruitment. Third and perhaps most 
importantly, child protection was, at this time, widely accepted and embodied in 
numerous IO conventions, declarations, and provisions. Thus, these documents represent 
norm acceptance in the international community. While some issues remained, child 
rights, and the norm against child soldiering was the very widely accepted. Therefore, the 
norm of child protection has been internalized, the final stage in the norm life cycle.  
 
Stage 3: Norm Internalization 
Empirical evidence suggests states have internalized the norms respecting the 
rights of children. Simmons (2009) tests the impact of ratification of the CRC and 
OPCAC on behavior towards children. First, she finds that child protection efforts tend to 
be stronger than obligations towards children. Thus, she finds statistically significant 
reduction in child labor rates, but fails to find robust improvement in the proportion of 
children immunized against measles and diptheria-pertussis-tetanus. However, national 
recruitment laws, nested within child protection norms, improved noticeably. Controlling 
for a several factors that might explain changes towards child soldiering, Simmons finds 
statistically significant improvement. The legal minimum age for joining the military, for 
conscription, and for combat all improve after ratification of the OPCAC. This suggests 
that not only do ratifiers take their signatures seriously, but in the realm of child 
 32 
recruitment states are internalizing the norms contained in the multitude of child 
protection documents.  
Rules, codified into law, make this internalization possible. They clarify the norm 
by outlining ever more precise definitions and identify not only what constitutes 
violation, but what the consequences are. In March 2006, former President Charles 
Taylor was indicted for war crimes. The charges included the use of child soldiers under 
the age of 15. One month later, the Secretary General's monitoring group in Sudan 
recommended further investigation into state support for the recruitment of children 
(Chikukwa 2010: 49). As will be argued in the next chapter, such high-profile incidents 
also send signals of appropriateness to non-state actors.  
 
Summary 
 The norm against child soldier use has been clearly established. Through a slow 
process beginning with child-targeted development and culminating in the most 
universally accepted human rights treaty, states accept that children have rights as a 
specific group. Child soldiering is included within this framework. The debate is settled; 
states should not use them. This suggests clear signals of appropriateness are being sent. 
States know how they are supposed to act. In the next chapter, I argue that non-state 
actors are also receiving these signals. A particular subset, those driving to establish their 
own independent state, is particularly receptive to these signals.   
 
2.3 Explanations for child soldier use 
Systemic Influences (Opportunity/Supply) 
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Recent empirical literature generally falls into one of two categories: supply-side 
theories and demand-side theories. Supply-side theories emphasize the number of 
children vulnerable to conscription and volunteerism. Goodwin-Gill and Cohn (1994), for 
example, propose that poverty levels account for the number of children able to be 
employed by hostile parties. Høiskar (2001) contends that a pool of unemployed children 
leads to high levels of volunteerism among youths. The same economic conditions that 
drive child “volunteers” may perpetuate their use by destroying the productive capacities 
of a state, further reducing alternative employment opportunities. Conflict itself can drive 
the use of child soldiers in other ways. War-orphans, lacking parental guidance or 
seeking a sense of belonging, are susceptible to the enticing rewards of life as a rebel 
(Brett and McCallin 1998). Likewise, Achvarina and Reich (2006) propose that the 
concentration of vulnerable children in unsecured refugee and internally displaced 
persons (IDP) camps make attractive and easy targets for recruiters. Instead of raiding a 
village to take a small number of recruits, rebels will target the large pool of potential 
fighters available at vulnerable locations. They find evidence that the number of refugees 
in a country is linked to a higher ratio of children to adults engaged in combat. This 
research identifies the structural factors driving child soldier rates. While fundamentally 
important for the phenomenon generally, the current project is more concerned with 
children in conflict conditions where systemic factors like poverty and vulnerability are 
largely invariant. I set aside this conception and control for structural influences 
empirically. It is therefore important to consider the other side of the equation.  
 
Recruitment Decisions (Demand) 
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Demand-side theories revolve around the decisions of leaders and how they 
evaluate troop capabilities. Singer (2005) explains the recent proliferation of children in 
combat by looking at the post-Cold War boom in availability of child friendly weapons as 
well as the nature of guerrilla warfare. Children are valuable because of a narrowing 
capabilities-gap with adults. The proliferation in recent years of light, child-friendly 
weapons, like the AK-47, can partially account for the rise in child soldier occurrence 
worldwide. Unlike past conflicts, children now possess many of the same combat 
capabilities as their adult counterparts, but are cheaper to feed and house, are easier to 
manipulate, and their loyalty is less-costly to maintain.9 One counter-argument is that 
child soldiers are often not armed with conventional weapons of war. Instead, knives and 
machetes are used in combat. Child-friendly arms, then, may not explain proliferation in 
all areas. For example, the Arrow Boys in South Sudan and Uganda are locally-organized 
militias of youths armed with bows, arrows, and spears that allow them to defend 
themselves against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Thus, child soldiering must 
reflect more than just child capabilities, such as how this factor is internally processed by 
the commanders.  
By most accounts, children are cheaper to use than adult soldiers. They are easier 
to recruit because they often have fewer social ties and familial responsibilities than 
adults. Not only does this make them easier to recruit in the first place, but it also 
facilitates cheaper maintenance costs over adult soldiers. They require fewer resources to 
keep happy than adults who are likely sending the money back to their families. Orphans 
                                                 
9 The idea that “new civil wars” are somehow different than “old civil wars” is questioned by Kalyvas 
(2001). He maintains that the distinction does not withstand empirical scrutiny. The use of child soldiers in 
many conflicts from the American Civil War through World War II leads to doubt about a fundamental 
change in child capabilities.  
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are attractive recruits for the same reason. Without an active kinship network maintaining 
protection, orphaned children become easy prey. This reduced expenditure is valuable 
when an organizer needs to amass a number of troops quickly and cost-effectively. The 
social network necessary to build a committed and disciplined fighting force takes time. 
Collier (2000) introduces the concept of an entrance threshold that many would-be 
rebellions fail to meet. Using children allows recruiters to quickly field enough troops to 
meet this threshold, or to at least be taken seriously as a credible threat to the 
government.  
Paradoxically, one reason children are often targeted in the first place is because 
they are easier to subdue and less likely to fight back. Thus, while they can swell the 
ranks, their quality in the line of fire is often in doubt. The overall cost to use child 
soldiers is low, however, so are their capabilities. Beber and Blattman (2010) maintain 
that especially young children, though targeted, are often released shortly thereafter. Only 
after a trial period are youngsters armed, and even then it appears that adolescents are 
often the real prize. The aims of the group, therefore, determine how many are needed 
and to what task they will be put. Child soldiers are efficient when rebel leaders are 
concerned with bolstering the numbers of guns they can put in the field (Andvig and 
Gates 2010). Children are cheaper to recruit than adults and easier to exclude from the 
spoils of war. They are also less costly to maintain because they quickly build group 
bonds and are less likely to defect. But their skills in combat are somewhat limited. 
Commanders will weigh the costs and benefits of recruiting adults versus children. In 
some contexts, adult recruits may prove too costly to use and children too cheap to 
ignore. Where the cost of using children is low, due to poverty, dislocation, insecurity, 
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etc., armies will augment their forces with children, especially in the face of financial 
limitations. Such explanations focus primarily on the short-term costs associated with 
using child soldiers. 
Both theoretical perspectives, supply and demand, likely determine the number of 
child soldiers used. In situations of excess demand, supply determines the ratio (Andvig 
and Gates 2010). For example, in the final days of the Nazi-regime, military leaders 
recruited children en masse because there were so few adults available for military 
service. The same was true with the Confederacy in the American Civil War. If children 
are forcibly recruited, this indicates a situation of constraints resulting from capital 
shortages, duration, or high intensity. Alternatively, where high numbers of children are 
available, however, characteristics within the group determine the ratio. In these excess-
supply conditions the leadership determines how many children will be used and the 
manner of their service. If children are compelled to volunteer, the leadership determines 
some expected benefit. However, if there are a high number of adult volunteers, 
recruitment will be highly selective, forced recruitment is not needed, and child soldiers 
will not be used in large numbers (90). 
As an extension of the demand-side explanations of child soldiering, my theory 
takes into account international norms as an additional factor governing rebel decisions. 
Separatists, non-separatists, and opportunistic rebellions represent three types of groups 
that evaluate the usefulness of child soldiering differently. For separatists, the costs far 
outweigh the benefits. For opportunists, the reduced capability is of little concern. In the 
next section, I continue to explore the literature governing behavior during armed conflict 
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by looking at civilian abuse more generally. This discussion will allow us to better nest 
child recruitment in the larger literature of human rights violations during times of war.  
 
2.4 Explanations for Civilian Abuse 
Using child soldiers is a form of civilian abuse. While academic coverage of the 
issue of child soldiers is relatively new, scholars have explored the general issue of 
civilian abuse quite expansively. This literature focuses on elite decisions about when to 
abuse and when to refrain. It suggests that while in some cases decisions to defy 
international (and local) norms are made by the individual, generalizable theory should 
focus on the leaders. One set of explanatory factors of civilian abuse focuses on group 
characteristics, with unit discipline identified as the strongest factor (Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2006). This position reinforces the idea that many rebel leaders do not want 
their troops to abuse civilians because it is costly in the long run. A second line of inquiry 
suggests that international institutions, both formal and informal, can influence when 
civilians will be abused by offering incentives and disincentives for combatants. These 
trends in the literature, internal and system-level explanations, serve as a guide to the 
study of child soldiers.  
 
Internal Explanations 
 One consensus in this literature is the power of internal group characteristics to 
influence behavior. Within an organization, decisions must be made that reconcile or 
coordinate the group’s objectives with those of the individual fighter. These are not 
always the same. For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) explore the level of 
civilian abuse by combatants in Sierra Leone’s civil war. They find that many rebel 
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leaders, even those within the infamous RUF, did not always want to pillage and plunder. 
In purely pragmatic terms, it may cost them supply bases and future support (Valentino, 
Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Where discipline can be maintained, violence will be 
less common than where violations go unpunished (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). 
Rebels may also avoid civilian abuse for fear of damaging the productive capacity of 
their areas of operation (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002). Some groups will even go as far as 
providing local public goods to enhance their areas (Lichbach 1994; Wickham-Crowley 
1992). 
The environment may also affect levels of civilian abuse. There are two 
conflicting approaches to this view. Particularly wealthy areas may be seen as valuable 
and therefore witness high contestation and thus greater collateral damage among civilian 
populations (Ross 2004b). At the same time, Gates (2002) argues that rebels may avoid 
recruiting in contested areas because those troops are more likely to defect, with 
conscription and other violence more likely to occur outside of these places. Competing 
interests between leadership and the rank and file may also result from these 
environmental features. Groups can become inundated with opportunists that are unlikely 
to consider the overall aims and motivations of the rebellion. These elements feel they 
can benefit financially from the continued conflict (Dishman 2001). This situation most 
likely occurs when short-term rewards are offered for joining the rebellion (Weinstein 
2005; Cornell 2005).  
Taken together, internal explanations of civilian abuse can be extended to the 
study of child soldier at least three ways. First, child soldiering should be more (or less) 
common when either the rebel leadership or the rank-and-file have strong incentives to 
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do so. Second, wealth can also play a role in leadership decisions and decisions from the 
lower ranks. Finally, it is also valuable to consider monitoring and discipline problem 
when trying to explain child soldiering.  
 
Systemic Explanations 
 Treaties that aim to curb civilian abuse may be effective for a number of reasons. 
First, treaty signing is a deliberative process. States often go to great lengths to carefully 
consider the consequences of signing international agreements. Therefore, they will likely 
adhere to civilian protection because it is legitimate long before the agreement is signed 
(Franck 1990). Second, international social pressure can also be conducive to protection 
(Lipson 1991). Targeting civilians may be militarily prudent, but will bear long-term 
consequences. Action today may make it difficult to maintain the prohibition in the 
future. Reputation is linked to action in conflict. Being seen as an abuser of civilians may 
allow other state actors to doubt your commitment to international law. Finally, 
agreements can clarify what cooperation means by explicitly spelling out appropriate 
behavior. Treaties can coordinate action and identify punishment for abrogation (Chayes 
and Chayes 1993).  
These external factors influencing civilian abuse might also affect child soldiering 
among non-state actors as well. Rebel groups cannot sign treaties, but this does not stop 
them from considering their implications. For example, one Italian NGO advised the 
leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan to sign a plethora of human rights treaties. The signature 
was not binding, but the act of offering support would, following careful consideration of 
the implications would signal commitment to international standards. Second, as argued 
in the next chapter, if international signals are felt by non-state actors, and human rights 
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commitments instill pressure for action or restraint, some non-state actors might also be 
constrained. Third, that reputation is influential even in matters of security, suggests that 
even where giving weapons to children can inflict damage, it may not be worth the social 
costs. Finally, when child soldiering was codified in agreements such as the CRC, 
OPCAC and various other agreements, this offered clear proscriptions on appropriate 
behavior.  
Both internal and systemic-level explanations of civilian abuse can be used to 
identify the areas of study to consider for the current project investigating child soldiers. 
Incentives and discipline should be explored to determine when and how child soldiering 
is valuable. At the same time, international treaties and social pressure should be 
considered as additional costs associated with rebel behavior.  
 
2.5 Changes in Recognition Policy 
Secession is a different kind of rebellion. Fundamentally, the goals of 
secessionists are long-term. They cannot win without receiving recognition by the 
international community. Unfortunately, the process of state recognition is inconsistent 
and is constantly evolving. Stated criteria for statehood are often cited, but seldom used 
as explicit rules governing independence. Further, stated principles are often at odds with 
one another with little clarification or determinacy from major powers. Thus, those 
seeking recognition can look to the past for inspiration that independence can be 
achieved, but must be thoroughly grounded in the international sentiment of the present 
for the clues about what will help their claims win support.  
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Before the mid-18th century, recognition was not really an international relations 
concept. Statehood was largely a domestic issue. To the extent that international actors 
recognized states, this act was either illegal (partition or annexation) or unnecessary 
(dominant de facto principle) (Crawford 2006). This conforms to the declaratory theory 
of state recognition, whereby new states are formed regardless of the position adopted by 
existing states. Conversely, the constitutive theory posits that statehood depends on the 
acceptance of contemporary states. Here, existing states determine who will enjoy the 
rights and duties of equal international actors. Despite some debate to the contrary (e.g., 
Crawford 2006), state recognition since around the American Revolution has been 
constitutive in practice. That is, states must have the political support, through 
recognition, of their would-be peers before they can enjoy the legal status of statehood. 
This position did not occur quickly. Instead, it evolved; it ebbed and flowed through 
decades of international relations.  In this section, I will recount the recognition policies 
practiced by the international community beginning with the American Revolution. 
Generally speaking, five distinct periods exist. They are summarized in Figure 2.  
--Figure 2 here-- 
 
US Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (Dynastic Principle) 
Up to the early 1800s, international state recognition followed a dynastic 
tradition. The creation of states was resisted if it represented a threat to the established 
order of the divine right of kings. Around the time of the American Revolution, liberal 
philosophical traditions began to challenge such received wisdom. US independence was 
achieved through force and diplomatic wherewithal. However, it was ultimately the 
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relinquishment of power by the British that led to wider European recognition. Non-
monarchies had existed in the past and acceptance of American claims did not threaten 
dynastic rule in Europe. Conversely, the new states created in the wake of Napoleonic 
expansion had been carved out of existing monarchies and were thus deemed illegitimate. 
At the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), organized to determine the post-war political 
arrangement, the Napoleonic satellites states were absorbed by larger states. Recognition 
of the United States was slow, but not collectively resisted by the international 
community. The French Revolution, on the other hand, was seen as a threat to dynastic 
order. Thus, before and after American independence, the international community 
maintained a policy of dynastic legitimacy regarding state recognition. At this point, 
however, a new policy built on demonstration of control was gaining ground and would 
lead to a shift in international behavior towards new states.  
 
Central American and Latin American Decolonization (De Facto Recognition) 
The transition from dynastic legitimacy to the principle of de facto recognition 
was swift. After 1815, colonies in Central and Latin American began calling for 
independence. While dynasticism remained a concern and major powers were at first 
reluctant to recognize these new states, they did so because of the facts on the ground. 
This move was led by the US and Great Britain. Both maintained a non-interventionist 
policy, but the British felt duty-bound to mediate. The US maintained rhetorical support 
until the British led the way. Also, at this time the concept of uti posseditis juris (“as you 
possess, so you may possess”) was established. This would later become very important 
as a justification for maintaining the arbitrary colonial boundaries in Africa. In Latin 
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America, new states that demonstrated their ability to obtain and maintain control over 
previously recognized colonial holdings were entitled to recognition.  
Cases from this period also reveal that recognition policies as practiced by the 
global community as a whole can change quickly. The policy of dynastic legitimacy was 
maintained in 1814-1815, but even during this reiteration of policy, twelve new states 
were formed against established European monarchs between 1810 and 1830. Thus, 
while the international system currently seems closed to unilateral secession, this policy 
may give way abruptly in favor of a return to a de facto recognition policy or one of more 
significant conditionality.  
While not always consistent, the new status quo of de facto statehood established 
by the US and Britain in Latin America represented the established norm before World 
War I.  Both Belgian independence and the reunification of Italy and Germany took place 
amid both reticence and fractured support throughout Europe. In the case of Italian 
unification, Russia and France were opposed, as were the German states. However, 
Britain led the drive for recognition because, even though they too opposed unification, it 
was preferable to constant war. Sardinia, Central, and Southern Italy joined together after 
Great Britain (1861), Russia (1862), and later Austria (1866) formally recognized the 
state of Italy. German unification was an even better example of de facto recognition. 
There was considerable disagreement as to the character of the union. The major states of 
Prussia and Austria forced the shrinkage of Denmark and annexed Alsace Lorraine from 
France. Britain, Russia, and, of course, France resisted these acquisitions, but lamented 
because the unified Germany maintained effective control of the occupied territories. A 
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major power response failed to materialize, and they begrudgingly conferred 
independence.   
 The breakup of the Ottoman Empire proceeded similarly to central and southern 
European unification. When Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro declared 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, the first response was to maintain the status 
quo. However, a weakened empire unable to hold onto its territory would destabilize the 
region. Therefore, recognition proceeded with a mix of demonstrated control and 
conditionality whereby recognition was granted only after the applicant met additional 
overt and covert requirements. The Treaty of San Stefano recognized Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Romania. In 1822, Greece declared independence and the major powers 
initially failed to support it. However, after promises to establish a monarchy and a 
concerted diplomatic effort to individual states, Greece was recognized in 1827 with the 
Treaty of London. After the events in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, recognition 
in the 19th century maintained a unifying theme: the system determines new states; the 
new states do not determine the system (Fabry 2010: 84). 
State recognition in 19th Century Europe provides a solid foundation for the 
argument presented in the next chapter. First, claimants made appeals for recognition on 
various grounds. However, their reassurances were made in terms that the major powers 
would find appealing. For example, Belgium appealed for support by reminding the 
European powers that it had an established monarchy. Greece did the same by promising 
to establish a monarchy. This is not unlike earlier efforts by Brazil where the election of 
the king of Portugal's son to the "Emperor of Brazil" indicated their efforts to show 
commitment to the international order of the day, which was dynastic legitimacy. Thus, 
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while the new states were breaking with the status quo of territorial integrity and the 
recognition system was one of de facto statehood, the behavior of those desiring 
independence were made in the language of legitimacy at that time. This reiterates the 
notion that the international system governs new state formation.   
 
World War I - Post-World War II (Conditionality) 
The end of World War I witnessed the introduction of the ground-breaking 
concept of self-determination and immediately exposed the inherent problems contained 
in it. A mere claim of self-determination does not determine who qualifies for the right, 
how to verify it, or what obligations are owed once the right is established. After World 
War I, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed, and German territorial 
acquisitions dispersed. A number of new states declared independence under Wilsonian 
self-determination. At the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the principle was largely 
upheld, but pragmatism was firmly in place. Full control in an ethnically heterogeneous 
conflict zone is practically impossible. This was evident in the boundary delimitation 
talks, which ultimately acknowledged previous boundaries, leaving many minority 
groups in states to which they did not want to be joined. The lasting legacy of the 
conference was a respect for territorial integrity (uti posseditis juris). The new rhetoric of 
self-determination was vague and served to morally ground secessionist movements, 
while arresting international political will.  
The right to self-determination has repeatedly come into conflict with the idea of 
territorial integrity. With 141 new states being recognized since 1945, both policies can 
easily be characterized as inconsistent. Hannum (2005) makes it clear that while the 
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official policy that independence should be denied has not wavered, the nature of state 
formation is such that mixed signals have been sent time and again. Namely, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, especially the case of Yugoslavia, when coupled with 
rhetoric concerning human, minority, and indigenous rights and representations, can be 
seen as support for statehood if under legitimate claims. Furthermore, as Fabry (2010) 
points out, separatists are more likely persuaded by paragraph 2 of UNGA Resolution 
1514 proclaiming the right of all peoples to self-determination than by paragraph 6, 
which establishes the right of territorial integrity (224). Biafra, in 1966, was not 
dissuaded by the UN-backed defeat of Katanga in 1963. Bangladesh was not dissuaded 
by Biafra's failure to achieve statehood. Cabinda, Abkhazia, Chechnya, etc., are no more 
likely to be restrained by the post-decolonization norm of territorial integrity than were 
their predecessors fighting for independence.10  
The Stimson Doctrine practiced by the US and followed by the League of 
Nations, reinforced non-recognition of independence or acquisition by conquest. It was 
used in condemning the Japanese-led formation of Manchukuo (Manchuria). It also 
reinforced international rule of law (an illegality cannot become a source of legal right). 
However, when combined with a right of self-determination, it often only served to drag 
out hostility, uncertainty, and strife. During this transition phase from de facto 
recognition to one based on international legitimacy, many unrealized aspirations were 
born. Non-recognition was the legal norm, but self-determination was the growing 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, in my personal interviews with representatives of Somaliland, they routinely assured me 
that their claims were rooted in the principle of territorial integrity and decolonization rather than purely 
self-determination. Somaliland existed as a separate colony from Somalia and achieved independence for 
five days before joining the new Somali Republic. The idea that their claims are in line with all 
international principles including respecting colonial borders is also found in the official "Case for 
Somaliland's International Recognition as an Independence State" published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
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rhetorical shield behind which new claims to statehood hid. Depending on which side of 
the struggle one was on, they could find a legal backing as a source of their legitimacy. 
This period is characterized by the introduction of conditionality. Prospective 
states had to demonstrate that not only could they acquire territory, but the claimants had 
to convince specific international institutions that it was administratively competent. The 
Middle East and former Ottoman Empire territories were marked for phased 
independence. However, the League of Nations, through the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, established the rules and procedures to which new states were subjected 
before they would be recognized. Even when Britain, in its role as host country, 
suggested Iraq be recognized, the League said they were not ready, and denied 
independence. This condition of capability continued through Israeli independence. Only 
after demonstrating its ability to maintain security against aggressive Arab neighbors did 
it receive widespread recognition in 1958 despite having declared it in 1948.  
During this time, recognition was a mix of practical realities on the ground and a 
balance of power among the major states. Thus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia 
gained recognition based on the "norms of international society," while independence 
claims by the Caucasian Republics were ignored and reoccupied by Soviet Russia (Fabry 
2010: 123). Immediately after World War II, recognition policy followed a conditional 
interpretation of self-determination. By this time, however, colonialism had been 
completely discredited. Falling back on self-determination, drives for independence 
sprang up around the world. This marked the beginning of normative international 
recognition policy. 
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Decolonization (Legitimist Principle) 
This era of conditionality was brief. By the 1960s, with colonialism thoroughly 
discredited, independence claims were legitimized by the mere status of being colonies. 
With the principle of self-determination as a backdrop, states were quickly recognized 
without meeting any viability or capability benchmarks. The only states deemed 
legitimate were those marked as non-self-governing entities or trust territories at the 
foundation of the UN. Thus, ethno-nationalist groups championing independence on the 
grounds of self-determination were said to be illegitimate and the international 
community denied their claims. Only current colonies had a legitimate right of self-
determination. Though, once again, the practice of uti posseditis juris meant that the 
colonial boundaries would become the new state boundaries regardless of ethnic 
composition of the country.  
Fabry (2010) calls this the new "dynastic legitimacy." In other words, prior to US 
independence and remaining a concern up to WWI, monarchism was the order of the day, 
and claims to independence were filtered through this informal test of legitimacy. Under 
decolonization, claims were legitimate if they were former colonies. They were 
illegitimate even if they maintained de facto statehood, met conditionalities, or had 
compelling claims of self-determination. In the end, a right of self-determination was the 
large print. The fine print was that only previously identified dependencies had a 
legitimate claim to self-determination. In reality, it was harder for people to gain self-
determination than before the phrase was coined (169). 
This provides evidence for the legitimacy argument presented in the next chapter. 
Although the terms of legitimacy changed, the idea that only legitimate claims will be 
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honored is evident throughout 1960-1991. Katanga and Biafra were denied recognition 
because they were not former colonies. Rhodesia was not recognized because the 
minority-led government did not meet the spirit of decolonization. It went against 
international opinion as espoused by the UN General Assembly (now swelled by former 
colonies). In the mid 1970s and early 80s several states within South Africa declared 
independence. These Bantustans are illustrative because even though South Africa 
recognized their independence claims, they were isolated internationally because the 
global consensus believed this to be a ploy to maintain apartheid. Lest arguments about 
puppetry win the day, it is worth pointing out that one of the Bantustans, the Republic of 
Transkei, broke diplomatic ties with South Africa after a row over labor conditions in the 
Rand mines.  
 
Post-Cold War Period 
In the post Cold War period that saw the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), state recognition continued with the established principles of uti posseditis juris 
and legitimization, but included a mix of conditionality and pragmatism by the 
international community. While some commentators thought the recognition process after 
the Cold War was the birth of a new qualified right to unilateral secession, Fabry (2010) 
contends that it merely solidified the norms of international legitimacy settled in the 60s 
and 70s. New states needed the host sovereign's consent, and uti posseditis juris was 
maintained. The USSR fits this contention, but the non-consent of SFRY was justified by 
saying that government ceased to function. There was no one with which to negotiate. 
The continued decline of the de facto principle was coupled with a return to 
conditionality. The Guidelines On Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
 50 
Soviet Union (1991) were the first written conditions since the short-lived Permanent 
Mandate Commission (1931). In principle, they upheld democratic governance, human 
and minority rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and other concerns championed by the 
international community.11 In practice, these conditions were inconsistently applied, 
though not altogether unimportant.  
Once again, a legitimist principle built largely around uti posseditis juris was 
maintained. Juridical and administrative borders were sacrosanct. Republics' claims were 
heard, while sub-republics, like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the 
various Serbian Republics, were not. This reinforced the claim that self-determination is 
not a universal positive right. Fearing the setting of precedent and the creation of new 
ethnic minorities with their own claims, the international community refused to hear the 
claims of self-determination by illegitimate parties (i.e. sub-republics). However, targeted 
application of "legitimacy" resulted in the conflict that the major powers tried to avoid. 
Minority groups in the new states fought for independence despite uti posseditis juris. 
This reached such a zenith that Kosovo, an unrecognized sub-republic, turned into a 
humanitarian disaster for over 8 years that ultimately required NATO intervention to 
resolve. After everything, Kosovo was recognized after the European Community and the 
US conferred legitimacy based on humanitarian concerns. The major powers made it 
clear this was not a change in the official policy against secession. Of course, Russia 
quickly said the same thing about its prior recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.12   
                                                 
11 Non-proliferation is one very clear international norm that applied to former Soviet Satellites seeking 
statehood. Like child soldier use, this norm is accepted and internalized. Unlike child soldiers however, 
most groups seeking independence do not have nuclear capabilities.   
12 South Ossetia has since been recognized by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu. Abkhazia adds 
Vanuatu to their list of recognizing states.  
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Summary 
 The recognition of new states since at least 1776 has been inconsistent and shifts 
in policy are difficult to predict. From the mid 18th century through around 1815, 
dynastic legitimacy was the established order. Statehood was controlled by the existing 
family of nations. New states were resisted if the European powers perceived their claims 
as a threat to their own monarchic control. From 1815 to World War I, de facto rule was 
often all that was needed to convince world powers that recognition should be granted. 
This corresponds to previous customs of statehood under the declaratory principle where 
recognition was merely a formality. After World War I and through the establishment of 
the state of Israel in 1948, conditionality was exercised such that diplomatic interaction 
depended on the policies and practice of prospective states. This again put the impetus on 
claimants to make their case to the international community or fail to enjoy the legal 
status of statehood.  
Self-determination was introduced by Woodrow Wilson, but was so untenable 
that it succeeded only in bringing about new claims for independence that had little hope 
of being realized. In the 1960s, state recognition generally saw a revival of the legitimist 
principle. At this point, however, legitimate meant current colonies of protectorates. Self-
determination was used to justify new states, but territorial integrity under colonial 
borders was maintained. Therefore, only colonies, and not their sub-state populations, 
were granted statehood. This changed in the neo-legitimist period following the Cold 
War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the recognition of Eritrea and 
South Sudan harkens back to the dynastic legitimacy of the early 1800s. The international 
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community supported those claims for independence if the host country agreed (Eritrea 
and South Sudan) or if the host country ceased to exist (Yugoslavia). Of course, the 
Republic of Kosovo was also recognized at this time despite failing many conditions in 
place for new states. This was explained away as an exception. In truth, though, other 
than the general trends identified above, almost all new states were, in one way or 
another, exceptions to the largely closed international community.  
There are two main points from this subsection. First, the power of recognition 
has evolved into a fundamentally political act. Contemporary states weigh the outcomes 
of independence for entities that claim it. They either decide to recognize new states or 
fail to do so. This is fundamentally a political decision. Existing states may refuse to 
accept the de facto existence of entities because they do not find them politically 
acceptable (Biafra, Katanga). Importantly, this political act has legal consequences in 
international law. Recognition serves to treat states as an actor in international affairs. 
The recognizer enters into relations with the recognized who then enjoys all the rights of 
equals indefinitely. Non-recognition, however, maintains the status quo. The entities have 
no international legal recourse because they are non-persons.  
The second major point is that because it is a political act, an individual decision 
for states to make, the international community operates from a set of informal criteria 
for recognition. Currently, these informal criteria form a legitimist principle. If the claim 
appears legitimate, that is, if they are politically acceptable to the contemporary family of 
nations, the state will be recognized; if it is not, the claim is rejected. As will be made 
clear in the next chapter, non-recognition is a curse that ensures de facto states will at 
some point be reintegrated into their mother country, unless and until recognition occurs. 
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2.6 Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I provided the building blocks for the theory presented in Chapter 
3. The evolution of child protection shows how the issue of children's rights went from 
non-existence in 1900 to one of the most widely respected human rights concerns in 
2000. From here, I recount the different explanations modern social scientists use to 
explain child soldier use. Even though the norms against the practice exist, child 
soldiering is still prevalent in much of the world. The discussion on civilian abuse was an 
attempt to ground the study of child soldiers in a wider area of study that includes 
abrogation of norms in the name of conflict. Finally, the argument presented in the next 
chapter largely centers around the goals and motivations of separatist groups. As shown 
here, independence movements have been successful in the past with over 150 new states 
added to the global community since 1776. However, the criteria for recognition have 
been largely inconsistent. With the argument firmly rooted in the work of previous 
scholars, I now turn to using these pieces to extend the discussion regarding child soldiers 
and show how motivations of rebels and their perception of the world system can 
influence their behavior. 
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Chapter Three: 
A Theory of Constrained Behavior 
3.1 Introduction 
My theory follows a straightforward logic. Rebels are assumed to be rational. The 
use of child soldiers has been unanimously condemned around the world. Secessionist 
rebels’ ultimate goal is state recognition. This depends on states in the international 
community. Therefore, separatists are more likely constrained in their recruitment 
practices because of the pursuit of legitimacy. Financing is also an important 
consideration for rebel groups. Some groups, after tapping into a lucrative, illegal 
commodity, may come to see the conflict status quo as profitable. These opportunistic 
rebellions become less concerned with winning. In the pursuit of profits, they will be 
more likely to see greater benefit in using child soldiers. They are cheap and, because 
opportunist rebellions are less concerned with victory, reduced capabilities will not be an 
issue. Nor will any considerations about an external audience. Finally, duration increases 
costs and makes cheaper soldiers more appealing. This makes restraint more difficult for 
all conflict types.  
 This chapter begins by explaining the assumption of rationality and why this is a 
valuable and useful starting point for the current project. The second part identifies the 
influence that treaties have in establishing norms and how those norms influence state 
behavior and non-state behavior alike. After reviewing recognition policy from a 
normative framework, I proceed to model the decision structure for separatists and how 
this influences their behavior towards child recruitment. The final three sections provide 
an extension to the argument by addressing the economic issues associated with conflict 
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and the influence this can have over recruitment decisions. The models presented are then 
tested in Chapters 5-8 with both quantitative and qualitative empirical tests.  
 
3.2 Rational Rebels 
Historically, the study of political violence is built around assumptions 
concerning participants. Reports about collective action written about one's political or 
ideological enemy tend to portray the other as irrational. In the past, governments 
typically commission such reports. Therefore, they often have unintended biases in their 
conclusions. More recently, social science research has adopted a more objective 
approach. Far from being the product of "criminals, madmen, the offspring of madmen, 
alcoholics, the slime of society, deprived of all moral sense," collective action, even when 
violent, appears to follow calculated decisions about the environment (Rule 1988: 95). 
This proposition is important because it allows for the systematic study of political 
violence, the evaluation of causal arguments, and the extension of other forms of deviant 
behavior.   
The evolution of the concept of the rational-rebel was slow to develop. In the late 
18th and early 19th centuries, riots were frequent occurrences in the United States, Ireland, 
England, India, and elsewhere. Breaking free from the prosecutorial mindset that 
preceded it, reports at this time recognized the entrepreneurial spirit of the organizers of 
such action (Wilkinson 2009). Symbolic issues that could rally a substantial number of 
participants were used by individuals with a vested interest in challenging the state. For 
example, during World War II, structural factors, such as mass recruitment and labor 
market changes, placed stress on the wartime population and provided the uneasy 
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environment in which rumors could incite crowds to action (Weckler and Hall 1944). 
Structural factors and the logic of stimulus-response violence are also accepted as the 
best explanation for the race riots of the 1960s (Graham and Gurr 1969). Such 
approaches better explain the character of mass political violence where ordinary citizens 
can mobilize to redress grievances. Further, it recognizes the generalizable patterns found 
in collective behavior. Even in decisions to instigate or join violent activities, people are 
rational.  
The concept of the rational-rebel, at present, appears to be the dominant paradigm 
in civil war literature. Rational-choice theories are used to explain behavior at various 
stages of a rebellion: from the very beginnings of political violence (Muller and Weede 
1990), to initial acts by elites (Weede and Muller 1998; DeNardo 1984; Leites and Wolf 
1970), responses by the masses (Mason 1996), and in the end when faced with 
continuation or cessation of hostilities (Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002). In addition, 
Moore (1995) suggests that third-party involvement in intrastate conflict also relies on a 
rational calculation of costs, benefits, and a keen eye towards the future. 
In the current project, I argue that rebel behavior is bound by strategic concerns 
and that commanders will refrain from using child soldiers when it helps them reach 
long-term goals. Rebel goals will determine how much they care about international 
opinion and how likely it is that norms will influence their recruitment decisions. Further, 
funding choices and duration can influence the extent to which rebellions value victory 
and, thus, how willing they are to trade capabilities for lower costs. In the next section, I 
discuss how international norms provide the conceptual framework in which state and 
non-state actors operate. If the environment for rebels is in many ways the same 
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environment for states, and rebels are rational, they will act the way they think they are 
supposed to.  
 
3.3 How International Norms Influence Behavior 
International treaties can influence state behavior even in an anarchic world 
system. The classic realist position argues that states will comply with international 
treaties only insofar as it is in their interest (Mearsheimer 1994). Chayes and Chayes 
(1993) counter the realist position with the observation that in the realm of security, 
economic, and environmental treaties, noncompliance is the aberration. States often go to 
extreme measures to appear compliant even if it would be in their best interests to 
abrogate. Treaties, they argue, are the result of timely and well-considered negotiations 
that reflect how seriously states consider the terms. Compliance itself may also be in the 
best interest of the state. Noncompliance can threaten other agreements by making an 
administration appear untrustworthy. Even where states have no intention of following 
through with obligations, merely the act of signing can invigorate local and global civil 
society, putting pressure on leaders to improve human rights practices (Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui 2005). International norms derive from these treaties and other widely-
accepted international agreements.  
The power of international norms to shape state behavior is well-documented. 
Social pressures of inclusion and the desire to avoid being seen as a deviant member can 
be very strong. Japan originally resisted the international ban on ivory sales, for example, 
but relented “to avoid isolation in the international community” (Chayes and Chayes 
1993: 201). Actors who fail to comply with such widely accepted norms and openly 
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flaunt abrogation risk near universal scorn and will be viewed with suspicion and treated 
as pariahs. Norms often become entrenched because they serve as external signals of 
good behavior (Hyde 2011). Election monitoring is now a prerequisite for democracy. 
Even the pseudo democrats feel pressured to allow observers in order to avoid the stigma 
that comes with being an autocrat.  
Finnemore (1996) suggests that norms represent a change in the international 
system whereby IOs and NGOs provide states with direction concerning appropriateness 
of action. The case of global opinion against apartheid South Africa illustrates how norms 
can redefine national interests (Klotz 1995). Here, global sentiments about racial equality 
superseded strategic interests. Tannenwald (1999) demonstrates how the opposition to 
nuclear weapons is so high that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki no states have used them 
in aggression. This norm is so strong that deterrence often fails even against nonnuclear 
states because they know such weapons will not be used in retaliation.  In effect, the 
options available to international actors have changed due to accepted norms. Thus, 
norms can constrain state behavior. Such effects should not be limited to state actors 
alone. In the next two sections, I demonstrate how non-state actors are also aware of 
many of the same signals that state actors are, and that these signals can alter behavior.  
International relations can affect the behavior of groups in the run up to, and 
during, civil war (Thyne 2009). Governments and rebels alike are subject to international 
signals of support or disapproval. During the 1970s, presidential succession in the White 
House dramatically altered the likelihood of civil war in Nicaragua by changing the 
expectations of the actors. Under the Nixon administration, the rhetoric from the White 
House was that the US was firmly anti-communist. This had the effect of giving a free 
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pass to the Samoza regime to crack down on the Sandanista insurgents. United States 
foreign policy shifted under the Carter administration. The new rhetoric championed 
human and civil rights, and this sent hostile signals to the Samoza regime. Managua 
changed course and made moderate concessions. However, the Sandanistas used the 
signals from Washington to rally support against the repression of Samoza. Events 
unfolded rapidly and by 1979, Samoza succumbed to the rebellion and resigned his post.  
Non-state actors are aware of international mood and change their behavior based 
on rational expectations about the international community. Such was the case in 
evidence with Hutu extremists during the Rwandan Genocide. After the Battle of 
Mogadishu in Somalia 1994, the international community pulled out of the country 
virtually cutting off all aid to the region and letting the warlords have free reign over the 
civilian populations. This was tragic for Somalis, but it also sent a signal that the global 
conglomerate of would-be interveners did not have the appetite for sustained 
humanitarian missions. This specific event was later cited by many Rwandan Interhamwe 
as a reason they did not fear international intervention to stop the Genocide. The 
Interhamwe believed their actions would be ignored by world leaders reluctant to get 
involved in a local African conflict (Dallaire 2003: 240). Conversely, in another example, 
Kuperman (2008) finds evidence that Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars acted as a result of 
beliefs about the international community. In the dissolution of Yugoslavia, vulnerable 
groups attacked much stronger state institutions because they believed that it would 
provoke a harsh backlash by the government, but, more importantly, this response would 
promote international intervention on the side of the weaker party.   
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Non-state actors can be influenced by accepted norms in the similar ways as state 
actors. Bob (2005) finds that rebels are willing to alter their message, goals, and tactics to 
attract support from transnational NGOs. For example, the Zapatista separatists framed 
theirs as a movement against globalization rather than the initial fight for indigenous 
rights. Further, at least since September 11, terrorist tactics have severely hindered 
secessionists’ ability to rally international support for their cause (Hannum 2005: 69). 
Recent CIA accounts of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) members struggling 
to balance the attention-grabbing acts of terror with the negative publicity that follows 
are, therefore, unsurprising (Coll 2005). Ultimately, the PLO reduced the intensity of 
their attacks because of the public-relations value of adopting less coercive tactics. If 
non-state actors are aware of the international enviornment and subject to the same 
signals of appropriateness, they are, in many ways, under the same social pressures as 
states.  
Treaties can also serve as signals to non-state actors. The Conventions on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol (OPCAC) are just two of the most 
prominent documents of which non-state actors may be aware. Equally important are the 
monitoring programs of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the 
various UN Security Council Resolutions addressing child soldiers. These include high 
profile indictments, such as Charles Taylor in 2006. Perhaps more telling, a number of 
rebel groups have indicated their commitments to these treaties. In 2007, the Karen 
National Liberation Army in Myanmar instituted recruitment ages in its "Deeds of 
Commitment." Both the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the SPLA in South Sudan made 
strong pledges of demobilizing their child soldiers throughout the 2000s. Further, 
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rebellions have even expressed explicit support for OPCAC, including the ONLF in 
Ethiopia and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They likely think this is important because child 
soldiering is condemned by numerous treaties and NGO forums. 
Rebels operate in the same world system as state actors. The audience for treaty 
relations is not always those intended. Simmons (2010) suggests that even non-ratifiers 
may be internalized and practice norms contained in treaties (274). Just as rebellions 
change their message and behavior in seeking approval from NGOs, they can become 
both informed and emboldened by legitimizing effect of compliance with the 
international human rights regime.  However, this depends on the value they place on that 
external environment. Rebel leaders most concerned with social pressures are the ones 
likely to comply. As non-state actors, they are limited in their actions to appear compliant 
to international norms. There is no treaty to sign or convention to attend. Instead, they 
must actually demonstrate they are willing to act as the community acts.  Therefore, child 
soldiers will be avoided by rebels wishing to signal a legitimate claim for statehood.  
 
3.4 Recognition Revisited 
 Kilcullen (2010) identifies an ever-growing concern of insurgents. In addition to 
the political unity within the group, with the civilian population, and trying to thwart the 
political unity of the government, insurgents are also increasingly aware of the political 
message consumed by the international community. In particular, the global audience 
was influential in the East Timor liberation struggle where previously successful 
counterinsurgency strategies employed by Indonesia failed to overcome FRETILIN. In 
the late 1990s, globalization increased the value of international propaganda. For 
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example, in 2004 Osama bin Laden made a video where he ranted about typical al Qaeda 
grievances. However, this time he included global warming as another evil committed by 
America. CIA analysts concluded that the goal was to link international terrorism to the 
Democratic Party in order to ensure reelection of George W. Bush (Suskind 2006). While 
US voters are not the same thing as the international community, this example shows 
how individual non-state actors often try to reach wider audiences by speaking their 
language. While international propaganda is prominently used by rebellions around the 
world, this is not a new development. Groups trying to get their own state have been 
aware of international audiences for centuries.  
Independence movements have sought support from the wider audience of the 
international community at least since 1776. The US fought for its independence, but it 
did not succeed until they had the support of major European powers. Despite any reason 
for assuming a universal right to self-determination, or even a reasonable expectation of 
material support, the US still sent diplomats and emissaries to France, the Dutch 
Republic, Spain and Russia. Support from France became so integral to the success of the 
revolution that some commentators go as far as to suggest Louis XVI should be 
considered one of the founding fathers (Fabry 2010: 35-36).  
Modern separatists adopt a range of strategies to achieve their goal of recognition, 
but publicity is an area where many concentrate their energy (Wood 1981). In the 
comparison of Algerian and Moroccan Berbers, Slymovics (2005) claims that both 
groups made their case for cultural rights to their domestic audiences. However, Algerian 
Berbers changed the basis for their movement on fundamental rights of self-
determination when they switched their target audience to the international community. 
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Behavior changes when the audience changes. In a personal interview in 2011, a high 
level representative of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) representative told me in an 
interview that there were several occasions where the domestic constituency wanted 
action, but the leadership followed external wishes. Even agreeing to work with the 
governing party in 1991 was solely the result of the signals from the international 
community.  Thus, rebel groups that care about international contexts will speak, and act, 
in accordance with that audience  
 
International Legitimacy 
The burden of proof lies with the secessionist to convince the international 
community that they are worthy of joining as equals (Hannum 2005). Wight (1972) 
defines international legitimacy as the “collective judgment of international society about 
rightful membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may be transferred; how 
state succession should be regulated, when large states break up into smaller, or several 
states combine into one” (1). The problem for separatists is that legitimacy is “an elusive 
and nebulous notion on the frontiers of morality and law” (1). Even prior to the American 
Civil War, secessionists have felt the need to justify their claims in terms that other 
nations (a community of which they wish to be a part of) understand. In other words, they 
sought and seek legitimacy in the eyes of their potential peers (Meadwell 1999). The 
principle of self-determination, and claims of a right to it, indicate how rebel groups look 
to the international community for cues on what makes their movement legitimate. 
During interviews with the staff of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 
(UNPO), I was routinely told that members of the European Parliament are specifically 
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targeted because they care about a particular issue. Taiwanese representatives, for 
example, began touting their record on cultural rights and democracy because it would 
bring the support of the influential Green Party. UNPO also targets specific members of 
the European Parliament by tapping into goals they care about. One parliamentarian was 
known as a champion of maritime security. A meeting was arranged between him and the 
Somaliland delegate to emphasize their anti-piracy efforts. Such examples illustrate the 
importance that secessionist groups place on international concerns. They go to great 
lengths to put their struggle in terms the international community supports. 
Most governments want to stay neutral because foreign meddling is often 
unpopular and risky if they back the wrong side (Wood 1981). To ease the burden on 
international actors, hopeful states often go to great lengths to assure the global 
community that they are legitimate. During the era of Dynastic Legitimacy, new states 
tried to convince Europe that they had nothing to fear and that they were not a challenge 
to established monarchism. As previously noted Brazil elected the King of Portugal's son 
and proclaimed him the "Emperor of Brazil.” When Belgium sought independence in 
1830, it made a concerted effort to remind the world that it too had an established 
monarchy in the guise of newly elected King Leopold I. Lacking such credentials of its 
own, Greece promised to establish a monarchy if it were recognized. Furthermore, 
prospective states offered assurances of human rights provisions when they thought it 
would help their case. Once again, Brazil was in tune with the rhetoric of its future global 
partners when it offered to ban the still active slave trade in 1825 (Fabry 2010: 66). In 
another example, before it was independent, Romania offered greater religious tolerance 
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to its minorities in exchange for recognition. Avoiding child soldiers might make support 
less politically risky. 
 
Conditionality  
The international community, to its credit, facilitates such quid-pro-quo behavior 
by placing conditional recognition in many cases. After World War I, the victorious 
Allied Powers sought to lay the foundation of peace. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia were recognized, but only after agreeing to accept the minority rights 
provisions outlined in the Paris Peace Conference (Fabry 2010: 131). In 1931, the League 
of Nations created the short-lived Permanent Mandate Commission, which set the 
guidelines territories had to follow in order to be recognized. Prominent among these was 
the “capability principle” whereby would-be states had to demonstrate they could be 
effective. This was not a mere continuation of the de facto statehood principle. Control 
alone was not enough to bring recognition. Would-be states had to show their 
administration was capable and sustainable. In one example, Great Britain sought to 
recognize its mandate of Mesopotamia as the Kingdom of Iraq. Despite inheriting full 
control from the British, Iraq did not meet the capability condition and the League of 
Nations refused to recognize its sovereignty.  Later, in an effort to get ahead of the 
massive changes in the world system, the European Community established “The 
Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” in 
1991. This ambitious plan upheld democratic governance, human and minority rights, 
nuclear non-proliferation, and other concerns championed by the international 
community. These conditions highlight an explicit link between internal rule and the 
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conduct of international relations. In practice, as should be unsurprising, these conditions 
were inconsistently applied. In the end, both the US and the European Community 
favored non-proliferation above all other concerns. However, hopeful states sought to 
fulfill each requirement. At the same time, even this shows the power of the international 
community over the policies of potential new states.  
For nearly 250 years, new states have followed a similar pattern towards 
statehood. First, they seek support for their claims internationally. This was seen with US 
independence and throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Second, they go to great 
lengths to tap into the general sentiment of the international community at the time, such 
as when Greece and others promised to establish a monarchy. Finally, the international 
community, knowing the position would-be states are in, capitalizes and draft 
conditionalities that must be met before conferring statehood. While professed goals 
differ from back-room deals and a severe information gap exists, the general process 
appears relatively consistent. From dynastic legitimacy through the Permanent Mandates 
Commission and, finally, with efforts to control the Soviet dissolution, ample evidence 
exists that not only is the international community more than just a bystander or reluctant 
acceptor of conflict outcomes, claimants to independence know this and act accordingly.   
 
3.5 Legitimacy Constraints  
It is clear that secessionists are aware of the consequences of losing international 
support. This should not be surprising. As the previous section shows, secessionists have 
long felt the need to justify their claims by framing their struggles in the language of 
legitimacy. Contemporary independence movements inevitably call for decolonization 
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regardless of the circumstances of the union. International recognition is sufficiently rare 
that prospective states engage in diplomatic efforts to secure recognition and, with it, 
legal protection. Furthermore, they know that some behaviors likely limit support. Child 
protection exists as one such norm of behavior that is widely accepted, clearly expressed 
and applicable to all rebel groups. Thus, in an effort to avoid defeat, secure support, and 
fully achieve their goals, rebellions with the goal of independence should be less likely to 
use child soldiers. In this effort they try to avoid the fate of many unrecognized states 
that, upon failure, have ceased to exist.  
Quasi-states, if sufficiently strong, can exist without recognition. However, they 
are living on borrowed time. The best case scenario in the short term is some form of 
autonomy within the federal structure. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka controlled a large territory in Sri Lanka. They enjoyed some support 
from India until the 1991 assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi. The 
LTTE wallowed in quasi-statehood, accepting and rescinding various peace initiatives. 
Independence was never reached, and, in 2009, following a swift military defeat, the 
LTTE and the likelihood of an independent state of Eelam died. Therefore, the most 
likely outcome for quasi-states is eventual reabsorption into the host state. Organizations 
that can garner support, however, are less likely to suffer this fate. As Kolstø explains, “A 
quasi-state may increase chances of achieving political recognition if it manages to build 
strong state structures and eliminate the most blatant criminal activities in its territories” 
(2006: 735). Child soldiering is an overtly criminal activity that is near-unanimously 
condemned. As a result, using underage fighters would risk costing crucial support.  
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Even though there is little generalizability in decisions over recognition, it is 
reasonable for rebels to anticipate loss of support for illegitimate actions and behavior. 
For example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist tactics have severely hindered 
secessionists' ability to rally international support for their cause (Hannum 2005: 69). 
Further, in 1995, Operation Storm by Croatia was a harsh but effective means of crushing 
the separatist Serbian Republic of Krajina. Commentators claim that the international 
community was mute because the Srebrenica massacre just two months earlier cost the 
Serbs sympathy (Kolstø 2006: 737).  
While some actions are condemned without denigrating the claims (e.g., terrorism 
in the Occupied Territories), other actions are not as easily overlooked. For example, 
kidnappings, cruel and unusual punishment, and beheadings in the Chechan Republic of 
Ichkeria effectively evaporated global support for the state. Chechen leaders had achieved 
victories in their drive towards independence, even winning nominal autonomy from 
Russia with international support. However, failure to live up to the principles and norms 
of international law resulted in international condemnation (Ware 2005). The lesson of 
Chechen misbehavior and its consequences were not lost on its fellow separatists in 
neighboring Dagestan. In 1999, a Senior Researcher at the Dagestan Scientific Center, 
Mahomedkhan Magomedovich Magomedhanov, evaluated where the Chechens went 
wrong:   
Those "fathers of the nation," including those of the Chechen nation, who resort 
to violence while pursuing the supreme goal of self-determination, might benefit 
from paying attention to the ideological priorities of the global community… It is 
well known that the internationally recognized principle of self-determination 
contradicts the equally widely recognized principle of the inviolability of state 
borders. …The use of inadequate and inappropriate methods in the struggle for 
national and state self-determination, and for independence—such as terrorism or 
attacks on the borders of neighbors—only increases the risks of suffering and loss 
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for one’s own nation….Otherwise, the fruits of independence that are so ardently 
desired may not even be attained. 
Though the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is just one of 
16 active UN treaties acknowledging the protection of human rights, it is “the most 
widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in history” (UNICEF 2005). Given its 
near complete support by the international community, the norms regarding the rights of 
a child offer very clear signals of appropriate behavior. Even the Taliban, who have 
deservedly earned condemnation by the world, have an official policy that states 
“Mujahedeen are not allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield” 
(Coalition 2008: 41). Of course, this belies the fact that they routinely use young children 
in combat. Use of child soldiers is often vehemently denied, and revelations are followed 
by hasty justifications. For example, the New Peoples’ Army (NPA) in the Philippines 
claims to reject recruits that are under 18. When child soldiers were observed in their 
ranks, NPA officials defended the organization by claiming difficulty in verifying age 
(Coalition 2008: 277). Under conflict conditions, rebel leaders are faced with the 
opportunity to hire underage recruits. Commanders could recruit them and arm them, 
abruptly ending their innocence and often their lives. But such action, while economical, 
would risk international scorn, and prove detrimental to their overall success.  
All rebellions can benefit from international support. However, secessionists face 
unique concerns. Secessionists cannot “win” without legitimacy. As Wood (1981) notes, 
“no successful secession is complete until it has become institutionalized in a new 
government, legitimate at home and recognized abroad" (133). Quasi-states, if strong and 
autonomous, may exist without recognition. However, without statehood, it is only a 
matter of time before reabsorption or hostilities will resume (Islam 1985). It is extremely 
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difficult to get recognized as an independent state, though there are exceptions 
(Bangladesh, Eritrea, and South Sudan). It is arguable that victory is the one common 
goal of every rebellion, but victory alone cannot achieve the ends sought by secessionist 
movements.  
Non-separatist rebels have inertia on their side. Continuity of the international 
system is important (Brown 1950). While it may not always be politically palatable to 
recognize a government born of revolutionary, military, or otherwise unconstitutional 
means, it is often a practical necessity. Governments born through illegitimate means 
may be tolerated and in some circumstances welcome (e.g., Libya), but secession is a 
different issue altogether. Rebellions aimed at the center and rebellions aimed at exit 
might both want international support, states are more willing to begrudgingly accept 
new governments than new states. Considerable resistance over welcoming a new 
country remains (e.g., Biafra, Katanga, South Ossetia, Abkhazia).   
Secessionist groups are the most concerned with the international norms. Thus, 
they are the rebel groups most subject to the constraining power of international 
legitimacy. Groups seeking independence cannot win without the backing of the 
international community. They have little hope of achieving the status of legitimate equal 
in the eyes of the world if they engage in egregious violations of accepted norms. 
Operating under such social pressure, secessionists are more likely to comply with the 
norms against child soldiers than those not concerned about legitimacy. In the decision to 
use child soldiers, legitimacy serves to constrain rebel behavior and pushes the likelihood 
to use child soldiers downward.  
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3.6 Finances and Civil War 
Long-term considerations are also manifest in decisions related to economics. 
Fiscal approaches to civil war have a strong tradition in conflict studies. While the notion 
that rebellions are quasi-criminal organizations is evident by the fact that they are, in fact, 
breaking the laws of their country, the idea that they exist solely for the pursuit of profit 
is more dubious. What is clear, however, is that motive alone is not sufficient to spark 
rebellion. Independent sources of funding can provide start-up costs and an economic 
motivation to rebel. At the same time, certain resources can alter the structure of the 
conflict and provide new means and new incentives to participants. There are three 
primary ways in which natural resources can influence civil war: onset, duration, and 
intensity. 
Natural resources can encourage conflict onset by weakening states' and their 
ability to eliminate extralegal challenges. States can be weakened by a lack of economic 
diversity, and the economy may become beholden to fluctuations in commodity pricing 
(Klare 2001). Economic instability is part of the structural factors that can promote civil 
war. Focusing on a single resource can also weaken the economy and lead widespread 
grievance. Single-commodity economies run the risk of overvaluing the currency which 
can hinder domestic industries outside of the extraction sector. Finally, if a government is 
able to procure its expenditures on a single-resource such as oil and natural gas there is 
little need to engage in taxation. Therefore, they are left without the bureaucratic 
infrastructure needed to respond to unrest (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Alternatively, the 
importance of maintaining a particular sector may encourage heavy-handed government 
responses which could promote instability further.  
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Would-be insurgents can also be enticed into open rebellion by natural resources. 
They can serve as an attractive “pot of gold” that offers a big reward if the capital can be 
taken. States flush with oil wealth; for example, can be open to challenge because the 
payoff is big enough to overcome the risks of a failed attempt. Likewise, resource 
concentration can promote separatist rebellions. If the valuable resource is located in a 
particular area a new identity may form around the promise of economic gain (Le Billon 
2001). Old identities can also reemerge as resource wealth is uncovered. For example, the 
Scottish National Party that argues in favor of Scottish independence enjoyed a huge 
boost in support after oil was discovered in the North Sea (Collier 2005). Collectively, 
these onset mechanisms can be thought of as a "resource curse" whereby natural resource 
wealth, typically thought of as a positive, promotes instability and conflict in many ways.  
The nature of the conflict can also be influenced by the presence of significant 
resource wealth. The effect is varied depending on the strategies of the commanders. 
Fighting over resource-rich territory may encourage civilian violence as dominance over 
the area is more valuable than winning public support. At the same time, an attempt to 
attract supporters in contentious areas may constrain behavior (Keen 1998). Too much 
extraction would risk turning the populace against the rebels (Bates, Greif, and Singh 
2002). Civilian abuse may be curtailed in an effort to “win the hearts and minds” of 
valuable constituents. This may even go as far as providing public goods such as 
education centers and health facilities (Lichbach 1995; Wickham-Crowley 1992). Wood 
(2010) adds that civilian targeting may be a function of rebel capacity. Where rebels are 
strong, they will opt out of violence in favor of selective benefits. If natural resources 
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make rebels more capable, then those rebels should be less likely to abuse civilians. 
Intensity can also increase if the conflict is lengthened by the types of resources present.  
Once civil war begins, duration can also be influenced by natural resources. First, 
if the conflict is secessionist, the presence of natural resources can make both sides less 
likely to accept a negotiated settlement. For both sides, an agreement on resource 
distribution remains uncertain (Fearon 2004). Abrogation is a constant threat. If natural 
resources provide high profits to insurgents, they can preclude an end to conflict 
(Sherman 2000). Peace deals will be less likely because rebel leaders will need large 
fiduciary promises to give up their lucrative trade in the illicit economy. At the same 
time, if a deal is concluded, mid-level officers, and the rank and file rebels, may be 
encouraged to disobey ceasefires and/or splinter into new insurgent factions. Lootable 
resources such as diamonds13 and drugs offer one high-value commodity that can alter 
the utility of victory for rebel forces.  
 Natural resource wealth can induce conflict, and make civil wars more intense. 
Also, profitability can make cessation less likely. In the next section I argue that it is this 
mechanism that makes child soldier use more likely. The type of natural resource can 
influence how likely it is that incentives will change from victory to perpetuation. 
Lootable resources offer profits, but successfully taking over the state can threaten to end 
this revenue stream. Therefore, child soldiers will be used as a way to maintain the 
insurgency, but not risk ending the business by actually defeating government forces.  
 
                                                 
13 There are two ways to mine diamonds. Primary or "shaft" mining involves deep excavation pits and high-
tech equipment. Secondary, or "alluvial" mining uses open pits and relatively simple dredging processes. 
For diamonds to be "lootable" they need to be of the secondary type.  
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3.7 Rebel Resource Curse 
Throughout the Cold War, patron-states held great influence over their client-
rebellions. The superpowers and their allies engaged in large-scale, yet discrete, financing 
of rival rebels operating in a rivals' sphere of influence. Well-known examples of this 
include Soviet support for the EPLF in Ethiopia and American support for the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan.14 Non-superpower sponsors are another important source of 
funds. Co-ethnics across borders can be seen as potential extensions of one state’s 
territory. The neighbor may then offer to exploit domestic tensions (Carment, James, and 
Taydas 2006). The side-effects of this support meant that in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, rebels have turned to local resources and looting to replace the lost 
patron funds (Keen 1998; Labrousse 2004). One quick and easy source of funds are 
lootables. Easily accessed and mobile, lootable resources can provide a boost in strength 
a rebellion needs to maintain its struggle. However, they can also pollute the group’s 
goals and obscure its nature such that perpetuation is more economical than victory. 
Under such circumstances, child soldiers become much more valuable.   
One consistent feature of the influence of lootable resources is their impact on 
duration. The presence of gemstones and narcotics tend to make wars last longer and 
generate conflict-inducing support from external actors (Fearon 2004; Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2000). Addison, LeBillon, and Murshed (2002) suggest that lootables lengthen 
conflict because there is more profit in perpetuation than cessation. They can operate as a 
rebel version of the “resource curse,” changing the recruiting policies of the rebellion 
(Weinstein 2005). Instead of attracting genuine adherents to a cause, opportunistic 
                                                 
14 Currently, state sponsors of insurgents is relegated largely to state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran 
support for Hezbollah) and cross-border rivalries (e.g., Rwanda, DRC, Zimbabwe, etc.) (Salehyan 2009). 
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behavior may corrupt any long-term goals the rebel leaders may have held and proceeds 
to “shape the character” of the rebellion itself (598). 
 
Opportunism in the Ranks 
While it is conceivable to think a greed-based rebellion can turn into one of 
grievance (through government crackdown, popular backlash, etc.), it is more realistic to 
imagine noble causes being tarnished. Opportunistic rebellions are not a distinct category 
of rebellions. Instead, opportunism plagues rebellions and pollutes whatever goals they 
say they hold. Secessionist and non-secessionists alike can have opportunistic elements. 
If they do, I argue the behavior will be similar even if the stated goals are different. 
Cornell (2005) and Dishman (2001) discuss how insurgent and terrorist groups are 
increasingly involved in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking. Instead of doing 
what they can to achieve military success, rebel leaders will put a premium on profit over 
triumph.   
Peters (2009) find this same phenomenon evident in the Taliban, which most 
commentators would label an archetypal ideological insurgency. Through first-hand 
interviews with government officials, opium farmers, and rebel confidants, she finds that 
the Taliban have become more concerned with the opium market than actually fighting 
coalition forces.15 I explore this case in more detail in Chapter 7. Along with the FARC in 
Colombia (also Chapter 7), the RUF in Sierra Leone, and numerous Burmese rebels, all 
                                                 
15 During their brief control of Kabul from 1996-2001, the Taliban occasionally issued prohibitions against 
growing opium. However, such proclamations were inconsistent and were not widespread. By most 
accounts these were used to artificially inflate opium prices for the sellers at the expense of the growers 
(Peters 2009).   
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of these cases illustrate that strife can be good for business. For them, victory is less 
desirable than the status quo.  
  
Utility of Victory 
The use of child soldiers itself suggests the rebel commander is less serious about 
winning. Children are not as capable as adults. Even if psychologically scarred from 
knowing only war, they are less likely to show courage under fire (Singer 2005; 
Somasundaram 2002; Kimmel and Roby 2007). Children can be drugged and ‘convinced’ 
to carry out simple tasks, but a drugged child is less capable than a fit and well-trained 
adult who knows why they are fighting. Underage fighters are particularly susceptible to 
non-lethal deterrence, psychological operations, and disjointing tactics that exploit the 
characteristic fear of children. In fact, the official tactic when confronting child soldiers 
for the U.S. military is, “[d]emonstrative artillery and mortar fires (including the use of 
smoke), rolling barrages (which give a sense of flow to the impending danger) and 
helicopter gunship passes” (Singer 2005: 6). This suggests rebel commanders using 
children may have a low utility of victory.  
Oil, natural gas, and other natural resources can provide startup costs or represent 
future payoffs for would-be insurgents (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Humphreys 2005). Furthermore, insurgent groups can tap a number of funding 
sources throughout its duration. However, only illicit sources of funds, those that are 
lootable, accessible, and mobile seem to have the effect of changing the behavior and 
goals of the organization. Such resources alter the recruitment strategies whereby even in 
the event that rebel leaders maintain goals, the soldiers act as spoilers to any peace 
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negotiation because continuation of conflict is more profitable (Weinstein 2007). 
Opportunism serves to increase the likelihood that child soldiers will be used.  
 
3.8 Legitimacy Constraints and Duration  
For some rebellions, adherence to the norm against child soldiers is easier. For 
others it is much more difficult. Rebellions that are confronted with increasing costs will 
be more likely to opt into the child labor market. Using children reduces expenses 
through reduced operational and outfitting costs. Food, clothing, housing, and other costs 
are lower for children. They are smaller and require fewer amenities to stay satisfied. 
Also, whether recruited or conscripted, child soldiers often lack the familial bonds that tie 
adult soldiers to “home” or “family” (Gates 2004: 2). Wages are also generally lower for 
children (Andivg and Gates 2010).  
Modification of rebel behavior is common as conflict proceeds and circumstances 
change. This change may take years or even decades. Rarely are scholars able to see the 
transition in abrogation of norms as clearly as in the case of the Abu Sayyeff Group in the 
Philippines. Active since 1991, they have committed a number of high-profile 
kidnappings and murders since their founding. Despite these actions and amidst global 
outcry, they were not known to use child soldiers in the early years of their insurgency. 
However, in 2000, a 15 year old was captured during a military operation against the 
group (Coalition 2001: 352). They were soon known to routinely employ youths 
(Coalition 2004). By 2008, independent observations revealed that a majority of its forces 
were in their mid- to late teens (Coalition 2008: 278). This case illustrates how duration 
can influence the likelihood that child soldiers will be used.  
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Legitimacy constraints should weaken vis-a-vis concerns over maintaining the 
struggle in the face of defeat. While secessionist rebellions are more aware of and 
respectful of international norms, they are not immune to the mounting costs of war. 
However, they are most dependent on the international community for reaching their 
goals and will therefore be the most resistant to duration costs. As conflict persists, 
rebellions will be more likely to abrogate the norm against child soldier use, but this 
effect will be conditioned on whether or not that rebellion is aimed at secession. For 
example, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) began their separatist efforts in 1978. For the 
first few years of its existence, the PKK was primarily concerned with strengthening its 
base of support in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq. Though not afraid to use 
violence, the PKK pushed for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan. This 
pursuit of legitimacy resulted in official overtures “[to respect] the Geneva Conventions 
on treatment of POWs and of civilian noncombatants” (Nigogosian 1996: 43). Further, “a 
diplomatic offensive to secure recognition, acceptance and eventually legitimacy from 
NGOs, the United Nations, the European Union and the European Parliament as well as 
from the European Human Rights Commission… is specified” (43). In 1990, a 
compulsory service law stipulated the recruitment age of 18-25 (Coalition 2001: 228). 
They were able to maintain such adherence for 22 years from its founding. Only in 1994 
did the PKK begin to recruit children (228). This example illustrates how concern over 
legitimacy wanes over time, but secessionist rebellions will attempt to respect the norm 
against child soldier use. Legitimacy constraints may be powerful enough to alter 
behavior, but they are not eternal. If the goal of the rebellion is secession, this will 
condition the effect of duration on the likelihood of using child soldiers.  
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Regardless of motives, all rebel leaders are subject to duration costs and 
excessively long conflicts force commanders to cut expenses. One sure way to do this is 
to reduce costs by augmenting their forces with cheaper child soldiers. As conflict 
continues, costs mount. Child soldiers are less costly than adults. Therefore, as duration 
increases, child soldiers are more likely to be used. Legitimacy constraints should still 
operate, but their effect will lessen as time wears on.   
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 The decision to use child soldier is a cost-benefit calculation. The use of children 
is more costly for some rebel groups than others because some are more dependent on 
support from the international community. It represents a violation of international 
norms. Adherence is valuable for state actors because of social pressures from their peers 
(Avdeyeva 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Non-state actors are also aware of 
and are influenced by international signals (Dallaire 2003; Thyne 2009; Kuperman 2008; 
Bob 2005). Therefore, norms can affect non-state actor behavior. A secessionist rebellion 
is not complete until independence is achieved, which takes international recognition 
(Wood 1981: 133). Thus, separatist rebellions will be less likely than non-separatists to 
break the international norm against child soldier use (H1). Rebellions whose goals are 
profit maximization, or are otherwise inundated with opportunists, will be more likely to 
use child soldiers than those that are not (H2). This is due to the combination of a lack of 
concern for international opinion and a lower premium on soldier quality/capabilities (the 
utility of victory is low). This can affect secessionists and non-secessionists alike. Cost is 
one additional factor that can influence how easy or difficult it is to abide by norms. 
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Costs can take their toll on any rebellion. Longer wars are more likely to involve child 
soldiers because they are cheaper and, therefore, may help keep the insurgency solvent 
(H3). However, the power of legitimacy constraints should hold even as desires to cut 
costs increase. Therefore, secessionist rebellions should be less likely than non-
secessionists to use child soldiers, even as duration mounts (H4). 
I frame my argument as a long term vs. short term, cost-benefit analysis. Rebel 
commanders face constraints like any leader. While many concerns are short term, like 
fielding troops, procuring weapons and supplies, etc., any competent leader must also 
consider long-term costs associated with their actions (Mason and Fett 1996). For 
separatist rebellions, behavior that is out of step with the norms of the international 
community may pose serious long-term costs. It is very difficult to get recognized as an 
independent state (e.g., The Basque Republic, Somaliland, Casamance), though there are 
exceptions (e.g., Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Sudan). It is arguable that victory is the one 
common goal of every rebellion, but victory alone is not enough to achieve the desired 
aims for separatists. If international support is the goal, rebel leaders will mimic their 
desired peer group and not flaunt international norms by recruiting children during the 
conflict.  
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PART TWO: 
DATA AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter Four: 
Concepts and Operationalization 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter explores how Hypotheses 1-3 are operationalized for testing. The 
goal is to be as open and honest about the difficult task of linking conceptual definitions 
with empirical measures. I try to be transparent about the sources used and the 
limitations. I also identify the strengths of my approach and explain why this represents 
progress when compared to previous studies.  
 I accomplish these tasks first by fully explaining the dataset. Data collection 
methods are discussed along with the problems I encountered along the way and what I 
did to resolve them. Second, I explicitly define the dependent variable, child soldiers, and 
how it is measured. In section three, I define the independent variables of interest as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The final section of this chapter briefly reviews the 
operationalization process of the control variables and the reason for their inclusion.  
 
4.2 Empirical Implications of the Theory 
 This section recounts the argument presented in Chapter 3, broken into distinct 
predicted hypotheses. First, rebels aimed at creating their own internationally recognized 
state put a premium on international support. As a result, rebels that maintain separatist 
intentions should be less likely to recruit child soldiers because this behavior represents 
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abrogation of the norms of the community of which they wish to join. Thus, concerns of 
legitimacy constrain their behavior so that young children will not be used in their 
military efforts. The hypothesis derived from this argument is:  
H1: Separatist rebellions should be less likely to use child soldiers than non-
separatist rebellions.  
 Second, opportunism represents both a type of rebellion, concerned primarily with 
profit, and also the possibility of a contaminating effect, such that the goals of the 
rebellion change from victory to maintaining the status quo. Such rebellions do not have 
an incentive to adhere to international norms, and they are less concerned with the overall 
capabilities of their troops because they want to maintain the conflict status quo. Instead, 
preoccupation with loot and profit will drive them to use the cheapest soldiers that can 
maintain their forces without increasing the chances of winning (and risk ending the 
business) or spur the government into a more active counterinsurgency (also a risk to 
ending the business). Illicit funds indicate rebellions that decided profit is more important 
than victory and that they are not concerned with international norms. The hypothesis 
derived from this argument is:  
H2: Opportunistic rebellions should be more likely to use child soldiers than 
non-opportunistic rebellions.  
It may be possible that rebellions wish to avoid international condemnation and 
avoid the child labor market. However, as conflict continues and costs mount, the risk of 
defeat rises. I assume that sustaining the movement is preferable to assured defeat, so 
rebellions should be more likely to break international norms and use child soldiers when 
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their struggle is long.16 At the same time, as conflict continues, concerns over legitimacy, 
while weakened, should maintain some effect on secessionist. The hypotheses derived 
from this argument are: 
H3a: As duration increases the likelihood child soldiers will be used increases.  
H3b: As duration increases the likelihood child soldiers will be used increases, 
but this effect should be weaker for secessionists.    
 
4.3 Case Selection 
 The theory is tested on all rebel groups active from 1998-2008. Previous work 
often uses the conflict or the state as the unit of analysis, but this is "almost always a 
mistake" (Ames 2010: 16). Using individual rebellions is preferable because a single civil 
war-state can have many rebellions. Using the nation-state would risk failing to include a 
set of cases where some rebels refrained from using child soldiers but others do not. 
Thus, using the state or conflict as the unit of analysis would conflate the use of child 
soldiers and lose the crucial variation that permits addressing the goals of this project. In 
the data explored here, there are 45 countries that have civil conflicts.17 Of these, 25 have 
at least two active rebel groups. Thirteen countries have three, and in 20 cases of civil 
war, there are four or more active rebellions. Looking only at the conflict-state, I would 
miss considerable behavioral variation exhibited by unique organizations (see Figure 3). 
--Figure 3 here-- 
                                                 
16 Even for opportunistic rebellions. I argue that these rebellions do not want to win, but they also do not 
want to lose. Both victory and defeat represent the end of business.  
17 In the empirical models explored in Chapter 5, I control for the possibility of non-constant variance by 
clustering by country.  
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To select the cases, I began with the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 
Global Reports (Coalition) from 2001, 2004, and 2008. These contain detailed 
descriptions of child involvement by the government and armed groups in the country for 
the years 1998-2008.18  I compiled a list of all armed groups presented in each report. The 
combined total was 526 non-unique armed groups for which some information was 
available.19 I then cross-referenced this list with the Expanded Armed Conflict Data 
(EACD) on non-state actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). The entries 
were referenced with secondary source material to verify rebel name spelling variation 
and categorize splinter groups (e.g., Globalsecurity.org, DeRouen and Heo 2007, World 
Bank Violent Conflict Dataset, and the START terrorist database). I removed duplicate 
entries where the rebellion "ended" in the EACD data, but began anew in the 1998-2008 
time period. I further removed non-civil war dyads, such as the US vs. Al Qaeda, 2001-
2008, and the ECOMOG vs. RUF-controlled Sierra Leone, 1998. This process left 103 
unique rebellions in the dataset.  
 
Data Collection 
Ideally, research on child soldiers would estimate the size of the youth force. 
However, this is not the best approach for a variety of reasons. First, as Brett and 
McCallin (1998) point out, "[t]he total number of child soldiers in each country, let alone 
the global figure, is not only unknown but unknowable" (27). For example, a global 
estimate of 300,000 is the number consistently offered since at least 1996 (Machel 1996). 
                                                 
18 The Coalition Reports only cover the years 1998-2007. However, there were no rebellions whose 
activities began in 2008 or were otherwise not mentioned in the reports past the year 2008.   
19 The initial step to identify armed groups, I went through all the reports making a new entry for each 
group mentioned. Several groups were in more than one report and were therefore coding more than once. 
The final step removed these duplicate entries.  
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In my own attempt to estimate the total global number, I recorded any mention of 
numbers. The data are too incomplete to use in a model, but they are suggestive. My best 
estimate is approximately 400,000-450,000 child soldiers being used by armed groups 
suggesting that the numbers are probably much higher than previously thought. This 
figure excludes national militaries and government-aligned paramilitaries.  Also, these 
estimates are from just 84 of the 526 armed groups mentioned in the Coalition reports. 
Not every entry for individual groups reported a count at all.  
Relying on counts of demobilized youth does not help because there are surely 
countless others that have not been demobilized. Further, many have likely been 
informally demobilized through desertion or simply failing to return. Still others may 
have only been abducted in order to give NGOs something when they ask for it (Pederson 
and Sommerfelt 2007: 261). For example, some West African armed groups, including 
the RUF were known to abduct groups of children just so they would have someone to 
demobilize at the request of foreign NGOs. Even Achvarina and Reich's (2006) 
influential work, which developed child to adult soldier ratios for some conflicts in 
Africa, relies on estimates that vary considerably (Andvig 2006: 17). In my dataset, I opt 
for a less informative, but more reliable dummy variable to indicate if child soldiers are 
being used.20 Also, while total numbers are valuable, what is important is whether or not 
a group is willing to use children or not, whether or not they are breaking the norm.  
My approach guards against some of the issues of validity. While I rely on 
secondary accounts that fail to reveal the extent to which child soldiers are being used, 
                                                 
20 I initially set out to create an ordinal variable to measure the magnitude of use, but this too was 
problematic. Researchers report on child soldier use in dramatic and descriptive terms. I had hoped to use 
systematic adjective or adverb use, but this proved fruitless. Instead, NGO researchers do like to identify 
the youngest child observed. I used these terms in an attempt to capture some degree of the magnitude of 
norm violation.  
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the process I used takes into account rebel profiles as a whole. That is, I take very weak, 
or the absence of, evidence against some groups and ultimately compare it to 
overwhelming evidence against other groups. For example, while a child soldier (17 
years old) was said to be involved in an attack for the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine. However, since this was the “only attack known to have involved a minor” 
(Coalition 2004: 314), this group was not equated to groups that are seen to “regularly” or 
“systematically” use child soldiers. Although it would be ideal to have more precise 
information, the nature of the phenomenon limits such an approach. The dataset in this 
project, though failing to capture all of the variation, offers a way around the problem of 
information quality. Put simply, it is the best given both the nature of the phenomenon 
and the research question.  
 
Sources 
I used many sources to collect data. First, as mentioned, the Coalition to Stop the 
Use of Child Soldiers, now known as Child Soldiers International, is a London-based 
NGO that collects and produces many documents relating to child soldiers around the 
world. Their primary product is a global report produced every three to four years since 
2001. Their work attempts to document violations of the rights of children by 
governments, government-backed militias, criminal gangs, and armed opposition groups 
within every country over the course of three time periods.21 Second, I consulted the 
para-military profiles available on the website GlobalSecurity.org. Based outside of 
Washington DC, this subscription service provides extensive information on matters of 
                                                 
21 The reports cover the following time periods: 2001 Report June 98- April 2001; 2004 Report April 
2001- March 2004; and 2008 Report April 2004 – October 2007. 
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defense, military, and security. Most valuable for my research is an encyclopedia of rebel 
groups that includes history, goals, tactics and strategies, and funding for armed actors. 
Similarly, I consulted the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Terrorist Organization Profiles. This 
think-tank is funded by the Department of Homeland Security and produces hundreds of 
peer-reviewed academic publications and conference presentations. Taken together, all 
three sources provide comprehensive information about individual armed groups.  
 
Potential Problems 
One potential problem confronted with my coding rubric is reporting bias. It 
could be argued that because child soldiering is a globally popular problem, rebellions 
that avoid them will be underreported. Conversely, child soldiering is an elusive 
phenomenon that may be difficult to observe. As a result, it may be the case that some 
groups avoid detection. If this is random, it is tolerable. However, if it systematically fails 
to capture child soldier use for secessionists groups or over represents greed-based or 
lengthy rebellions, it is unacceptable.  
I address the potential of reporting bias in a number of ways. First, the number of 
“armed opposition groups” included in the Coalition reports is substantial. The combined 
2001, 2004, and 2008 reports contain detailed information on well over 500 groups 
because the organization is an advocacy group aimed solely at bringing attention to the 
plight of children affected by armed conflict. It is unlikely they missed anyone. Of 
course, it is still possible because the volume of information varies by report. To avoid 
systematic error, I use information gathered from all three reports. Therefore, if there is 
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less information in any one report, it is likely captured in another. Second, I use the 
concept of evidence, rather than proof. Using three reports that often contain three 
independent accounts of a group’s recruitment policies, there are three chances for 
researchers to report on the use of underage troops. I conclude, on the basis of these three 
reports, whether or not there is enough evidence to suggest the organization uses child 
soldiers.  
Third, the depth of information is high. Using the reports of an NGO dedicated to 
researching child soldiers allows me to consult not one, but, effectively, hundreds of 
researchers' accounts of the rebels. Based on the Coalition's access, this often includes 
direct conversations with the rebels, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
centers, or other NGOs that work in the area. While it is possible that some 
underreporting is present, it is unlikely that this will systematically bias my results.  
 Finally, secessionists have a global presence and are, therefore, more likely to be 
the subject of greater scrutiny. Thus, if there is systematic reporting bias, it would work 
against finding support for my theory. Separatists have higher global profiles, and their 
behavior is more likely to be reported on. If my coding scheme misses child solider use 
among groups, these groups are more likely to be non-separatists. Likewise small, greed-
based rebellions are more likely to be underreported in the reports. Also, such groups 
may be more dangerous and thus more difficult to access. Since I expect them to have 
high rates of violation, any systematic reporting bias would work against me finding 
support.  
 
Temporal Variation 
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Many researchers wrongly assume that variables are stable over time (Ames 
2010). With the study of child soldiers, static analysis yields potential problems. 
Rebellions do not always start off recruiting children, and there are numerous high-
profile promises of demobilization. Unfortunately, at this point, I am unable to 
satisfactorily gather enough temporal data on the groups to adequately analyze data over 
time. One reason is that the coalition reports neglect to include when child recruitment 
began. Another reason is because the EACD is also temporally invariant. If the active 
period of rebel activity ended and another began, both observations have the same value 
for the variable of interest. Thus, were I to include a temporal child soldier measure, 
many of the independent variables in the dataset would not reflect the same variation. I 
attempt to address the issue of temporal variation modestly by considering the length of 
the rebellion. I recognize that this is not ideal. It fails to capture change in group behavior 
and group goals. When better data are available, future scholars should proceed with 
time-series analysis.   
Still, I am confident in my coding scheme. The time period covered (10 years) is 
sufficiently brief that total changes to recruitment policies should be rare. Those entries 
for which I have temporal data adopted changes farther in the past than when Coalition 
began collecting data. Second, demobilization is rarely complete. In fact, unfortunately, I 
have not encountered a rebellion that has ever completely ceased using children even 
when they made official proclamations to do so. Thus, while the ideal would be a 
temporal analysis on recruitment, data availability does not permit such a study. 
Regardless, I am still confident that my approach is sufficient to address for the research 
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question. If not, I expect the bias to nullify my findings and I will be more likely to 
commit Type I error.  
 
Geographic Variation 
Child soldier data are almost always spatially distributed (Ames 2010). While I 
partially alleviate the concern of geographic variation by looking at individual groups, I 
cannot do so fully. I address the issue indirectly by looking at the funding profiles of the 
rebels, rather than looking at resource allocation by state. However, I do use state-level 
geographic variables for some of the controls. For example, I use the number of refugees 
by country of asylum to proxy for a pool of vulnerable recruits. This is less than ideal. 
One preferred method would look at where the rebels are active and look for specific 
instances of camp militarization. However, I do not have the resources required to code 
these data.  
 
Forced vs. Voluntary Recruitment 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, most researchers recognize the difference between 
volunteers and forcible recruits. I do not. Instead, I take the approach that armed group 
leaders operate in an environment of fixed (and high) supply of children (Andvig and 
Gates 2010). In these situations, their own decision to use children is the more important 
issue. Furthermore, regardless of the motivation, children are able to be used, and they 
offer certain strengths and weaknesses. I assume, as do age of consent laws, that adults 
are liable even when the choice is made by the child. Thus, there is no distinction in this 
project between forced and voluntary service. Were the unit of analysis the individual, 
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this discussion would be absolutely crucial. Since the level of analysis is the group, such 
considerations are better left to future research.  
 
4.4 Measuring the Dependent Variable 
In order to see if the factors identified in Chapter 3 have the predicted effect, I 
created four measures of child soldier use. This approach proxies the level of norm 
violation in regards to recruitment. Using any child soldiers is normatively bad, but using 
a small number of 17 year olds is qualitatively different than routinely recruiting 
thousands of pre-teens. This multi-faceted approach makes possible a more nuanced 
evaluation of norm violation.  
 
Definition of a Child Soldier 
 The definition of a child soldier is surrounded by debate and fraught with 
difficulty. In order to capture the strongest signal of appropriate behavior, I use the most 
widely agreed upon concept in the IO/NGO framework. The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (OPCAC) was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2000, and entered into force in 2002. The protocol sets the minimum age for 
recruitment at 18, but offers some leniency (such as time and resource considerations) for 
states that recruit over the age of 15. More recently, the Paris Commitments and 
Principles was a major international conference sponsored by UNICEF and the Secretary 
General's Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. The resulting 
agreement, "Paris Principles," offers a comprehensive definition that recognizes standard 
age thresholds and the a wide variety of roles for youths. I adopt this definition as most 
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appropriate. It is the definition used in the Coalition reports, although they readily admit 
that "there is no precise definition" (Coalition 2008: 411). As precise conceptual 
definitions are crucial for systematic analysis of a phenomenon, I use the words contained 
in the most recent report:  
Any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government 
armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political 
group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of 
tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, 
spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; 
logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour. Child 
soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of sexual abuse 
(411).  
 
Operationalization 
Child soldier use is difficult to capture objectively (Pederson and Sommerfelt 
2007; Ames 2010). Therefore, I do not claim to rule out child soldier use, only that there 
either is or is not enough evidence to conclude a group is violating a critical international 
norm. The primary dependent variable explored here is child soldiers, which is a 
dichotomous measure that indicates whether or not there is evidence (0=not 
used/mentioned, 1=used/mentioned). This process revealed 8 rebellions that were not 
mentioned in the Coalition Reports at all. After careful secondary source research on each 
rebellion, and in light of the thoroughness of the Coalition reports to identify all 
documented cases of child soldier use by armed groups, these 8 rebellions were coded 0.  
An additional process produces the three remaining variables that capture norm 
violation. If child soldier use was documented, I record the youngest reported age of the 
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children. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 5-17 years. If there was no mention 
of a youngest age whatsoever, the datum is coded as missing.22  
Going beyond the Coalition's definition, the third measure records if children 
were used at a lower age threshold: younger than 15. This cutoff is consistent with the 
original text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN 1991) and the 2008 
Child Soldier Accountability Act (US Congress 2008), which define child soldiers as 
persons fourteen years old or younger. Based on this information, I estimated the typical 
age at which children were being recruited. Child soldiers-15 is coded as "1" if the typical 
age was less than 15, or "0" if either child soldiers were not used or if the age appeared to 
be 15 or above. For example, concerning the RUF, the Coalition reports, “[o]ver 50 
percent of people who suffered forced recruitment were abducted at the age of 15 or 
younger, and over 28 per cent at the age of 12 or younger" (2008: 299). I coded this as 
"1." Afghanistan’s Northern alliance was coded at the higher age threshold. While they 
used soldiers younger than 15, this does not appear to be the norm given the information 
reviewed. “Boys between the ages of 14 and 18 were used as spies, messengers, porters, 
security guards and cooks” (Coalition 2004: 162). This is an imperfect system, as I was 
only able to estimate the typical age if at least some age was given (51.5%). Thus, if there 
was no information on ages and child soldier use occurred, I can only say that evidence 
existed for soldiers under the age of 18. Table 1 offers a summary of the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variables.  
--Table 1 here-- 
                                                 
22 One consistent concern with using age as a threshold for determining child soldier use is the notion age 
is culturally subjective. In some cultures, children are considered adults much sooner (Pederson and 
Sommerfelt 2007). While this concern is valid, a quick look at the within-country variation reveals that 
many instances of rebels using child soldiers occur in the same country where other groups do not recruit 
children, where voting ages are high (18 years) or age of consent matches global standards (16-18 years).  
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I include an ordinal variable child soldiers-ord to measure the extent of the 
violation. This variable was coded as "0" if there was no documented evidence that the 
group used child soldiers. If there was evidence of child soldier use but no reported age, 
this variable was coded as 1 to indicate that the entry at least met the Coalition's 
definition of a child soldier as a person under the age of 18. Reported usage of under 15 
was recorded as 2, which represents the more extreme cutoff. If the youngest reported age 
seemed like an aberration and did not represent the typical age category of the children 
being used, I made the decision to recode this as "1." For example, the Peoples Liberation 
Army (PLA) in Nepal were reported to use child soldiers, "the youngest being 12 years 
old." However, I felt it necessary to consider "[t]he general practice of the PLA was to 
enroll children above the age of 16" (Coalition 2008: 274). In total, 14 similar decisions 
were made. This should not be problematic because the average discrepancy was 2.5 
years away from the 15-year objective cutoff. The mode was just one year. Also, this 
alteration works against finding significance for my hypotheses as groups using low 
children at lower ages will more likely be counted at the higher threshold if there is a 
problem. The PLA example was the most extreme subjective recoding. Figure 4 provides 
a general summary of the evidence uncovered.  
 As a final measure of child soldier use and norm compliance, I include a measure 
that records the lowest reported age if child soldiering is observed. This variable, age, 
ranges from 5 to 17 years with a mean of 11 and standard deviation of 2.9. There are 53 
observations. From this measure I can determine, beyond dichotomy, the extent to which 
the norm against child soldier use is being violated.  
--Figure 4 here-- 
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4.5 Independent Variables  
 In Chapter 3, the main hypotheses were derived from the theory. The models 
predict when rebels are likely to use child soldiers or when they will refrain. I now 
describe how the explanatory variables identified earlier are measured.   
 
Secession 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that where the rebel goal is secession, child soldiers are less 
likely to be used. The variable secession is used to capture the primary goal of the 
rebellion. To operationalize this concept, I code the type of rebellion using the START 
Terrorist Organization Profiles (Terror Knowledge Database 2010), para-military profiles 
from GlobalSecurity.org (2010b), and additional secondary sources.23 I recoded the data 
from the EACD in order to operationalize goals, rather than tactics. This was coded based 
on the stated goals of the rebellion or an analysis of their objectives. I used the values 
coded directly from the START database where researchers identified the goals 
explicitly. In the GlobalSecurity profiles, I coded the rebellions based on the relevant 
descriptions. Secession is a dichotomous variable that is recorded as "1" if the rebellions 
evaluated goals were either “Nationalist/Separatist” or “Secessionist,” and "0" otherwise. 
Even if other goals were included (e.g., religious, communist/socialist, leftist), rebellions 
were recorded as secessionist. Nearly half, 41.75% of the rebellions in my sample are 
coded as secessionist. The expected direction of the relationship is negative: Secessionist 
                                                 
23 I did not use the type of conflict recorded in the original EACD data. Here, there were several categories 
that would have captured the type of rebellion. However, the inclusion of terrorists as a type indicates that 
in some cases, tactics were used instead of goals and would be an inappropriate proxy for the concept of 
group goals. 
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rebellions should be less likely to break the norm against child soldiers. Table 2 offers a 
summary of the primary independent variables included in the dataset. Figure 5 
summarizes the number of groups coded as separatist. 
--Table 2 here-- 
--Figure 5 here-- 
Rebel goals may change. Some may call for a change in policy and later a change 
in government. Frustrated, they might then call for independence. While conceivable, 
goals are unlikely to have changed in the 10 year period that I have data on child soldier 
use. In fact, they do not for any of the 103 rebellions in the dataset according to the 
secondary source material. My sample does capture change in behavior, but I treated this 
as imprecision in the source material. In other words, for the sake of thoroughness, I 
attributed holes in the recruitment record not as evidence of child protection, rather as 
limited information in the period. This was only the case if there was no evidence in a 
single report but child soldiering evident in one or both of the other reports. Thus, rebel 
goals are treated as invariant for the large-n analysis. I confront the issue of changing 
goals in Part Three of the project where I look at case studies of individual rebellions in 
detail.  
 
Opportunism 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that rebellions that are opportunistic will be more likely to 
use child soldiers. To determine if illicit funds were used, I used four sources of 
information. First, I consulted the data on illicit funds collected by Fearon (2004). 
Unfortunately, this only covered rebellions up to 1999. I also used funding information 
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from Civil Wars of the World (CWW) (DeRouen and Heo 2007). With both sources, a 
significant problem was that the information contained therein referred to the civil war 
state rather than individual rebellions. Once again, I consulted the START database and 
GlobalSecurity.org. Between these four sources, I was able to rule out contraband 
financing for approximately 65% of rebellions in the dataset. I let START and 
GlobalSecurity.org take precedence in the coding. That is, if Fearon (2004) or CWW 
recorded illicit financing, but both START and GlobalSecurity.org failed to provide 
evidence, I changed the coding to "0". This strategy is used because while each source is 
valuable, only the GlobalSecurity and START profiles contain individual rebel 
information. Both CWW and Fearon (2004) often include two or more rebellions active 
during the conflict. The only time I can specify which rebellion is using contraband 
financing using these sources is if there is only one active rebellion. In the absence of 
alternative information, however, Fearon (2004) and CWW is preferred.  
Scholars have met considerable difficulty in arriving at a consensus regarding 
funding and civil conflict in previous literature. Many estimates involve the ratio of 
primary commodity exports to GDP (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or some variation of this 
measure. The type of resource is important, though, and may account for the mixed 
results in the literature. For example, Ross (2004a) suggests that for resources to be 
influential, they must be both portable and profitable. In other words, lootable resources 
should matter, whereas non-lootables may serve as an incentive, but are not likely to 
substantively influence the current funding profile of the rebellion. Another approach is 
to examine the geographic distribution of resources and the location of rebels (Lujala 
2010). This too is useful at explaining motivations, but it does not help fully understand 
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the impact of funding on behavior. For example, while active in the heart of a region 
known for drug-trafficking, the Shan State Army in Burma is not known to be involved in 
the illicit trade. In fact, they are even known to cooperate with Thai anti-drug taskforces 
to combat the cross-border trade in heroin (GlobalSecurity.org 2010). The same cannot 
be said of its contemporaries like the United Wa State Army and the Mong Tai Army. 
Likewise, though the Khmer Rouge was known to use illegal logging of forests in its 
controlled territory to fund its rebellion, the NDFB in India is said to erect signs to 
combat smuggling of trees in the Manas forest reserve (GlobalSecurity.org 2010). 
Therefore, state-level measures and geographic data were not precise enough to 
determine which rebellions were actually using lootable contraband financing to fund 
their rebellions. My approach offers such information.   
I consider rebel financing specifically. It is not enough to be in an area that 
happens to have the potential for illicit economic activity, and it is certainly not sufficient 
to be in a country with high value lootables. Instead, by recording the evidence for or 
against contraband financing of the operation, I am able to include reliable measures on 
economic activity. The conceptual definition, illicit economic activity, and the empirical 
definition I employ are more closely aligned than other approaches. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Figure 6. 
--Figure 6 here-- 
 
Duration 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that longer rebellions will be more likely to use child 
soldiers. I use the natural log of duration to capture the number of years the rebellion has 
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lasted from its foundation.24 To measure the length of the rebellion, it was necessary to 
consider when the rebellion began, beyond the 1998 beginning date of the sample. I used 
activity dates from the START terrorist database and GlobalSecurity.org. I also used the 
World Bank Violent Conflict Database (World Bank 2010a) and the Upsala Conflict Data 
Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002) as a cross reference for active dates. This combined 
approach allowed me to avoid intermittent lulls in hostility. To estimate the conditional 
effects of secession on duration, I use an interactive term duration*secession which is log 
duration times the dichotomous variable secession.  
 
General Drawbacks 
There are some shortcomings with my general data gathering approach. First, it 
may be the case that reporting bias limits information on non-Western or otherwise 
smaller rebellions. While this may be the case, because my temporal period is recent 
guards against this major concern. My initial rebel list comes from a dataset already 
widely used and contains detailed information. Rebellions explored here already have 
detailed information that was used to compile the initial list. Likewise, the secondary 
sources consulted appear to have little regional bias. That is, they report as much 
information on the Middle East and Africa as they do with South American rebellions. I 
suspect there could be bias due to the size of the rebellions or where there are many 
active rebels in one country. In GlobalSecurity.org’s profiles, in at least two cases, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Burmese conflicts, the website does not have 
specific profiles for the rebellions involved. However, in both of these cases, 
                                                 
24 The natural log was used because of considerable skewness in the data.  
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GlobalSecurity maintains a detailed report about the overall conflict, including discussion 
of the behavior and funding characteristics of parties involved. Therefore, while the 
individual profiles are not there, the relevant information is still available. Likewise, that 
I use two or more primary sources for explanatory variables, I am able to rule out 
substantial systematic reporting bias.  
 
4.6 Control Variables 
One valuable asset of statistical analysis is the ability to hold potentially spurious 
factors constant. The purpose of including control variables is to rule out competing 
explanations for the dependent variable. In this case, simply looking at the relationship 
between the primary independent variables and the child soldier use would leave open the 
possibility that another factor or factors are driving the relationship between both. That is 
some uncontrolled Z is causing the observed relationship between X and Y. Thus, it is 
important to consider additional factors in the proposed models.  
Unfortunately, the quantitative literature on child soldiers is limited. However, 
there are a number of concepts that are thought to influence the use of child soldiers. I 
primarily use the World Bank's World Development Indicators for these controls (WDI) 
(World Bank 2010b). There are two distinct ways in which the supply of children able to 
be pressed into service can be conceptualized. First, Høiskar (2001) suggests that youth 
unemployment increases the likelihood of child soldier usage because they have few 
alternatives for livelihood and may volunteer. To proxy for the potential supply of 
underage volunteers, unemployed youth, is operationalized using the employment to 
population ratio of youths aged 15-24. The mean is 48.2 with a standard deviation of 
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15.32. The expected relationship for unemployed youth is positive. The more children are 
unemployed, the more underage volunteers will be available. 
The second form of supply is the number of potential conscripts. Achvarina and 
Reich (2006) find that large pools of vulnerable recruits contribute to child soldiering in a 
conflict. I proxy this with two variables: refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs). Both variables use estimates from the WDI25. Log-refugees is the number of 
refugees by country of asylum.26 This is averaged over the period 1998-2008. The mean 
is 9.26 with a standard deviation of 3.5.  I also include a measure that records the average 
highest estimate of IDPs in a country, log-IDPs. Data availability limits the temporal 
coverage to 2001-2008. The average for log-IDPs is 11.1 with a standard deviation of 
4.4. This proxy varies from the Achvarina and Reich's original concept in two ways. 
First, they do not argue that the number of potential recruits is influential. Rather, it is 
vulnerability that matters. They use qualitative accounts of 16 civil wars where reports of 
camp attacks were available. In order to engage in the large-n analysis, I was unable to do 
the same. Instead, noting that all camps are inherently insecure and very few enjoy 
peacekeeper protection (Lischer 2010: 148-149). Therefore, I cautiously accept my 
chosen measures. Second, and less consequential, their theory predicts that the 
vulnerability of refugees IDPs will influence the child to adult soldier ratio, not just the 
occurrence of child soldiering. However, the same relationship should hold for use/non-
use as well. The more refugees and IDPs in a country, the larger the pool of vulnerable 
                                                 
25 Where the data were missing, I linearly interpolated to estimate the values.   
26 The natural log of refugees was used because of severe skew in the data (3.64).  
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youths and the more likely rebels can find potential recruits.27 The expected direction for 
log-refugees and log-IDPs is positive. Rebellions in areas with high numbers vulnerable 
recruits should be more likely to use child soldiers.  
 One of the most consistent features within a rebellion that explains when civilians 
will be abused is the level of internal discipline (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Child 
soldiering is a form of civilian abuse. Therefore, I include a control for the strength of the 
central command of the rebellion in my models. This is necessary to avoid the possibility 
that secessionist rebellions are somehow more in control of their forces and would 
therefore be less able to control for abuses. Strength central is evaluated based on the 
original EACD coding. I used a dichotomous variable to capture if the group has strong 
central command, coded as 1; the observation is coded 0 otherwise. There are four 
categories included in the original data; unclear, low, moderate and strong. To avoid 
losing 17 “unclear” cases, I opted for a dummy variable.28 Approximately 11.6% of the 
cases exhibited moderate or strong central control. The expected direction of strength 
central is negative. Rebellions with higher levels of central control should be less likely 
to use child soldiers. In the original study, Humphreys and Weinstein use individual-level 
surveys to determine how often punishment would follow transgressions. This process 
would be very difficult to replicate for my project.  
 I also control for the level of democracy in the state at the start of the rebellion. 
Andvig and Gates (2010) point out that government action can lead to grievances, 
prompting many children to volunteer or parents to send their children to fight with the 
                                                 
27 Ideally, I would have sub-national data for this measure and consider location of refugee-access and rebel 
use of child soldiers. Unfortunately, I do not. Also, methodological tools to appropriately consider 
geographic disaggregation are beyond the scope of this project.  
28 Variations in coding of the "unclear category" failed to result in statistically or substantively significant 
changes to the variables of interest. 
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rebel forces. Alternatively, government repression may lead many adults to join the 
insurgency. This would lead to a glut in the labor market where children would be easier 
to turn away. One example of this is in the Burmese civil war. There, the government 
conscripts children because adults are not volunteering (Becker 2010). These arguments 
justify inclusion of a democracy control variable. I use the average Polity IV value to for 
the country during the 1998-2008 time period. (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). The mean 
for democracy is 2.1. The expected direction for democracy is not known because either 
mechanism could be at work. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 In Chapter 3 I argued that concerns over international legitimacy serve as a 
constraint on the recruitment behavior of rebel groups. If a group seeks recognition, they 
will refrain because international support is crucial to reach their goal. Opportunistic 
rebellions are not subject to legitimacy constraints. Also, incentives exist that lead one to 
question whether they even care about winning. The reduced employment cost of using 
children will be more important to them compared to lower global reputation and a 
reduction in capabilities associated with child soldiers. The length of the rebellion will 
have a similar effect, whereby concerns to keep expenses low will drive rebels to use 
low-cost children, but this effect will be tempered by legitimacy constraints. 
 This chapter laid the basis for the quantitative analysis that follows. I offered 
justification for the inclusion and measurement of each variable along with a brief 
account of how this project improves on past limitations. In the next chapter, I subject 
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each variable to statistical tests to determine when rebellions will refrain from breaking 
the international norm against child soldier use and when they will not.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Source Theory Variable Descriptive Statistics Source  
Norm Violation child soldier  76.7% Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008 
Extreme Norm Violation child soldier-15 30% Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008 
Categorical Norm Violation child soldier-ord Non-use 24.3%; cs_18 45.6%; cs_15 30% Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008 
Degree of Compliance age 11.1 years Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008 
Note: Descriptive Statistics refer to the proportions for dichotomous variables, and mean scores for continuous variable. Statistics for ordinal variable presented 
by category: non-use, cs_18, cs_15.  
 
Table 2: Key Variables, Indicators, and the Expected Direction of Relationship 
Source Theory Variable Descriptive Stats Expected Direction Source 
Legitimacy Constraints Secession 41.75%  Negative GlobalSecurity.org; START  
Opportunism Illicit 35%  Positive GlobalSecurity.org; 
START; Civil Wars of 
the World; Fearon 2004 
Length of Rebellion (log) Duration 14.4 years Positive GlobalSecurity.org; START 
Conditional Effect Secession*Duration . Negative  
Supply of Volunteers Youth Employment 48.2 Positive  World Bank WDI 
Supply of Conscripts 1 (log) Refugees  9.26 Positive World Bank WDI 
Supply of Conscripts 2 (log) IDPs 11.04 Positive World Bank WDI 
Internal Discipline Strong Central Control 11.65% Negative EACD 
Motivation to Volunteer Democracy  29% Mixed Polity IV 
 Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the proportions for dichotomous variables and mean scores for continuous variables.  
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Figure 3: Number of Rebellions per Country 
 
 
Figure 4: Evidence of Child Soldier Use by Rebellions 
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Figure 5: Number of Secessionist Rebellions 
 
 
Figure 6: Evidence of Illicit Funding by Rebellions 
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Chapter Five: 
Legitimacy Constraints and the Use of Child Soldiers  
5.1 Introduction 
 This project argues that rebels' long-term goals make them more or less likely to 
use child soldiers. This chapter tests this theory against every rebellion active between 
1998-2008.  Here, I will answer four questions. Do secessionist rebellions use child 
soldiers less often than non-secessionists? Are rebellions that use illicit funds more likely 
to use child soldiers than those that do not? Are longer rebellions more likely to involve 
child recruitment? If so, is duration less influential for separatists?  
 This chapter proceeds through six sections. First, I review the empirical 
implications of the theory presented in Chapter 3. This is followed by a brief discussion 
of the methods employed and a quick summary of the main findings. The next part 
focuses on the evidence for Hypotheses 1-3a on three different dependent variables. The 
fourth section explores the conditional effects of legitimacy constraints on duration and 
presents graphs to support Hypothesis 3b. The fifth section briefly discusses the effects of 
the control variables considered independently and then along with the variables of 
interest included in the models. Finally, I discuss the goodness of fit of the model and 
why this suggests my methods are a valuable improvement in the study.  
 
5.2 Analytical Methods 
I use logistic regression clustered by country to specify two types of empirical 
models: one where the age threshold of child soldiers is set at less than 18 years and 
another at under 15. A third model is tested using ordered logit to explore the effect of 
 110 
secessionist goals on the ordinal form of the dependent variable. Finally, I explore the 
interaction of duration and rebel type with three empirical models: one for each of the 
child soldier age thresholds and a third for the youngest reported age of the children that 
are used. For the youngest reported age, I use OLS regression.  
These methods are suitable for a number of reasons. First, child soldier use is a 
violation of international norms. Logistic regression allows me to gauge the effects of the 
specified predictor variables on the log-odds that violation will occur. From this, I can 
predict probabilities about the likelihood the phenomenon will occur for the different 
groups and estimate the magnitude of the factors identified. Finally, due to structure of 
the dependent variables, (dichotomous, ordinal, continuous) logistic regression, ordered 
logit, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models are the most appropriate estimation 
techniques, respectively.  
 
Summary of the Evidence 
The quantitative tests performed here confirm that rebels engage in long-term 
decision making about their recruitment patterns. As Table 3 shows, the impact of 
secession is consistently negative and statistically significant in all models of child 
soldier use. Separatist rebellions are not only less likely to use child soldiers; they are 
also less likely to use them at either age-threshold. Further, when rebel groups are using 
child soldiers, secessionists are statistically more likely to use older children. Illicit funds 
are associated with a higher likelihood that child soldiers will be used. This is true for the 
higher age threshold and the ordinal version. Similarly, as predicted, we see a positive 
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relationship between rebellion duration and child recruitment as well as a conditional 
relationship with secession.  
--Table 3 here-- 
 
5.3 Quantitative Results 
 The decision to recruit child soldiers is the result of long-term calculations 
regarding the benefits and consequences of having underage troops. For some, the loss of 
legitimacy is not worth it. For others, neither loss of legitimacy nor a reduction in 
capabilities acts as a deterrent. For others, still, the low-costs of recruiting children appear 
valuable. Table 4 presents the results of the analysis with different forms of the as the 
dependent variable. The first hypothesis predicts that separatist rebellions should be less 
likely to violate the norm against the use of child soldiers. Model 1 tests the variables on 
the dichotomous child soldiers variable, while Model 2 use the lower age threshold child 
soldiers-15. I specified an ordered logit with child soldiers-ordinal as the dependent 
variable in Model 3. Finally, Model 4 tests the variables on the lowest reported age of 
soldiers used in the rebellion. The hypotheses perform remarkably well. Regardless of 
specification, the coefficients are in the expected direction and are statistically significant 
with at least 90% confidence (two-tail).   
--Table 4 here-- 
 
Hypothesis 1: Legitimacy Constraints 
First, I estimate the relationship of separatism on child soldier use. As shown in 
Model 1 (Table 4), secessionist rebellions are less likely than non-secessionists to use 
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child soldiers. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant (p-value .002). 
Separatists are also more likely to avoid especially young child soldiers (Model 2, p-
value .014). In Model 4 of Table 4, the coefficient for secession again has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant (p-value .003). The results are supportive of the theory, 
but the coefficients of logistic regression are notoriously difficult to interpret 
substantively. Therefore, I use Clarify to estimate the predicted probability child 
recruitment will take place (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Results are presented 
graphically in Figure 7. The substantive impact of the key variables of interest is 
revealing. First, the likelihood of child soldiers being used is approximately .79, when 
continuous variables are set at the mean and dichotomous variables are all set to 0. 
However, setting secession to "1" reduces the predicted probability to .46. This represents 
a 42% decrease in the likelihood child soldiers will be used holding all else equal. In 
Model 2 (Table 4), for the lower age-threshold, the difference between separatists and 
non-separatists is stark. The predicted probability that child soldiers under 15 years old 
will be used is .36. This falls by over 67% to .12 for secessionist rebellions. Exploring the 
ordinal measure (Model 3), separatist rebellions are more likely to be in category 0 (no 
child soldiers) than the other two categories. The predicted probability increases from .18 
to .45, suggesting a higher degree restraint. Secessionist goals reduce the likelihood child 
soldiers will be used by 14.5% compared to the baseline. The effect on category 2 (child 
soldiers less than 15) is more impressive at 65.5% reduced likelihood. Taken together, 
these results reveal strong support for Hypothesis 1. Separatist rebellions use child 
soldiers less often than non-separatists.  
--Figure 7 here-- 
 113 
Using the lowest recorded age as the dependent variable uncovered the expected 
relationship as seen in Table 4 Model 4. Secession is positive and statistically significant 
(p-value .05). Even separatist rebellions that use child soldiers (violating international 
norms) are likely to employ older children, indicating some degree of restraint. When 
considering the lowest reported age, on average, separatists will use children 1.6 years 
older than non-separatist rebellions, holding all else constant. This offers further evidence 
that rebellions aimed at independence engage in a form of compliance to the norm. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Opportunism 
 In the second set of model specifications, I estimate the relationship between 
illicit funds and child soldier use. Rebellions that use contraband financing are more 
likely to use child soldiers than those that refrain. In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value .01). For the lower age threshold presented 
in Model 2, the relationship is also positive and statistically significant at standard levels 
(p-value .1).  Using the ordinal dependent variable, illicit also performs as expected. 
Rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to be in category 2 (less than 15), than 
they are in category 1 (less than 18) and category 0 (no evidence).  
Once again, it is useful to explore the results by estimating predicted probabilities. 
The likelihood that child soldiers will be used increases substantially for those rebellions 
that have drugs or conflict gemstones in their financial portfolios. For rebellions that 
refrain from using illicit funds, the likelihood child soldiers will be used is estimated at 
.79. This increases by nearly 23% (.97) for those that do use illicit funds. For children 
under 15, the likelihood that rebel groups will use them increases by 47% from .36 to .53. 
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With the ordinal measure of child soldier use, the changes are similar. Rebellions that do 
not use illicit funds are 62.8% more likely to be in the non-use category, while 
contraband financing make rebellions nearly twice as likely to use excessively young 
children compared to the other two categories. Hypothesis 2 finds strong empirical 
support in these data. Rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to use child soldiers.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Duration 
 Quantitative tests reveal the length of the rebellion is influential just as Chapter 3 
predicted. The coefficient for duration in Model 1 (Table 4) and Model 3 are positive and 
statistically significant. Longer rebellions are associated with a higher log-odds ratio 
when the dependent variable is child soldiers (p-value .075). Using the ordinal variable, 
longer rebellions are more likely to be in a higher category away from the non-use 
baseline (p-value .066). Substantively, at one standard deviation below the mean of 
log_duration (2 years), the likelihood that child soldiers will be used is .7. This rises to 
.86 (23%) at one standard deviation above the mean (28 years). Finally, going from one 
standard deviation below to one above the mean reduces the likelihood that child soldiers 
will be avoided by 55% (.12 compared to .267). Interestingly, child soldiers at the higher 
age threshold are around 11% less likely to be used. However, the reason appears to be a 
result of their decision to use very young children. Rebellions of around 2 years are not 
likely to use children less than 15 years old (predicted probability = .2). This increases by 
over 55% for wars lasting around 28 years (predicted probability = .4).  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Conditional Effects 
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Hypothesis 3b predicted a conditional effect of secession on duration. Table 5 
reports the empirical evidence. The interactive term, explored graphically in Figure 8, 
reveals that the effect of secession remains negative even at exceptionally high duration. 
That is, throughout the length of the war, secessionist rebellions show restraint. This 
effect weakens over time, but remains consequential. A similar relationship is observed at 
the lower age threshold as well, Figure 8. While negative, the effect of secession weakens 
over time. The effect weakens only after (log) duration exceeds one standard deviation 
above the mean, or about 28 years. Collectively, these graphs reveal strong, though 
qualified, support for Hypothesis 3b. As a final test on the marginal effects, I again 
explore the role of secession and duration on the lowest reported age of child soldiers 
(Figure 9). Again, secessionist rebellions that do employ children appear to generally use 
older kids. However, this only holds for conflicts of about 28 years. The effects of 
secession decrease over time up to this point. From the evidence uncovered here, 
Hypothesis 3b is supported. While duration does increase the likelihood child soldiers 
will be used, this effect is conditioned by groups goals aimed at independence.  
--Table 5 here-- 
--Figure 8 here-- 
--Figure 9 here-- 
 
5.4 Control Variables 
The only control variable to consistently find empirical support is the estimate of 
IDPs within the country. A higher number of IDPs increases the likelihood child soldiers 
will be used by rebel groups in that state (p-value .000). This is also true for the lower age 
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threshold (p-value .09) and the ordinal measure (p-value .008). Substantively, the effect is 
quite large. Going from one standard deviation below the mean to one above, changes the 
estimated likelihood from .6 to .9 for the higher age threshold (50%) and almost 100% 
(.25 to .48) for those under 15 years old. While not an exact test of Achvarina and Reich 
(2006), it does offer more support for their theory about camp security and its positive 
effect on the use of child soldiers. Interestingly, the strength of the central control 
measure was not statistically significant in any of the models. Likewise, employed youth 
and state-level of democracy fail to reach standard levels of significance.  
 
5.5 Model Fit 
The overall goodness of fit of the fully-specified model is strong (Table 4, Model 
1). First, the pseudo-R2 is .34 indicating a strong fit. Additionally, I compare the area 
under the Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) (Fawcett 2006). With just the control 
variables, the area beneath the ROC is .74 indicating that the model produces a fair model 
fit. By adding the primary independent variables to the model, the area under the curve 
improves substantially to .86. With a chi-square test comparing the baseline model with 
the models including rebel type, illicit funds, and duration, Model 6 significantly 
improved upon the predictive power (Prob > χ2 = .04). Taken together, including rebel 
type, funding and duration are necessary components of models predicting the use of 
child soldiers. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
Based on the empirical evidence uncovered in this chapter, the theory presented in 
Chapter 3 has strong support. All hypotheses are supported. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
secessionist rebellions should be less likely to use child soldiers. This is supported in 
each model and holds for both age thresholds. The impact of secession is consistently 
negative and both statistically and substantively significant. This is true regardless of age 
threshold, and even where child soldiers are used by secessionists, they tend to use older 
children. This identifies a strong constraint imposed by the pursuit of legitimacy.  
The second hypothesis predicted that rebellions that rely on illicit funding should 
be more likely to use child soldiers. Second, the impact of illicit funds is consistently 
positive and has a remarkable substantive impact. At the higher age threshold (<18 years 
old) and using the ordinal variable, the effects of illicit funds are positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests the impact of opportunism on long-term decision making is 
strong.  
Hypothesis 3a predicted the effects of duration on child soldier use to be positive. 
The impact of duration was also positive and substantively important. This was found to 
be the case at both the higher age threshold and for the ordinal measure. Finally, the 
theory also led to Hypothesis 3b, which expected a conditional effect of secession on 
duration. Evidence for this was found at most levels of duration. The impact is no longer 
statistically significant only at excessively high levels of duration (>2 standard deviations 
above the mean, about 52 years). Coupled with the conditional effect of secession, the 
evidence presented here suggests rebels update their preferences with regards to 
recruitment decisions and, by extension, their willingness to abrogate international 
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norms. All of the results when taken together suggest that rebel type, funding, and 
duration are highly influential on the decision to use child soldiers.  
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                       Table 3: Summary of Results from Quantitative Analysis 
 Secession  Illicit Duration Refugees IDPs Strong 
Central 
Control
Employed 
Youth 
Democracy
Child Soldiers - + + . + . . . 
Child Soldiers-15 - + . . + . . . 
Child Soldiers-ord - + + . + . . . 
Age + . . . . . . . 
                 Note: "+"= positive and significant relationship, "-" = negative and significant relationship, "." = insignificant results.  
                 Conditional models are presented graphically in Figures 8 and 9.
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     Table 4: Impact of Primary Variables on Child Soldier Use (1998-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (CS) (CS_15) (CS_ord) (Age) 
     
Secessionist -1.649*** -1.551** -1.368*** 1.648* 
 (0.533) (0.634) (0.455) (0.825) 
Illicit Funds 3.351** 0.685* 1.151** -0.560 
 (1.340) (0.421) (0.460) (0.855) 
(log) Duration 0.414* 0.354 0.400* -0.529 
 (0.232) (0.272) (0.217) (0.446) 
(log) Refugees 0.0649 0.0645 0.0781 -0.00582 
 (0.0929) (0.0532) (0.0542) (0.135) 
(log) IDPs 0.231*** 0.135* 0.183*** -0.169 
 (0.0662) (0.0817) (0.0687) (0.133) 
Strength Central Control 0.492 -0.799 -0.365 0.0199 
 (1.215) (0.739) (0.500) (1.059) 
Employed Youth -0.00344 0.0100 0.00538 -0.0510 
 (0.0244) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0361) 
Democracy 0.00436 0.000472 -0.00618 0.00364 
 (0.0710) (0.0363) (0.0382) (0.0966) 
Constant -2.412 -3.874**  16.42*** 
 (1.594) (1.556)  (2.524) 
Cut 1   2.252*  
   (1.204)  
Cut 2   4.771***  
   (1.374)  
     
Observations 103 103 103 53 
Wald chi-squared 24.83*** 15.21** 26.34  
Pseudo R-squared 0.344 0.130 0.151 0.215 
      Robust standard errors clustered by country presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "CS" = child soldiers, "CS_15" = child soldiers_15,        
      "CS_ord" = child soldiers_ord 
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Table 5: Conditioning Effects of Secession on Duration (1998-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (CS) (CS_15) (Age) 
    
Secessionist -1.593 -6.151** 9.438* 
 (1.140) (2.428) (5.057) 
Illicit Funds 3.347** 0.947** -1.089 
 (1.354) (0.464) (1.034) 
(log) Duration 0.425 0.224 -0.306 
 (0.312) (0.298) (0.482) 
Secession*Duration -0.0280 1.557** -2.683 
 (0.447) (0.699) (1.685) 
Employed Youth -0.00347 0.00797 -0.0421 
 (0.0243) (0.0152) (0.0363) 
(log) Refugees 0.0652 0.0855* -0.0474 
 (0.0938) (0.0501) (0.136) 
(log) IDPs 0.231*** 0.116 -0.0942 
 (0.0652) (0.0806) (0.161) 
Strong Central Control 0.502 -1.018 0.297 
 (1.195) (0.768) (1.104) 
Democracy 0.00496 0.000642 0.0106 
 (0.0696) (0.0376) (0.0934) 
Constant -2.438 -3.546** 15.18*** 
 (1.692) (1.470) (2.844) 
    
Observations 103 103 53 
Wald chi-squared 26.53 18.38  
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.344 0.155 0.259 
Robust standard errors clustered by country presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "CS" 
= child soldiers, "CS_15" = child soldiers_15, "Age" = lowest recorded age of the child soldier. 
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Figure 7: Impact of Independent Variables on Child Soldier Use (1998-2008) 
 
 
Note: Circles reveal the predicted change in child soldier use as the row variable ranges from 1 standard deviation below the mean to 1 standard deviation above 
the mean for continuous variables and 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables while holding all other variables constant. Whiskers reveal the 95% confidence interval. 
"X"s reveal the predicted change in child soldier use at the 15 year age threshold.  
 
 
Primary IVs
Controls
 
Employed Youth
 
Democracy
 
Strong Central Control
 
(log) IDPs
 
(log) Refugees
 
(log) Duration
 
Illicit Funds
 
Secession
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Max Min %Change 
.79 .46 -42% 
.36 .12 -67% 
.79 .97 +22% 
.36 .53 +47% 
.7 .86 +23% 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
.6 .9 +50% 
.25 .48 +95% 
. . . 
. . .  
. . .  
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
Difference in Predicted Probability 
 123 
 
Figure 8: Conditional Effects of Secession on Duration for Child Soldier Use 
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Figure 9: Conditional Effects of Secession on Duration for Lowest Age 
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PART THREE: 
CASE STUDIES 
A. Review of Theory 
 The main arguments in this project revolve around the type of rebellion and their 
long-term decision-making. I argued in Chapter 3 that secessionist leaders are more 
influenced by international norms because they aim to join the international community 
and hope to demonstrate their legitimacy by maintaining child protection and refusing to 
use child soldiers. Therefore, separatists groups should show a strong inclination towards 
international opinion, even to the point where it is favored over domestic demands. 
Conversely, rebellions relying on illicit funds should be more likely to use child soldiers 
because of an alteration of goals among the leadership and rank and file which reduces 
the utility of victory. Rebellions that are active in a profitable illicit economy should 
exhibit features consistent with those that put a premium on the status quo. Detailed 
inquiry into their actions should reveal instances where victory was clearly not the aim.  
In this brief section, I walk through the main rationale for adopting a qualitative 
approach to the theory of legitimacy constraints. Next, I discuss the different aspects of 
the case studies used and why they are valuable as tests of the hypotheses.  
 
B. Justification for Qualitative Approach 
The previous chapter revealed strong statistical relationships between the use of 
child soldiers and rebel type, funding, and duration. These results, while consistent with 
my theory, tell only part of the story. It is necessary to explore the mechanisms identified 
in Chapter 3 in a way that can better illustrate the fluid and dynamic aspects of the causal 
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story. Therefore, I use case studies to further illustrate the determinants of child soldier 
use. With systematic small-n research, I am able to rule out some alternative explanations 
of recruitment decisions that cannot be adequately controlled with quantitative analyses. 
The quantitative tests are valuable, but qualitative research can help assess aspects of the 
theory that statistics cannot uncover.   
One of the most important reasons for using small-n research for the study of 
child soldiers is to more effectively rule out alternative explanations. This project is 
focused on a phenomenon that remains understudied. Therefore, it is difficult to compile 
an exhaustive list of control variables for the large-n models. For example, one of the 
most common suggestions for differences in child protection is the ubiquitous "culture." 
This is a fuzzy concept that is notoriously difficult to measure (Zadeh 1965). It can mean 
one thing to a researcher (e.g., religion) and something different altogether with another 
(e.g., farming practices). Treatment of children is easily susceptible to cultural arguments. 
The cases discussed here explore local norms where rebel groups operate and compare 
these to international norms and those of the rebel groups themselves. The small-n 
research conducted here serves to rule out such competing explanations.  
 A second major strength of qualitative research is the depth of analysis that is 
possible. Quantitative research explores many cases, but ultimately researchers are 
limited in the depth of their knowledge. Qualitative research is the reverse of this; 
"knowing more about less" rather than "less about more" (Ragin 2000:22). In this project, 
I aim to remedy both by engaging in an in-depth analysis of multiple cases.  
This rectifies the conceptual stretching employed for the large-n study. For 
example, the concept of child soldiers is reduced to an indicator variable. The cases allow 
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me to better explore the child soldier variable of the large-n analysis.  In all but the 
Somaliland case, I explore the volume or numbers of child soldiers used by each group, 
as well as the age, under 15 years. That is, exploring the child soldier variable beyond a 
"2." It is not the case that the other groups in the large-n data do not offer any child 
protection. Rather, such behavior is captured by the less-than-ideal "0" in the child 
soldier use measure.  Of the four cases, only Somaliland and the SPLM offer substantive 
child protection. For them, I "unpack" the "0" on their child soldier measure. Another 
way to think about following the norm against child soldier use is as a continuous 
variable. With my 2,1,0 indicator, I am only getting part of the picture. The cases let me 
extend the measure above 2 (extremely young ages) and below 0 (more than just not 
letting them be soldiers). 
Even using the more nuanced age-related variables does not solve the problem of 
loss of information. The extent of use and the number of children used by each group is 
valuable information that is, at this point, almost impossible to find for the full sample of 
cases. The task is more manageable for groups involved in the four civil wars explored in 
this section. Another benefit offered by the richness of detail is to extend the concept of 
non-use of child soldiers into the realm of child protection. Thus, if groups fail to use 
child soldiers (like Somaliland, Chapter 6) or stop using them (like the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement, Chapter 8) qualitative research allows greater exploration into the 
policies of the group that help children. This broadens the measurement of child soldier 
use from positive (child soldiers present) to negative (higher levels of child protection). 
This would be difficult to do with large-n analysis.  
 128 
 
 Third, I am better able to explore causal mechanisms behind my theory with 
qualitative research. I provide a causal story in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5, I offer empirical 
support for this story, what should be seen if the story is true. With qualitative case 
studies, the decision-making processes that lie at the heart of the theory can be explicated. 
Certainty will remain elusive; individuals retain private information. However, with 
detailed examination of records, policies, secondary source analysis, and personal 
interviews, these data lead to strong inferences about the private information of decision-
makers. Such exploration reveal better how the goals of the rebellion and funding sources 
influence the behavior and characteristics of the rebellion itself (George and Bennett 
2005). 
 Finally, small-n research will help identify other important variables whose 
relationship was dismissed in the statistical analysis. Statistical insignificance is not the 
same thing as having no relationship. Case studies have an advantage in exploratory 
research (Gerring 2004). Therefore, the analysis that follows will be able to identify 
where additional variables play a role even if those variables did not have statistical 
significance in the large-n analysis. 
 
C. Qualitative Methods Employed  
In this project, case studies are used to explore the causal mechanisms of my 
theory of legitimacy-constrained rebel behavior. I utilize three qualitative methods to test 
my theory. First, I use a most-similar systems design to explore rebellions in the ongoing 
Somali civil war. I chose this case because selecting rebellions in a single country largely 
holds constant a number of potentially influential variables in order to identify the effects 
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of a key causal variable (Lijphart 1971). However, it is impossible to control for all 
possible variables, (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Therefore, a second case study uses a 
most-different systems design to explore the second empirical statement regarding 
contraband financing. Here, I compare the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) with the Taliban in Afghanistan. On as many variables as possible, FARC and 
the Taliban are different, except on the primary variables of interest. Finally, I utilize 
deviant-case analysis to explore the role of legitimacy constraints on the behavior of the 
Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM offers insight into a rare 
successful secessionist movement. South Sudan gained independence in January 2011. 
However, they also used child soldiers. I will explore this case to find out why my theory 
failed to predict this behavior.  
With all approaches, I am adopting both explanatory and descriptive designs 
(Berg 2009: 327). I attempt to test the causality I propose is at work in the large-n 
analysis. At the same time, I am providing a link between the theory and the ability to 
interpret the findings in both the large-n and small-n analysis. This approach adopts both 
comparative and longitudinal case studies.  
 
D. Somaliland 
The most obvious form of selection bias, according to King, Keohane, and Verba 
(1994), is selecting cases we know support our conclusion. This is certainly suspected in 
my selection of cases. However, random selection in cases studies is not always feasible 
or desirable (125). Certainly in the selection of Somalia, I anticipate my results based on 
a preliminary review of the literature concerning child soldiers. However, Somalia is such 
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an important case that it would be more problematic if left out. Somalia provides a 
natural experiment where a number of rebellions are ongoing in the same country. More 
than this, the cultural, historical, and societal similarities allow an opportunity to explore 
why some rebellions behave differently than others. Also, King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994) emphasize the importance of variation on the dependent variable. Selecting 
Somalia accomplishes this. Finally, they point out that a case can, but does not always 
mean a single observation. Here, I will explore at least three observations within the case, 
thereby allowing for variation in both my explanatory and dependent variables.  
I explore the role of rebellion type in the case of Somalia. I selected this case 
using a most-similar systems comparative design.29 Rebellions ongoing in Somalia share 
a number of characteristics. First, they are opposed to the same actor: the internationally 
recognized Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. They also had the same 
exposure to recent historical events, such as the calamitous Ogaden War 1977-78.  They 
have similarities in terms of language and religion, and share various population-related 
demographics, such as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
However, there is variation in outcome and in goals of the rebellion. I will primarily 
explore the Somali National Movement, which became the self-declared Republic of 
Somaliland. I then use the most-similar systems design to rule out alternative 
explanations for Somaliland's high levels of child protection by comparing the group with 
the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. I will also explore the Islamic Courts Union 
and its militant wing, the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Together, along with various militia 
groups in the country, I explore the goals of rebellion and how it influences the 
                                                 
29 That the unit of analysis is sub-regional this case study is essentially an area study with all of the benefits 
therein (Coppedge 2002). 
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recruitment of child soldiers. Thus, while the cases were selected having some idea of the 
value of the variables of interest, they reflect the full variation in the dependent variable. 
Therefore, the selection criteria should not be correlated with the error term (Collier and 
Mahoney 1996).  
Further justification for the case selection is that Somalia is a least-likely case. 
That is, any superficial reading of the history of the conflict leads to the conclusion that 
“all parties to the hostilities” use child soldiers (Coalition 2008: 306). Therefore, to 
uncover variation in the use of child soldiers by one group would be informative. Also, 
Somalia is of paramount importance in world affairs as one of the highest profile civil 
conflicts ongoing. Uncovering rich information about parties involved in the conflict 
would be very valuable. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), producing unbiased 
information is one of the criteria that should guide case selection. Reliable sources need 
to be consulted. Information for Somalia is relatively easily accessible because of the 
amount of NGO attention the conflict has received. Likewise, a history of vocal political 
actors with well-documented statements and beliefs is likely to allow for research into 
thoughts and motivations of decision-makers within the movements. While the latter 
source of information will not be unbiased, having the actors’ own words to serve as a 
guide for their motivation will perhaps be more valuable than a third party interpretation 
of their motives.  
 
What I Expect to See 
 In this case, a cursory reading of the evidence reveals that Somaliland, unlike 
every other group in Somalia's long civil war, refrains from using child soldiers. If my 
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theory is correct, I also expect to see a clear payoff to the government for restraint. In 
addition, there should be a record of statements by officials that indicate strong 
appreciation for international standards. Finally, if the empirical record reveals 
knowledge by senior officials of the political power of human rights in general and child 
protection specifically, this would support my theory. Absence of these crucial elements 
would cast doubt over the theory's accuracy.  
How I Will Know if I Am Wrong 
Conceptual stretching is inevitable with large-n research. I have only explored a 
brief report about child soldier use by some of these rebellions. I do not have information 
about the nuances of their use. If child recruitment turns out to be minimal and somehow 
only extreme cases were reported, my hypotheses will lose support. Furthermore, I only 
assume that secessionists and non-secessionists differ in their concern with international 
opinion. It could be the case that other groups are equally concerned. If that turns out to 
be the case, then my theory of norm-constrained behavior will lose support, and I will 
need to reevaluate my argument. Finally, if alternative explanations are discovered to be 
highly influential, then I will need to reformulate my hypotheses, or consider additional 
control variables in my quantitative models. By exploring the case of Somalia, I may 
uncover a number of competing explanations that may challenge my theory of 
legitimacy-constraints.  
 
E. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Taliban 
I will use a most-different systems design to explore the issue of rebel financing. 
Here, I selected cases that have similar child recruitment strategies but are otherwise 
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wholly different. FARC is a Latin American armed opposition group that has been 
fighting a leftist struggle against the relatively stable Colombian government. The 
Taliban emerged from the relentless tribal conflict that occurred in the wake of the 
withdrawing Soviet-backed Najibullah government. They were the de facto ruler of 
Afghanistan from 1996-2001. They are currently fighting in opposition to the US-backed 
NATO Coalition Forces as well as the internationally recognized government of Hamid 
Karzai. I chose these cases because both groups represent important cases. They are also 
important for international security and, like Somalia, are equally high-profile 
insurgencies. Also, ample evidence exists about both funding sources and the behavior of 
the groups needed for a thorough analysis.   
What I Expect to See 
 The Taliban and FARC are known users of child soldiers. However, it must be 
clear that they know these children are poor soldiers and this deficiency does not deter 
their use. Further, considerable evidence must be present to suggest these groups have a 
vested interest in conflict continuation. It will be difficult to establish that these groups do 
not want to win. Instead, I need only show that elements within the group profit from 
fighting, this is preferred to any kind of closure, and using children accomplishes both. 
Most importantly, in order to support the hypothesis that illicit financing will promote 
child soldier use, this comparison must sufficiently eliminate alternative explanations that 
could also drive the empirical relationship revealed in the large-n analysis.   
How I Will Know if I Am Wrong 
It is not clear to what extent leaders of these groups have a lowered utility of 
victory or have allowed opportunists to infiltrate their ranks. My theory proposes both, 
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but it is true that both groups have stated political goals. If it turns out that illicit funds are 
truly just a means to an end, then my hypotheses will lose empirical support. Also, the 
use of child soldiers may be more of a tactical move than an economic decision. If it is 
the case, as some have argued, that children are intended to actually achieve victory and 
they do not represent a reduction in capabilities, I will have to reevaluate my theoretical 
conclusions in light of the new evidence.  
 
F. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
 The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army led the people of South Sudan to 
independence after nearly 30 years of armed conflict. It should, according to my theory of 
legitimacy constraints, offer a case of high child protection in an effort to garner 
international support. However, throughout the conflict, child soldiering was common in 
all parties to the conflict. In the third and final case study, I adopt a deviant-case analysis 
in an attempt to find out what went wrong. In my research, I attempt to reconcile the 
apparently contradictory findings. I rely on secondary source material and a personal 
interview with the Ambassador of South Sudan to the Kingdom of Belgium and 20-year 
veteran of the SPLM diplomatic corps. This mix of evidence reveals that far from being 
an aberration, many of the causal mechanisms were at work in the case of South Sudan.  
What I Expect to See 
 If my theory is to retain support even from this deviant-case's challenge, I need to 
find other areas of agreement. A link between secessionist policies and concern with 
international norms should be uncovered, even if these were not dominant. Further, I 
should be able to identify ways in which the theory is intervened by another factor that 
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prevents the causal mechanism from operating. Finally, I expect to see positive changes 
in child protection should coincide with changes regarding independence. Major pushes 
toward secession should accompany advances in child protection, and vice versa.  
How I Will Know if I Am Wrong 
 On the surface, in the case of the SPLM the theory has failed. However, the causal 
mechanisms may still be present. If, on the other hand, regardless of separatist goals, the 
SPLM made no effort whatsoever to court the international community through their 
actions, then my theory will need to be reevaluated. At the same time, if child soldiering 
was not a consideration, but the group followed other international norms, then using the 
subject of child soldiers to demonstrate the normative framework for rebel leaders will be 
flawed.  
 
G. Summary 
 In the three chapters that follow, I illustrate how the long-term decision making of 
rebel leaders plays into their decision to break international norms and recruit child 
soldiers. Combatants in all of these cases engage in manners consistent with a rational 
understanding of the international and domestic political environments in which they 
operate. To put it succinctly, a causal process linking group goals to their recruitment 
behavior does appear to be at work. Secessionists care about the international community 
and need it to win; opportunistic rebellions value the status quo and use underage troops 
to maintain it.  
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Chapter Six: 
International Norms in the Civil War of Somalia 
6.1 Introduction 
In the middle of 2011, a nationwide children's radio contest was held in Somalia. 
During the holy month of Ramadan, children were quizzed on such questions as "which 
war was Sheik Timajilic…killed in?" The contest was for children ages 10-17. The top 
two exceptional youths who answered the most correct questions were awarded AK-47s, 
while the third place winner received two hand grenades (Gettleman 2011). The contest 
was conducted by Al-Shabaab, one of the latest iterations in a string of anti-government 
insurgencies operating in the war-ravaged country.  
Meanwhile, 900 miles away in Northern Somalia, radios announced that a new 
building was to be erected in the center of town near the main airport. The United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had just laid the cornerstone for what it plans to be 
the largest headquarters for children's issues in the Horn of Africa. The land was granted 
as a gift by the administration of the Republic of Somaliland, indicating its adherence to 
children's rights, education and protection (Somaliland Press 2011).  
Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and has been fighting for state 
recognition ever since. Two rebellions -both in Somalia- highlight the variation in rebel 
behavior even among those fighting the same government in the same state in the same 
region. One shows complete disregard for using children for violence while the other 
shares the common global opinion that children deserve protection and the right to 
develop into adulthood.  
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 In Chapter 2, I proposed that rebellions that have the goal of independence are 
less likely to use child soldiers because they cannot win without the support of the 
international community for their cause of independence. Using child soldiers can be 
rational based on resource constraints, but whatever gain in troop size risks losing crucial 
backing by the global community. Somaliland, in the north is an armed separatist group. 
Their goal is independence. Other groups maintain a variety of goals from limited 
autonomy to control of the capital. Below, I argue that this factor can explain the 
differences in rates of recruitment of child soldiers.  
Examining the case of armed groups in Somalia allows for a laboratory-like 
comparison. United in 1960, the Somali state collapsed in 1991 into factional fighting 
that has yet to produce a stable government in Mogadishu. Instead, various groups have 
risen and fallen over the past 21 years. All of the groups share cultural, religious and 
historical similarities. However, they vary according to their overall goals. In this chapter 
I present a thorough exploration of the case of the Somali National Movement (SNM) 
and the Republic of Somaliland that it begat. By examining the recruitment practices and 
group goals, I outline a causal argument whereby adherence to international norms of 
child protection is a product of the leadership's pursuit of international support. They 
want to show they can be a global partner, and act accordingly. I use a most-similar 
systems design to rule out alternative explanations that may account for Somaliland's 
unusually high levels of child protections. Finally, I offer a brief review of the goals 
maintained by the various clan-based militias, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the State of Puntland. These goals help 
explain the variation in child protection.  
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6.2 Background to Somaliland and the Somali Civil War 
The SNM was just one of many clan-based militias in Somalia during the 1980s 
that formed to challenge the government. After the Ogadan War in 1978, groups 
throughout Somalia rose to challenge the government. In this section, I trace the 
background events to the conflict that continues to envelope the southern regions. This 
introduces the rebel groups that are contemporaries of Somaliland, in that they are 
operating in the same country at the same time. I go on to explain the rise of the SNM, 
and the establishment of a de facto independent Republic of Somaliland. This section 
serves to identify the actors in Somalia from the 1980s to the present. Later in this 
chapter, these actors, and their behavior towards child recruitment will be compared.  
 
The Somali Civil War in the South (1978-2009) 
The decline of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime began in the wake of a 
devastating defeat by Soviet-backed Ethiopia in the Ogaden War in 1978. On July 13, 
1977, Barre, seeking to capitalize on the weakness of an historic rival, invaded Ethiopia 
in an attempt to wrest control of the Ogaden territory and achieve the long-sought dream 
of uniting all Somali speakers into a unified "Greater Somalia." The Soviet Union had 
been the official superpower backer of Somalia since the 1969 coup headed by Siad 
Barre. However, after a communist coup in Ethiopia in 1974, they opted to support the 
politically and historically more prominent power. Somali forces were repulsed after a 
huge influx of Soviet weapons, personnel, and trainers came to aid the beleaguered 
Ethiopian troops (Marcus 2002). By late 1977, Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen and 
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East Germany had all supplemented the Ethiopian forces forcing the Somalis to retreat in 
defeat. After the Ogaden war in March 1978, Somalis were disheartened, the military was 
humiliated and bitter, and the clan demographics were rocked by the ensuing refugee 
crisis. Support for the regime plummeted. A group of Majerteen Military officers 
attempted a coup against Barre, but failed. Those that escaped arrest fled Somalia and 
formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) with the support of Ethiopia.  
Over time, rebellious forces formed in the north, south, east, and west. The SNM 
in the north formed around the Isaaq clan-identity. They, too, received support from 
Ethiopia. When this was removed and their foreign bases denied, they went on the 
offensive, quickly taking the towns of Burao and Hargeissa. In the south, the United 
Somali Congress (USC) successfully drove Barre's forces out of Mogadishu. The victors 
quickly collapsed into competing factions, all vying for control of Mogadishu. Intense 
fighting gripped the capital -fighting that continues unabated through 2012. When the 
government succumbed to the concerted force of these rebellions, retreating military 
factions formed insurgent factions. In 1991, Somalia descent into clan-based civil war 
officially commenced. The origins of the SNM and Somaliland are similar to other 
groups in the country, but the unique goals of the group help explain its behavior and 
recruitment patterns.  
Siad Barre fled Mogadishu on January 26, 1991. After his ouster, many groups 
fought for control of the state. USC leader Mohamed Farah Aideed chased Barre's forces 
out of the capital. In Aideed's absence, another USC leader, Ali Mahdi, declared himself 
president. Aideed's faction, now called the Somali National Alliance, returned to 
Mogadishu. At the first Somali peace conference in Djibouti in 1991, Mahdi's claim to 
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the executive was supported by the international community and he remained the 
internationally recognized head of state for the next nine years.  Aideed rejected this and 
these groups, along with a number of local militia forces, engaged in an all-out civil war. 
Responding to the growing humanitarian disaster, the United Nations offered food aid to 
the troubled region. Finding it increasingly difficult to maneuver and facing more 
resistance from Aideed's forces, the UN Security Council approved a US-led 
peacekeeping mission in December 1992 (Lewis 2002). During an attempt to capture 
Aideed's top lieutenants; two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by militia RPGs. 
In the ensuing firefight, 18 US Rangers were killed and 73 were wounded (Bowden 
2010). The crisis prompted a US pullout, followed by UN personnel by May 1993.  
Clan fighting continued in the Southern regions. Fourteen peace conferences 
produced "governments" of Somalia, but few made it to Mogadishu. Some were never 
actually established in Somalia, instead operating from neighboring countries, usually 
Kenya. Control of Mogadishu bounced from clan to clan, each using its presence in the 
capital as a key to influence in the rest of the country. In 2000, a near-successful attempt 
to establish a government took place in Djibouti. The Transitional National Government 
(TNG) managed to exercise some control of Mogadishu, but resistance by the newly 
formed Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (headed by Aideed's son) and an 
inability to unify the country resulted in failure.  
  Amid all the chaos bloomed yet another organization that proved capable of 
taking, though not holding, Mogadishu. Sometime in the year 2000, responding to the 
absence of state authority, a small group of religious judges operating in their respective 
territories attempted to unify and lay claim to the country. They adopted the name Islamic 
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Courts Union, and many of their leaders had ties to Al Qaeda, Al-Ittihad al Islamiya and 
other known terrorist groups. The ICU's strength rose quickly and they largely succeeded 
in pushing out the warlords from in and around Mogadishu. With the support of the CIA, 
a new clan-militia made up of previous "warlords" formed a counterweight: The Alliance 
for Peace, Reconciliation and Counter-Terrorism (APRCT). They failed, and the ICU 
held Mogadishu for 6 months in 2006.  
Meanwhile, another international attempt to form a government had already taken 
place and was operating in Baidoa, an important city 200km northwest of the capital. The 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was led by Abdullahi Yusuf, former leader of 
the SSDF. After the failure of the ARPCT, the Ethiopian military was sent in to help the 
TFG and their former rebel client oust the ICU and take Mogadishu. They succeeded. 
The ICU fled and quickly devolved into the Al Shabaa and Xizbul Islam insurgencies. 
Both continued to have ties with terrorist networks and welcomed foreign fighters into 
their ranks. Since then, Ethiopian troops have withdrawn and returned, the African Union 
sent nearly 10,000 peacekeepers, and the Kenyan Defense Forces have engaged al-
Shabaab from the south. Interestingly, one of the moderate leaders of the ICU was elected 
President of the TFG in 2009. This did not stop the fighting, and al-Shabaab continues to 
plague the southern regions. Since 1991, an estimated 500,000-1,000,000 people have 
died in the civil war. Somalia remains one of the world leaders in refugees. While the 
TFG and their international backers have achieved considerable success in recent months, 
control remains tenuous, and the future is anything but certain. 
 
Brief History of the Northern Somalia   
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Somaliland began as a protectorate of Great Britain in 1888. Operating largely as 
a source of food for the more valuable British possession of the Port of Aden, Somaliland 
gained independence from Britain in 1960. Five days before the Italian Trust Territory of 
Somalia became an independent state Somaliland was briefly internationally recognized 
as an independent state. Wealthy independence leader Mohammed Ibrahim Hajji Egal 
became Prime Minister. Decolonization across Africa, and the south's impending 
statehood, fanned Somali nationalism (Touval 1963). When Italian Somaliland gained 
independence, the north voluntarily joined with them to form the Somali Republic. 
Almost from the beginning, the new relationship was rocky. The union proved 
economically unfair to the north. International livestock sales accounted for 80% of the 
national income, and 90% of the trade passed through Berbera. However, most of this 
revenue was spent on infrastructure and public works in and around Mogadishu 
(Bradbury 2008). Further, political representation was difficult because of the distance 
between Hargeissa and the Somali capital. Tensions came to a head when Somaliland 
officer Hassan Keyd staged an unsuccessful coup against the regime of Aden Abdullah 
Osman Daar in 1961. This failed, but demonstrated the tension that existed between the 
regions. Somaliland fared no better when Egal became the 3rd prime minister of Somalia. 
His rule was brief when, in 1969, General Barre took power in a bloodless coup to rule 
for 22 years.  
--Figure 10-- 
The goals of the SNM evolved quickly from its foundation. During the rebellion, 
Barre committed mass atrocities in the north. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed 
when the regime shelled Hargeissa to remove the SNM. "We were left with nothing. No 
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schools, No buildings were left standing" a Somaliland Representative told me in an 
interview. As recently as 1997, mass graves were being uncovered in the north, evidence 
of the brutality of the regime. These tactics failed to eliminate the SNM, and only 
succeeded in galvanizing the northern clans, especially the Isaaq against the regime. 
Support for the rebels rose considerably, with additional non-Isaaq clans joining the fight. 
The SNM did not originally set out to become independent, but support within the 
movement was always there. At the Grand Conference of Northern Peoples that took 
place in 1991, prominent elders, businessmen, academics and SNM commanders could 
not contain the multitudes congregating outside demanding independence.  
During the 2000s, Somaliland continued to develop and consolidate. A series of 
clan conferences produced a unique system of government that blended Somali 
traditional institutions and western liberal democracy. Local elections occurred in 2002, 
which determined the number of viable political parties that could compete at the national 
level. To ensure cross-clan representation, the parties had to reach at least 20% of the 
vote in at least four of the six regions. The top three parties would go on to compete in 
the national parliamentary elections in 2003. The Presidential elections occurred in 2005 
and the incumbent won by a narrow 80 vote margin. Kulmiye, the opposition party, 
challenged this through the Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the victory. The ruling was 
accepted by all parties (Kaplan 2008). Somaliland has achieved marginal economic 
development facilitated by Isaaq businessmen, investment by the diaspora, and returning 
refugees. The economy remains weak and both poverty and unemployment are high. 
Improvements in infrastructure, including the port of Berbera and Hargeissa airport, have 
contributed to the state budget, but foreign investment is needed. Despite growing trade 
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relationships with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Gulf States, one reason, among many, that 
Somaliland seeks independence is to tap in to development funds that are unavailable due 
to the state-centric international system. Demobilization of the SNM and other northern 
militias was largely successful, but not complete. Influential clan leaders were called 
upon to convince weary soldiers to lay down their arms. Further, wealthy businessmen 
offered aid to feed encamped militias and supported a limited degree of job training 
(Bradbury 2008). The gains of Somaliland are more remarkable because of events 
occurring simultaneously in the south.  
--Figure 6.1 here-- 
 
Meanwhile, in the South 
Over the past 20 years, clan-fighting has gripped Somalia. When the state 
collapsed, each piece formed their own mini-regimes complete with leadership, 
followers, and apparatuses for war-fighting. Groups maintained a variety of goals and 
espoused a range of doctrines. Like the others, the SNM was built around clan-identity 
(Isaaq) and was geographically situated in the north. Unlike the others, however, it 
adopted a separatist platform. Calling itself the Republic of Somaliland, they sought to 
build their region as a state. To do so, they needed international help. To achieve 
independence, they needed international support. They had militarily won their fight, but 
diplomatically much remained to be accomplished. Exploring the recruitment patterns of 
Somaliland, it is evident that much of their behavior can be attributed to the importance 
of global opinion. International recognition was the goal, and legitimacy was the way to 
get there.   
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6.3 Child Protection in Somaliland 
 Somalia remains one of the worst environments for children. The likelihood to 
reach adulthood is "among the lowest of children anywhere in the world" (UNICEF 
2012). The high rates of destitution are difficult to gauge because access for UN and 
NGO personnel remains highly restricted. According to international law, Somaliland is 
part of Somalia. However, UN and NGOs concerned with child rights recognize its 
distinctiveness. At least three formal reports have been drafted and all identify the 
remarkable improvements the government has made. Following a public commitment to 
the CRC in 2001, "[the government] has done much to honour the inherited signature to 
this treaty by working to align laws and policies to the international standards" (Save the 
Children 2010: 5). Responding to recommendations in these reports, Somaliland 
recognizes not just the implicit value of children, but also the importance with which the 
international community regards children's rights. The government maintains effective 
policies guaranteeing children's rights and engages in efforts to highlight these facts 
abroad.  
 The policies governing child rights is split between the official, the cultural, and 
the religious, which are, at times, competing. The age at which a person is considered an 
adult varies. In traditional Somali culture, children begin to take on responsibilities at 
around 6-7 years old (Mohamed 2003). Under Islamic Law, the typical age of majority is 
15, as prescribed in the Haditha. "The Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) 
inspected me on the battlefield on the Day of Uhud, and I was fourteen years old. He did 
not allow me [to take part in the fight]. He inspected me on the Day of Khandaq - and I 
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was fifteen years old, and he permitted me [to fight]" (MSA 2012).30 This is also the age 
of maturity at which custom bestows adulthood. Constitutionally, there is not a specified 
age of adulthood. However, the penal code places liability for crime only at 14 years old, 
and with reduced liability/punishment for those ages 14-17. This is open to interpretation, 
and a proclamation by the House of Elders suggests remanding children accused of 
crimes to traditional forms of justice rather than, or before, turning the child over to 
formal punishment (Save the Children 2010: 66). Further, the voting age in Somaliland is 
16. All of this would suggest an attitude toward child recruitment below international 
standards of 18.  
However, this is not the case, and there are no reports of under-18s being 
employed in the armed forces (Coalition 2001, 2008). In one interview with a Somaliland 
representative, I was told that the age when someone should be allowed to volunteer was 
context-dependent, but in his opinion, "maybe 25, 26, or above." Internationally, the age 
of adulthood is 18 years, and the Somaliland Constitution upholds these standards. 
Article 10 states, "the Republic of Somaliland recognizes and shall act in conformity with 
the United Nations Charter and with international law, and shall respect the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights." Going beyond this assumed signatory status, in 
November 2001, the government ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
This effectively raises the age of majority to 18. Perhaps more importantly, these gestures 
reiterate a commitment to international standards even when they are different than local 
or religious customs.   
                                                 
30 Translation of Sahih Muslim, Kitab Al-Imara: Book 020, Number 4605 (Muslim Student Association 
2012).  
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Official policy for the government of Somaliland regarding children's rights is far 
reaching, encompassing, and in keeping with international standards. In 2003 and 2010, 
the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other NGOs were invited to Somaliland to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis of the status of children. While many areas of concern 
remained, remarkable achievements were noted. Regarding specific recommendations 
made in the 2003 report, the "trend [in child rights] has been positive" (Save the Children 
2010: 5). One major concern expressed by UNICEF in 2003 was the lack of a separate 
system for children accused of crime. In 2007, the government passed a new Juvenile 
Justice Law that superseded the penal code mentioned above. Under this act, the age of 
criminal liability was raised from 14 to 15. Further, "minors aged 15 to 18" are only 
liable "if they have the capacity of 'understanding and volition." It is telling that the 
UNCRC is explicitly mentioned in the text as the reason for the changes to the original 
code (Juvenile Justice Law 2007). The law was announced in August 2008 at a 
conference organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
UNICEF.  
Throughout the reports, numerous recommendations were made to widen access 
to education. This was cited as a reason for high-dropout rates and also increasing the 
destitution of street children. A note was added to the 2010 report saying that the 
government ended school fees, making education free to all children. In an interview with 
the Somaliland Representative to the European Union, I was told that the plan was to 
extend free education through secondary schools. The representative also emphasized 
that this was for "boy and girls, both, equally." In a 2008 report on child protection in 
Somaliland by the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child 
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Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN), corporal punishment was cited as a major concern. It 
was troubling to the researchers that even though this was one of the main reasons for a 
high dropout rate among children between 12-15 years old, "the government of 
Somaliland has not outlawed corporal punishment in schools" (5). By 2010, "the Ministry 
of Education [had] made policy commitments to abolish [the practice]" (Save the 
Children 2010: 28). This was so, even though both teachers and parents support harsh 
classroom discipline and are in many ways resistant to abolition. Other developments in 
the policy areas of education, gender, disability, and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 
"are all good examples of the application of human rights/child rights principles into 
policy documents" (58). In 2005, a "Children's desk" was created as a permanent part of 
the Somaliland Human Rights Commission by presidential decree, and with support of 
the both houses of legislature. In addition to official policies and follow-through on them, 
Somaliland has turned to the international arena for assistance and to highlight its efforts 
at ensuring children's rights. 
Protecting child rights, though not a guarantor of international recognition, has 
ensured support for the long-term goals of Somaliland from at least one UN agency. 
Throughout the Children's rights reports, frequent reference is made to a severe lack of 
capacity that continues to limit Somaliland's progress in the area of child rights. A 
"capacity gap" or efforts to "build capacity" is mentioned over 50 times in the 2010 report 
alone. At the same time, NGO observers call on the international community to support 
such efforts, because it is the international community's obligation under the UNCRC to 
assist the government. Somaliland's unrecognized status "makes analysis problematic and 
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serves to obscure issues by conflating Somaliland's data with that of Somalia" (Save the 
Children 2010: 62).  
The government itself claims it would be better able to act if it had international 
recognition. During my 2011 interview with the representative to Ethiopia, I was told of 
the progress in ensuring education to Somaliland children. "In Somaliland, the child has 
to go to school, they have to play; they have to work. In Somalia, some children support 
their families with what they can get from the gun. Or in Puntland, the child supports the 
family from the ransom they get from kidnappings or hostages."  
Despite these efforts, one of the biggest concerns is unemployment after 
graduation. "We have thousands of young people but a limited number of jobs. We have 
succeeded to educate the children, but we have failed to create jobs for them." If these 
graduates fail to just get employment they'll say, look, over the past 15 years, I was going 
to school, with my books and now I have nothing to show for it, while a child next door 
is becoming a millionaire." This "threat to peace and security" is "why we make an 
appeal to the international community." This appeal is echoed even more explicitly in the 
2010 Save the Children report; "Somaliland must be one of the most obvious cases for 
assistance from the international community" (62). "The best thing that could happen for 
the children of Somaliland is that they live in a country that has international recognition 
and engages with the community of nations as fully functioning partner" (69). Ultimately, 
the influence of such NGOs in matters of state recognition may be minimal, but these 
statements amount to a clear relationship between support for child rights and 
endorsement for recognition.  
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Throughout its two decades as a de facto state, Somaliland has promoted 
children's rights. Not only has the government made efforts to enshrine these rights into 
law, but they have proved that their policies are not mere window-dressing by actively 
trying to live up to their commitments. At the international level, the government 
promotes their efforts. This fits into a larger strategy of highlighting its efforts at living 
up to global norms regarding democracy, women's rights, and international security 
concerns including anti-piracy and anti-terrorism campaigns. All of these efforts are in 
keeping with the overall goal of state recognition.  
 
6.4 Goals of the SNM and the Republic of Somaliland 
For over two decades Somaliland has sought independence from Somalia. Also, 
for over two decades they have maintained de facto control over a specified territory. 
They have formed a government through peaceful, democratic elections. They issue 
currency and passports, police their borders and patrol international waters. Finally, they 
engage in economic dialogue with their neighbors and are actively trying to enter the 
global economy. Somaliland has achieved de facto independence, but the goal is to be de 
jure independent. The ultimate victory, statehood, remains elusive. This cannot be 
achieved without the support and blessing of the international community. Somaliland 
knows this, and has made considerable effort to achieve its goals.  
Independence was not the initial goal of the rebel movement that turned into the 
self-declared Republic of Somaliland.31 However, strong secessionist sentiments had 
existed in the north since the creation of Somalia in 1960. Shortly after unifying, signs of 
                                                 
31 Until at least 1999 NGOs referred to the Government of Somaliland as the SNM (US Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services 1999).  
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separatist tendencies immediately emerged. The constitutional referendum that created 
the unified Somali Republic was campaigned against by the Somali National League 
(SNL) because it was viewed as detrimental to northern interests. The SNL enjoyed a 
strong majority in pre-independence Somaliland (20 of 33 legislative seats in 1960). In 
opposition, they called for a boycott that was largely adhered to, and only 100,000 
Somalilanders voted. Even those that participated voted against the referendum 
overwhelmingly. When the votes were counted the principal northern cities of Hargeissa 
(72%), Berbera (69%), Burao (66%) and Erigavo (69%) voted against ratification 
(Drysdale 1991). Despite this rejection, the constitution passed because the vote was a 
national referendum and was widely supported in central and southern Somalia. In 
December 1961, a Somaliland contingency in the military launched a failed coup in an 
effort to reclaim autonomy for the North (Lewis 2002: 173-178). Secessionist feelings 
remained, but lessened through the 1960s. In 1967, a northern Isaaq, Mohamed Haji 
Ibrahim Egal, became the Prime Minister before the assassination of the President in 
1969. During the dictatorship of Siad Barre, there were some Isaaq in high office, but 
these were largely rejected by their northern compatriots.  
Discontent with the union grew steadily throughout the 1970s. The Isaaq had 
enjoyed dominance in the clan-system in the north. Now they were in the minority. Also, 
the distance between Hargeissa (the northern capital) and Mogadishu (the federal capital) 
was nearly 1500 km (932 miles). This limited the national attention paid to northern 
concerns. Administratively, the English language was discarded for Italian, which 
favored the south. Professors were expelled and English-speakers were treated as 
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"second-class citizens."32 In the 1970s, several events fractured Somali nationalism and 
buried the dream of greater Somalia forever. First, a drought in 1974-74 was especially 
hard on the north, and forced many to flee to Europe and the Gulf States. On June 27, 
1977, French Somaliland opted for independence instead of union, a second rebuttal of 
Somali irredentism after a defeated 1958 vote to stay affiliated with France. When 
Somalia tried to annex the Ogaden (Somali) region of Ethiopia in 1978, they were dealt a 
crushing defeat. Kenya continued to exercise strict control of its Somali population in the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD). These events limited Somali nationalism and coupled 
with the mounting grievances against union, left northerners "bitter" about their 
experience under federalism. Thus, the separatist sentiments were felt very early.  
The precursor to Somaliland was the SNM. It began as a culmination of Isaaq 
frustration and alienation with the regime in Mogadishu. At inception, it was "a typically 
reactive Somali clan-based organization" no different than the earlier rebellion (SSDF) or 
later rebellions (USC, etc) that arose against Siad Barre (Lewis 1994: 180). The 
movement began unofficially in Jedda, Saudi Arabia in 1979-80. The influx of Somali 
immigrants left a small and cohesive group of Somali-northerners in the gulf state. They 
organized community events, started a newspaper, and held political meetings where they 
discussed events in Somalia in general and their northern home region in particular. At 
the same time, a group of Isaaq and other Somali migrants were establishing similar 
community groups in London. Here, they were more active politically, owing to British 
democratic institutions. The most significant event involved a protest of a hike in fees by 
the Somali embassy. By 1981, collaboration between the Saudi and London-based groups 
                                                 
32 My interview with Representative of Somaliland in Brussels, Belgium, Mohammed Daar, December 
2011.  
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was strong. Using Saudi-Somali money and London-Somali action, the SNM emerged in 
opposition to the increasingly repressive dictator at home. They relocated to Ethiopia and 
began planning a military response to events in the North. Military desertions to the SNM 
and civilian support in favor of the group grew as the government increased arbitrary 
arrests and indiscriminate shooting of northerners.  
Though the goal was not independence, the SNM's actions belied ulterior motives 
for the group. First, to the frustration of their Somali allies, the focus was always on 
liberating the northern territories. The SNM was "only secondarily interested in the 
south" (Lewis 1994: 208). 
 This pushed one top non-Isaaq SNM official, 'Ali Mohamed Ossobleh, to abandon the 
SNM and begin the USC. Second, the SNM went out of their way to deny irredentist 
plans, which, while crumbling after the 1970s, was still a powerful ideology for many 
Somalis. Before Ethiopia agreed to host SNM bases, the leadership assured Addis Ababa 
that the crisis with the Ogaden Somalis was an internal matter. This agreement reversed 
over 20 years of Somali foreign policy. By rejecting the idea of greater Somalia, the 
SNM showed they were open to the idea that the five Somalilands could, and perhaps 
should be, considered separately.  
More explicitly, after overthrowing Siad Barre, the SNM aimed to secure robust 
autonomy for the north. At the time, this could be seen as further rejection of Somali 
nationalism. During personal interviews with Somaliland representatives, I was told that 
separatism was always the will of the North, and all but a few of the SNM commanders 
kept independence as the goal. Because many leaders were defectors from the Southern 
military, they were "moderate" and "somehow wanted to have change of government," 
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but, "not all of them." When I asked the representative about how strong the sentiment 
was before 1991, he replied, "very strong." Only Tuure, then chairman, and "maybe two 
others were not [inclined towards independence]." In a revealing quote, a Libyan leader, 
with connections to Ethiopia was reticent about their support of the SNM because he was 
convinced they held secessionist goals. One SNM leader Sheikh Yusuf was quoted as 
responding to the dictator, "You are also labeled by Western media as backing world 
terrorism, so if that is true then we are also separatists" (Somaliland Times 2002d).  
Following the collapse of the regime, the SNM convened a "grand conference" in 
the north. It was attended by important clan elders, religious leaders, business people, and 
influential intellectuals, along with members of the diaspora. As talks progressed, the 
clamor for independence rose. On May 14, 1991, a public demonstration was held in 
Burao and Hargeissa, which included many SNM fighters. When the conference closed, 
the Republic of Somaliland formally declared independence, and the SNM chairman was 
selected as the first President. Thus, while it was not there explicitly in the early stages of 
the SNM, separatism was a goal that flowed as an undercurrent throughout the struggle.  
Since 1991, Somaliland has made considerable efforts to achieve statehood. The 
first president, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuure led the rebellion which resulted in 
independence. However, many doubted his commitment to the cause, and within two 
years he was replaced by another meeting of clan elders. As president, Tuure sought 
recognition abroad, but did little to encourage a sense of independent nationalism at 
home. He later accepted a position in Aideed's self-proclaimed government in the south, 
and continues to bear stigma by Somalilanders for his "betrayal." The second president 
was selected for his impressive independence credentials. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal 
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was the brief Prime Minister of independent Somaliland in 1960. He was also the last 
Premier of Somalia before Siad took power in 1969. His backers hoped that such 
credentials would make him an "international figure" that might help bring recognition. 
Externally, Egal established bilateral trade ties with Ethiopia and other influential 
countries. On March 9, 2002, Egal welcomed an official Ethiopian trade office that 
"aimed to strengthen relations and the development of commercial ties between the two 
countries" (Somaliland Times 2002b). Ties with Ethiopia, including high level diplomatic 
missions, led the Ethiopian Premier to remark, “there is a legitimate government in 
Somaliland" (Somaliland Times 2002h). A low-profile US delegation was hosted in 
Hargeisa, which saw US government officials in official meetings with Egal (Somaliland 
Times 2002f). Domestically, he sought the trappings of independence by issuing 
Somaliland passports and a new currency, the Somaliland Shilling. While this failed to 
result in independence, the peace and security established during his 10-year reign 
ensured that Somaliland would be considered unique in international discourse by 
advocates of peace and democracy.  
During the third president's tenure, a number of important steps towards 
recognition were taken. Egal died in 2002, and his vice president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, 
succeeded him as outlined in the constitution. During his administration, there was an 
aggressive campaign for international recognition. In 2004, Somaliland hosted two 
British MPs, allowing them to address both houses of the parliament. Upon their return, 
they addressed the British parliament and remarked, "I met ministers there, and I was far 
more impressed with their plans than those of several other African countries that I have 
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visited -countries that we recognize and support. Somaliland is doing nearly everything 
right, but it is being ignored" (Worthington 2004).  
Later that year, Somaliland joined the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization, a NGO based at The Hague. This organization represents a variety of 
political and cultural groups that do not have diplomatic access enjoyed by states. 
Through the UNPO, Somaliland engages a wider network of IOs, including the European 
Union. In 2005, President Rayale formally submitted Somaliland's application to the 
African Union. This came on the heels of an aggressive diplomatic drive for support in 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique among other African nations (Somaliland Times 2003). 
Throughout Rayale's term, he fought criticism and aggressively sought to improve ties 
with Djibouti. Djibouti remains an opponent of Somaliland's independence. If 
recognized, the Port of Berbera would command a substantial portion of the Ethiopian 
export market away from the Port of Djibouti (Gulaid 2003). Overcoming this resistance, 
Rayale early and often embarked on high profile visits to the neighbor in hopes of 
ameliorating its opposition. Building on Egal's relationship with Ethiopia, economic ties 
solidified political ties. Ethiopia accepts Somaliland passports and its currency. On June 
3, 2007, President Rayale formally met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. He 
was met "with full honours" (AFROL News 2007). Rayale was no more successful than 
was Egal at achieving recognition. At the same time, his efforts promoted goodwill with 
the international community and varying degrees of support in principle, if not in 
practice.   
The next president, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, elected as an opposition candidate, 
continued the drive for support begun by his three predecessors. Somaliland electoral 
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contests reveal the unity of position regarding international recognition. Before the 2003 
parliamentary, opposition to President Rayale contended that they would "work harder 
for international recognition." Silanyo pressed, "we need to make more friends. We will 
put much more effort towards publicizing our cause, and put our case to the international 
community much more effectively" (IRIN 2003). His party came up 80 votes short in the 
2005 presidential election, but was successful in the 2010 contest where he and his 
Kulmiye party once again promised that it would "use effective diplomatic tools…to 
achieve international recognition” (Somaliland Times 2010b). During the campaign, he 
went to the US and met with the diaspora and US congressmen. With this move, he 
showed that "even though it is not in government, [Kulmiye] could mount a diplomatic 
initiative to engage the most developed country in the world” (Somaliland Times 2010a). 
Rhetoric aside, these priorities were little different than what the previous administration 
promised and engaged in regularly. 
After securing victory, Silanyo followed up with his promise to push for 
recognition. The Somaliland representative to Ethiopia told me that since the new 
government has come to power, they have "knocked on every door" in their diplomacy 
push. The government has stepped up efforts at the African Union and the European 
Union. This was the highest priority identified by Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, 
Silanyo's new minister of Foreign Affairs. He called for a regional approach and working 
with UN and foreign aid agencies. This involved providing drought relief to help the 
troubled southern regions. The active approach taken by the Silanyo administration is 
commendable, but overlooks the consistent attention paid to the international community 
by previous Somaliland regimes and even the SNM before it.  
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In addition to following norms regarding the rights of children, Somaliland has 
made efforts to highlight the other ways in which it lives up to international expectations. 
One of the earliest decisions they made was in tune with international norms and 
expectations. When choosing the name Somali National Movement in 1981, the 
influential Saudi group wanted to include the adjective "Islamic" (Lewis 1994: 198). This 
proposal was ultimately dropped for fear it would scare-off Western support, whose 
outlook was damaged by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. A consistent demonstration of its 
adherence to international standards has been Somaliland's rich democratic tradition. 
Overt praise for this tradition belies the extreme tests faced along the way. In 2002, the 
unelected House of Elders voted to extend the government's mandate for an additional 
year because of incomplete voter registration. Opposition parties argued that to them the 
government would be seen as "illegal" on February 24, the date at which the extension 
officially commenced. Silanyo, politically unaffiliated at the time having just returned 
from a year abroad in London, narrowly averted an institutional crises by mediating 
between the disputants. Additional challenges were faced throughout Rayale's term, and 
the closely contested elections in 2003. Throughout, all parties maintained an eye towards 
the international community in largely abiding by constitutional rules.  
The constitutional succession of Rayale when Egal unexpectedly died in 2002 
was itself remarkable. In a published eulogy the week following Egal's death, one 
Somaliland organization called on the international community to "take notice of 
Somaliland's thriving democratic ideals, its rule of law, and its durable peace." The best 
response, the press release went on, is "to bestow on the state of Somaliland the 
recognition that it so richly deserves, as  a result of its already deepened democracy" 
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(Somaliland Forum Press Release May, 2002). After the disputed 2003 elections, the fear 
that failure to adhere to the constitutional process would derail its recognition was 
widespread. The non-partisan Somaliland Times, fearing the government would not allow 
for a genuine contest reiterated the associated risks of "loosing [sic] credibility." In a 
quick turnaround, they accepted the incumbent's razor-thin victory and charged that the 
opposition Kulmiye was holding Somaliland's democratic credibility "hostage," urging 
the chairman to accept the results. He did, and went on to win in the next, largely free and 
fair election. In my personal correspondence, the role of democracy in showing 
Somaliland's legitimacy was routinely brought up. One interviewee said that Somaliland 
should be "rewarded" for its having done the right thing by holding free electoral 
contests. Further, when asked where Somaliland looks for inspiration, he pointed to the 
four democratic elections as reason other nations should instead look to Somaliland for 
inspiration. Somaliland's democratic-ness is not just a method of changing government; 
rather, it is also another way to highlight its international legitimacy.  
In order to establish its role as an equal in the global community, many other 
areas of international concern have taken prominence in all government policies. 
Somaliland aims to be a regional security partner in the War on Terror and recent anti-
piracy operations. It maintains bilateral security cooperation with Ethiopia, Yemen, and 
Kenya (Wikileaks 2007). During a private meeting with the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, 
President Rayale pointed out that "Somaliland and the US had the same enemies” 
(Wikileaks 2008). In April 2011, President Silanyo supported a UN-backed plan to 
imprison convicted pirates in Somaliland. At the same press conference, the president 
linked the action with calls for independence (Somaliland Times 2011b). New legislation 
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officially labels piracy a crime and paves the way for pirate prisoner transfers to 
Somaliland. Once again, reference was made to the effort proving that Somaliland is 
"willing to cooperate with the international community” (Somaliland Times 2012c). In a 
united front against reunification with the south, Somaliland representatives have, since 
1991, refused to participate in International peace-talks with the South. It feared doing so 
would undermine its position. In a bold move President Silanyo appeared at the 
International Peace Conference held in London in 2012. He did so in order to advance the 
cause for independence at a wider venue than had taken place in the past. Participation 
occurred despite considerable domestic political backlash, particularly from high-profile 
opponents. Former President Rayale said the visit was not in the best interests of 
Somaliland, and that President Silanyo should not have participated (Somaliland Times 
2012b). Ultimately, the diplomatic value of appearing won. Along with millions of 
dollars in drought relief pledged to the south, such a move can only be interpreted as an 
effort to highlight Somaliland's shared interest in international efforts and concerns.  
Secessionist sentiments have always been present in the north. They provided an 
undercurrent to the SNM and in 1991 Somaliland formally declared their independence. 
Since then, the importance of recognition has figured prominently in domestic political 
affairs. Internationally, each leader from Tuure to Silanyo has made efforts to draw 
attention to Somaliland's successes. Furthermore, these efforts indicate the extent to 
which Somaliland cares about international opinion, as it is crucial to their long-term 
goal. 
 
 161 
 
6.5 Causal Mechanisms 
Somaliland's respect for children's rights, including its refusal to use child 
soldiers, is a product of their efforts at international recognition. Since at least 1991, 
Somaliland has embarked on a charm offensive (Wikileaks 2006). While not denying 
their sincere valuation of children, the decision to protect them is in accordance with an 
overarching desire to gain independence. They know that recognition is difficult, but 
believe it is possible if the case meets the right conditions. Somaliland officials know 
what is important to the international community and make every effort to highlight their 
normative accomplishments. While recognition remains unachieved, Somaliland 
continues to receive very positive feedback from important actors for their efforts. This 
highlights the causal process whereby perception leads to changes in behavior.   
Somaliland representatives show considerable adeptness in what is important to 
the international community. First, they know the vocabulary of international recognition. 
In my interviews, representatives repeatedly referred to the "reassertion" of 
independence. According to one, "[Somaliland is] not seceding, it's not secession, but it is 
abrogation of a union with Somalia." This was in keeping with past traditions in the 
interaction of states including Senegambia, and the United Arab Republic. I was often 
reminded that Somaliland adheres to the AU charter in that it exists within its colonial 
borders. One representative told me that unlike other independence movements "such as 
Rhodesia," Somaliland is democratic representing the exercise of self-determination 
enshrined in the UN charter. 
Second, representatives see value in highlighting accomplishments in areas 
important to the global NGO community. The Foreign Minister during the Rayale 
 162 
 
administration, Edna Ismail, believed Somaliland could serve as "a model country" for 
the region. "It has a controlled army, the diaspora is returning in large numbers, there are 
no arrears in salaries, no hunger and no malnutrition.  In addition, Somaliland has worked 
feverishly in the Global War on Terrorism (Wikileaks 2004). When asked about women's 
rights, one representative told me of the growing involvement of women in society and 
politics. "[We] have women doctors, women professors, the University of Somaliland, 
Hargeissa was founded by a women, minister of foreign affairs, Edna Ismail." When 
pressed, he believed this was important for the international community to see. The 
protection of child rights, too, was seen as influential for international legitimacy, and 
that it would help their cause. "It shows that Somaliland is a country that has values, it 
wants to develop the skills of the young people, give them employment, give them a 
permanent place in society." Finally, they believe the role that these efforts of adherence 
to international norms can play a strong role in recognition efforts. In terms of supporting 
independence, child protection and other norms are likely to help because "[recognition] 
has to be justified, you know? We have to show how responsible we are." I asked if one 
representative thought Somaliland should be rewarded for its good behavior, he simply 
replied, "Why not?" Another representative remarked, "I would say that the societies that 
keep values should be supported by the international community." Conversely, "[groups] 
that use child soldiers would stand in bad light in the international system." They are 
expected to receive less support from the international community because this 
"inflicts[s] so much pain and these are some of the things the international community 
should pay attention to." In the end, the importance of international norms to the 
Somaliland government is clear. One representative offered a good summary of the 
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government's position, "we are showing the international community that we are 
behaving as a government behaves and we want just to have a government that behaves 
and respects what the international community wants." 
Looking at the inconsistency with which international norms have played in 
decisions of recognition, it is perhaps puzzling that the government of Somaliland holds 
such beliefs. However, they do so because so far, even though outright recognition has 
eluded them, they have received numerous supportive overtures because of their efforts. 
Active diplomacy has led to measured support from important local actors. Ethiopia has 
tried to "sensitiz[e] the international community about the situation in Somaliland" 
(Somaliland Times 2002a). Early in the administration of President Rayale, the US and 
EU recognized the government of Somaliland as "the sole legitimate representative of the 
Somaliland people" (Somaliland Times 2002c). This had the effect of denying delegates 
claiming to represent the north at the numerous peace and reconciliation conferences 
organized by the UN and others. The European Union slowly but steadily increased its 
involvement in Somaliland by giving direct support to the government. South Sudan was 
expected to grant full diplomatic recognition to Somaliland when it became 
independent33 (Somaliland Times 2011a). Wales, though not independent itself, has 
officially recognized Somaliland's independence (AFROL News 2006). In their efforts to 
promote democracy, they have received near-universal acclaim. Prime Minister David 
Cameron said "Somaliland has taken an important step forward in showing that better 
governance and better economic progress are possible. In many ways, it is an example 
that others can follow" (Somaliland Times 2012a). Such sentiments are just a small part 
                                                 
33 As of this writing it has yet to do so.  
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of the larger support for recognition in the British Parliament. Godfrey Bloom of the UK 
Independence Party adamantly supports full recognition.  
"For 21 years the country has grown, unrecognized and unheralded. It is a 
multi-party democracy. It is free trading. We even use its prisons to lock 
up pirates. But if we fail to support it we will be missing a trick. Currently 
our Government is using the stick it must learn to use the carrot. We must 
reinforce success rather than failure. To do that we must accept reality on 
the ground. We must recognize Somaliland” (Somaliland Times 2012d).  
Somaliland's role in international security has also received powerful praise. The 
World Peace Foundation, a forum of scholars at the Harvard Kennedy School called for 
recognizing the independence of Somaliland because doing so would strengthen the 
incentives for neighboring Puntland to get serious about piracy. "Recognition of 
Somaliland will thus assist in strengthening accountability and governance in regions that 
are now pirate infected" (Rotberg 2010). In 2007, the Washington Post reported that the 
US Department of Defense supported an independent Somaliland: "[It] is an entity that 
works. The Pentagon's view is that 'Somaliland should be independent.'" The head of 
strategic communication for the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa eagerly 
spoke of engaging Somaliland and was only "waiting for [the] State [Dept.] to give us the 
okay" (Tyson 2007).  
Protecting child rights is directly responsible for support as well. In its second 
report, Save the Children called on the global community to reward Somaliland's efforts 
by conferring independence: "The best thing that could happen for the children of 
Somaliland is that they live in a country that has international recognition and engages 
with the community of nations as a fully functioning partner" (2010: 69). Of course, 
despite considerable support from many circles, full independence has not been achieved. 
To summarize the exasperation that my interviews,\ and the numerous political 
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commentators have expressed, the former Foreign Minister Edna Ismail Aden proposed 
that Somaliland was like a "beautiful woman that no one wanted to marry" (Wikileaks 
2004).  
 The government of Somaliland's primary goal is international recognition. To 
achieve this goal, they have to engage the international community directly. They have 
trained their diplomats to speak the language of recognition and to cultivate relationships 
with the global community. Perhaps most importantly, they have demonstrated in deed, 
not just creed, that they deserve de jure independence. In many areas from democracy, 
anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, women's rights, and child protection, Somaliland has tried to 
cultivate the image of an equal partner in the eyes of the world. They have strong 
incentives to do so. Without support, they would otherwise never achieve their primary 
goal.  
 
6.6 Competing Factors 
Somaliland's accomplishments are remarkable, and the citizens and government 
have much to be proud of. It is all the more remarkable considering the many similarities 
they share with their southern and eastern neighbors. To explain Somaliland's recruitment 
practices, I looked to the incentives based on their overall goals. In comparison, I will 
look to other groups active in the region, and show that faction aims can influence the 
degree to which they care about international norms and thus their likelihood to use child 
soldiers. But first, I will rule out alternative explanations through a controlled comparison 
using a most-similar systems design. In terms of culture, perceptions of childhood, and 
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history, Somaliland is very similar to Somalis in other regions. Therefore, these factors 
fail to account for the variation in recruitment strategies.  
Cultural explanations for Somaliland's respect for children's rights are not 
sufficient. Such differences are often cited as one explanation for Somaliland's success in 
light of the South's failure. The Somaliland representative to Ethiopia offered this as an 
explanation in my interview. "We are culturally different, our systems are different." In 
an outspoken op-ed in the Somaliland Times, a commentator spoke of a unitary culture as 
"nonsense!" (Hassan 2002). The author proceeds to claim that "[liberty] was a Northern 
creation" and that "if there are verifiable Southern virtues, I am open to hear them." Such 
ethnocentrism reflects pride of present accomplishments, rather than an anthropological 
reality. The Somalis share near-identical traditions of language and religion. Somalia, 
including Somaliland, is often referred to as the only ethnically homogenous country in 
Africa. Nearly all Somalis are practicing Muslims. Further, regardless of geographic 
location, Sunni-Islam is dominant. The arguably more tolerant, more pacific Sufism is 
popular in Hargeissa. However, it is also widespread in Mogadishu, and southern cities, 
and is the dominant religious order of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, an active 
government-aligned militia that is known to use child soldiers (UNSC 2010 2010: 6). 
Degree of religiosity is also not a sufficient explanation. The Somaliland constitution is 
based on Sharia law, and is said to be the foundation of the government.  
Even more than other forms of agricultural work, nomadic pastoralism increases 
the demands placed on children at young ages. Children as young as 6 begin to take on 
familial responsibilities (Save the Children 2010: 26). However, this livelihood is as 
dominant in the north as it is in the south. Even in Somaliland, around 19% of children 
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between 5-14 years old engage in some form paid labor (ANPPCAN 2008: 4).34 Views of 
children as maintaining economic potential and/or family responsibilities is not 
differentiable based on northern and southern "values." Cultural variation regarding child 
soldiers in particular fails to explain variation in use. Though one representative assured 
me it was "not the Somali way to use children in combat," actions by nearly all groups 
currently fighting in the south suggests otherwise. The 2010 UN Secretary General's 
Special Report on children affected by conflict in Somalia identifies child soldiering by 
nearly every group in the region except for Somaliland. All other armed groups flagrantly 
violate international norms. Surprisingly, reports also indicate the TFG government 
forces use children around the age of 15. Even the relatively peaceful and stable region of 
Puntland has 15 year-olds in their official police forces. Cited cultural differences of 
Somaliland fail to explain variation in recruitment rates. Perhaps it is even more telling 
that at least two prominent leaders of Al-Shabaab were from Somaliland and of the Isaaq 
clan (Horadam 2011).   
Some cultural variation does exist among the Somalis. The Rahanweyn and Digil 
clans are sedentary farmers that settled in the areas between the Jubba and Shabelle 
rivers. Also, there are ethnic minorities that exist in the south that include the Bantu and 
Arab settlers (Lewis 2002). However, these differences have not resulted in any 
meaningful variation in the child protection or the recruitment of child soldiers. The 
highest instances of child soldiering occur in the Southern regions where the Rahanweyn, 
                                                 
34 While child labor and child soldiering are often used as collective norms, the distinction is important. 
Child labor is a growing concern for many NGOs. In the language of norm establishment, it is most likely 
in stage 1, emergence. While language against child labor is often used in conjunction with proscriptions 
against child soldiering, it has yet to reach the critical mass to move into the second stage, acceptance. 
Also, it is important to keep in mind that the Somaliland government making strong efforts to ensure that 
all children go to school.  
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Digil, and numerous other clans reside, including the Hawiye and Darood. It is not 
possible to rule out that the northern clans of the Isaaq are somehow different.35 Issaq 
lands, including much of Somaliland, have no instances of child soldiering. However, 
there are other clans including the Dir, and Dulbahante also present in Somaliland. 
Further, President Rayale, who ruled for 8 years, was a Dulbahante. The Dulbahante are a 
sub-clan of the Darood that not only occupy the south (high levels of child recruitment), 
but also dominate the eastern, semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Puntland, unlike the 
Darood in the south, offer some degree of child protection. This, I argue in the next 
section, has more to do with the goals of the group rather than the clan-identity of the 
territory. Thus, cultural differences are an insufficient explanation for variation in rates of 
child recruitment of child soldiers.  
Another potential explanation for the non-use of child soldiers is the number and 
level of protection for refugees and internally displaced persons. The sizes of the 
vulnerable population in Somaliland and Somalia are difficult to compare due to nearly 
30 years of perpetual conflict and routine droughts and famines. During the 1980-1991 
civil war, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled Somalia. Conflicts in neighboring 
Djibouti and Ethiopia made respite difficult for all but the most financially able, or the 
lucky ones that could go abroad, to the Gulf States, Europe and the US. Since 1991, 
persistent conflict has maintained a steady flow of refuge and asylum seekers from the 
troubled region. By 2011, an estimated 770,000 Somali refugees remain resident in 
another country (UNHCR 2011). This puts the total at a distant third behind Iraq (1.7 
million) and Afghanistan (3 million). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia 
                                                 
35 Notwithstanding the Isaaq members of al-Shabaab.  
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reached a staggering 1.5 million by January 2011 (UNHCR 2011). To complicate the 
issue, IDPs in the north are referred to as refugees because Somalia is seen as another 
country. Therefore, the potential for vulnerability exists throughout the region but does 
not help explain rates of variation in youths being targeted.  
Vulnerable-youth security however, might explain some variation in child 
recruitment. Children in IDP camps in Somaliland tend to enjoy much greater protections 
than their counterparts in the south. The UNHCR maintains near total access to the 
northern regions, dissipating precipitously as one moves along the coast towards Kenya. 
However, this is likely a product of administrative priorities rather than capacity alone. In 
2002, the British government began a campaign of systematic repatriation of Somali 
refugees to Somaliland. The program was resisted by the Somaliland government because 
they did not have the resources to protect them (Somaliland Times 2002g). The situation 
has changed little with high numbers of refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti and 
relocation of Somali IDPs further burdening the limited resources of the state (UNHCR 
2011). In the past, the UNHCR and UNDP faced a shortage of funds and could not 
provide for the vulnerable populations. At present the government assists the UN 
organizations and other NGOs in an official capacity. Furthermore, the UNHCR 
maintains a substantial presence in the NFD with support from the much more capable 
Kenyan government, yet this area exhibits high rates of child recruitment.  
 Globally, schools are favorite targets by recruiters of child soldiers due to the 
concentration of vulnerable youths. This is true in the southern Somalia as well. Schools 
throughout the south, but especially in Mogadishu have even become parties to the 
conflict. Many had to be shut down due to insecurity (UNSC 2010 2010). Some are even 
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attacked by government troops because it is feared they will provide pools of recruits for 
al-Shabaab (UNSC 2010 2010: 12). By contrast, in Somaliland schools are given priority 
by the government and enjoy the highest portion of the state budget behind spending on 
defense and police (Save the Children 2010). Such funds contribute to the perception of 
schools as safe zones for children that keep recruiters out.   
Children in both the north and the south remain vulnerable due to conditions of 
high-levels of poverty. Despite considerable progress, Somaliland ranks high on global 
poverty rankings. The GDP per capita is estimated to be $250 per year, compared to $277 
for Somalia. Further, poverty remains a primary reason for other forms of child labor 
including domestic workers, shoe shiners and khat dealers36 (ANPPCAN 2008: 6). Child 
poverty in particular remains a concern of the government. One representative told me 
that the appeal of armed militias and pirate groups is an ever present concern for the 
government. Schooling is mandatory and expanding, but with limited prosperity awaiting 
graduates, the appeal of income through violence is a growing problem. Thus, while the 
availability of large pools of vulnerable children is one potential explanation, the 
protection children enjoy in the north is more likely a product of the government's 
position regarding children. Thus, level of protection alone is an insufficient explanation 
for Somaliland's non-use of child soldiers 
One argument for the considerable variation in outcomes from the north and the 
south is the colonial history. Somaliland was a former British colony, while the south was 
ruled by Italy. The British practiced indirect colonialism that left traditional rulers with 
more power than they had in the south. When I proposed this explanation to one of the 
                                                 
36 Khat is a local stimulant, similar to coffee but with strong importance for politic and society (Bradbury 
2008: 170-172). 
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representatives, he agreed that variation in colonialism could account for the strength of 
traditional institutions of conflict resolution and democracy.  
However, there are two issues that preclude colonial explanations for child 
recruitment. First, traditional Somali rule, even in the North, maintains lower standards of 
child protection than does international law. Somaliland's traditional code (xeer) finds it 
acceptable for children to work at less than 10 years old and to be punished for crimes at 
12. This mindset could easily be extended to service in the armed forces. Further, 
traditional practices justify female genital mutilation, a practice widely condemned by the 
international community. On these issues, government practices are much more in line 
with international concerns and laws than powerful local customs. Workshops and 
advocacy campaigns have been supported and hosted by the government. Thus, strength 
of traditional rule fails to explain high levels of child protection.  
Second, Somaliland was not the only Somali territory colonized by the British. 
The NFD in Kenya was also a British colony and was one of the five Somalilands that 
make up the ideological "Greater Somalia." Child protection in the NFD remains weak. 
Groups aligned with southern militias routinely recruit forcefully and solicit volunteers 
from the former British subjects.  
An additional historical argument could be made regarding experience under the 
Siad Barre administration. Due to the atrocities committed against the North, they may 
have been especially sensitized to the importance of human rights protections. Several 
thousand Somalilanders were killed from 1981-91 and entire cities were bombed into 
ruin. Systematic punishment was meted out by the notorious General Morgan, which 
affected every northerner and was one reason often cited as to why the differences 
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between the north and south are irreconcilable. However, Siad Barre was brutal 
throughout Somalia. During his reign of terror, hundreds of thousands were 
systematically killed, starved, or displaced by regime troops. Further, after 1978 his 
oppression was clan-based with particular harshness reserved for the Darood clans and 
the southern agriculturalists. While particularly harsh in the North, the atrocities 
committed by the regime were so widespread, that, were this line of reasoning sufficient, 
there would be rampant human rights protections throughout the region. This is not the 
case, and thus does not explain the exceptionally high rates of recognized international 
rights in the north.  
 Using the similarities of the armed groups throughout Somalia, it is possible to 
tentatively rule out competing explanations for Somaliland's child protection standards. 
Contrary to popular conception, Somaliland largely shares the same culture as their 
brothers to the south. Religion is an insufficient explanation because Somaliland is little 
different than the south in terms of type and intensity. Further, security is an important 
consideration, but while children are generally more secured in the north, this is likely a 
product of government priorities. Finally, historical explanations offer partial 
explanations, but by comparison do not account for similar experience in the NFD and 
the south during Siad Barre's reign. From a research perspective, it is fortunate that 
Somalia has many similar armed groups with which to compare behavioral outcomes. By 
comparison, Somaliland is very similar to groups in the south, but maintains remarkably 
different recruitment strategies towards children. Group goals appear the most likely 
source for this variation.    
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6.7 Goals and Recruitment Patterns of Other Somali Armed Groups 
Somaliland exists alongside groups that show low, but varied levels of child 
protection. Despite many similarities including culture, refugee protection, and poverty, 
Somaliland stands out as unique. As outlined in the previous section, in comparison to 
other groups active in the past two decades, Somaliland shares many similarities. 
However, the disparate goals of the group result in remarkably different behavior. 
Since the 1980s, various groups have challenged the governments in Mogadishu. 
The USC was one group rose to prominence as the force that ultimately toppled Siad 
Barre's regime. Just after Barre's exit, Mohamed Farah Aideed led a breakaway faction 
known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA). His son, a former US Marine, later 
formed the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in 2001. The SRRC 
reconciled the differences between the leaders of the former USC factions and openly 
fought the UN-backed government from 2001-2004. Factions within the SRRC also 
broke and supported the government. Still others evolved from the initial rebel forces that 
fought against Siad Barre. Iterations of these factions have continued under different 
names and different leaders through the present.  
In the absence of a central government, local Somali customs and religious 
traditions re-emerged. Local Islamic courts unified to become the ICU, which briefly held 
Mogadishu in 2006. The ICU fought against the CIA-backed ARPCT to win control of 
the capital, but was subsequently ousted by the Ethiopian-backed TFG. They then 
splintered into the factions of Al-Shabaab and Xizbul Islam, and continue to fight the 
internationally recognized government. One overarching shared trait of all these groups 
has been their desire to control Mogadishu or enough of it to exercise a monopoly of state 
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resources. Control of the capital did not require international recognition. These groups, 
clan-based militias and Islamic insurgents, were largely driven by short-term 
considerations of military and economic gain. These groups had few links to a wider 
global community. Those that did, including APRCT (US) and the ICU (Eritrea), did not 
risk losing their support by their actions.  
The APRCT represented the remnants of the clans that fought against US forces 
in the first Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, but were seen as the only force capable of 
challenging the ICU with and, by association, Al Qaeda. If historical enemies of the US 
could become temporary allies, the ARPCT had no reason to think their actions 
jeopardized US support. This was a marriage of convenience and both sides knew it. The 
ICU did not care about international opinion because their support derived largely from 
Eritrea, itself a pariah of the global community. Further, the core leadership of the ICU 
had been part of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a known terrorist group in the Horn of Africa. 
Thus, through extreme interpretation of Islam and antagonism to the UN-backed 
government, the ICU showed they and their offshoots cared little about global opinion.  
As each of these factions had little reason to fear a loss of international support, 
they are the groups most likely to use child soldiers. As made clear in numerous reports 
on child soldiering in Somalia, they all do. The SRRC was identified by name in the 2004 
Coalition report, but was just one of the many factions control that contributed to the 
approximately 200,000 Somali children that are involved in combat activities (99). The 
ICU's military wing and the current dominant opposition force was al-Shabaab (Arabic 
for "the youth"). Both the ICU and al-Shabaab have made public statements about their 
intentions to recruit children (Coalition 2008: 306). The Secretary General's Special 
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Representative reported in 2010 that "al-Shabaab has undertaken the most systematic and 
widespread recruitment and use of children in the conflict” (7). This included forced 
recruitment from Puntland and Somaliland, but also training in southern regions. 
Estimates are as high as between 30-45% of al-Shabaab's forces are children. Reports 
indicate children as young as 9 years old have been abducted and trained for combat 
(UNSC 2010 2010: 8).  
The Transitional Federal Government wants to maintain and expand their 
authority over the country. It was first led by Abdullahi Yusuf and later under the helm of 
former ICU chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Arguably, it has the most to lose if 
they flaunted international opinion. According to my theory, we can expect their 
adherence to international norms to be high, and they should refrain from child 
recruitment. However, evidence exists that current and previous administrations have 
used and may still use children. Under the administration of President Yusuf, children as 
young as 11 were reportedly seen at checkpoints, and many 14-18 year olds were 
acknowledged by the government as being used (US State Dept. 2006).  
However, the relationship the TFG has with the international community is 
mutually dependent. The UN, AU, and regional organizations want peace in Somalia, and 
have backed the government long before its arrival in Mogadishu. Nearly 10,000 AU 
troops are currently serving alongside the TFG to bring al-Shabaab to heel and restore 
peace to the country. Like the US/CIA supported APRCT, the TFG is seen as the best 
hope for stability. The international organizations have put all of their support behind the 
TFG. This does not mean that they should openly violate international norms, but that the 
consequences of doing so are more akin to those of an existing state government rather 
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than a would-be state. When the New York Times reported of child soldier use by the 
TFG in 2010, President Sharif issued a public statement vowing to crack down on any 
youth recruitment (UNSC 2010 2010: 9). Therefore, even though the TFG is reliant on 
the international community for support, they already have the legitimacy. Reports of 
child soldiering need to be acted upon, but are not damning for their overall goal of 
expanding control.   
The semi-autonomous region of Puntland began as a base for the SSDF. 
Throughout the 1990s, it existed as an enclave of the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood. 
They engaged in conflict with neighboring Somaliland over the disputed Sanaag and Sool 
regions that both entities claim. The north east clans of Somalia engaged in similar 
meetings as the northern clans in Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, however, Puntland 
declared autonomy within the Federal State of Somalia in 1998. Their goal is to resist 
domination, but have appeared in the past fully willing to work with the TFG and the 
international community. Independence sentiments existed, but cooperation was largely 
the rule (International Crisis Group 2006, 2009). The relatively strong relationship with 
Mogadishu is not surprising. The second president of the TFG was Abdullahi Yusuf, who 
vacated his position as Puntland President to serve the national government. At the same 
time, they remain resistant to centrist rule. In 2011, they formally broke ties with the TFG 
because their interests are allegedly not being served by Sheikh Sharif (Weinstein 2011). 
Because they do not seek international recognition, they are less dependent on the 
international community. At the same time, because they seek international goodwill to 
ensure a high degree of autonomy, they should care about international norms to a certain 
degree. The government has cooperated with anti-piracy operations and has enjoyed 
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increased development funds as a result. Because they need to maintain a particular 
image, in the past they have publicly supported child protection and maintain they will 
not use child soldiers. However, older children around 16 years old were reportedly in the 
ranks of the Puntland police forces (Coalition 2004: 99). In an extension of the argument 
presented here, the Puntland government's position bears a degree of international 
outlook, but success is not dependent on it. Therefore, they offer some child protection in 
accordance with international norms, but still exploit the usefulness of underage troops to 
a limited degree.  
The goals of the various groups in Somalia differ considerably. These goals 
coincide with the degree to which the group cares about the international community and, 
thus, the level of child protection offered. Al-Shabaab and the ICU before it do not care 
about the international community and ultimately show compete disregard for children as 
combatants. Likewise, the earlier iterations of warlords were only interested in taking 
Mogadishu and regularly scorned international opinion. Both the TFG and the semi-
autonomous Puntland administration should generally look abroad for support, but in 
practice are less dependent on global opinion than is Somaliland. The Puntland 
administration can sustain its goals without external partners, but would be better off 
without complete rejection by outsiders. Thus, they tend to respect children's rights, but 
are inconsistent in delivery. The TFG is dependent on Western governments, but the 
relationship works both ways. Thus, while giving lip-service to human rights, they are not 
committed to follow through. Issues other than child protection take priority. In 
comparison, Somaliland is dependent on the international community in order to achieve 
its ultimate goal: statehood. Without this support, Somaliland will never succeed, and 
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independence will forever be stalled. Thus, of all the groups active in Somalia today, they 
are the most likely to refrain from using child soldiers. As was noted in the previous 
section, all of these groups share similarities in history, culture, and a number of 
structural factors. However, they do vary in goals. This difference helps explain the 
variation in their behavior towards children.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 The SNM and from it, the Republic of Somaliland, began as nearly every other 
clan-based militia had in Somalia. Born of the repression of Siad Barre in the 1980s it 
emerged, and consolidated its rule throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Now, in addition to 
acclaimed stability, democracy, and modest economic development, it acts as a beacon of 
child rights not seen anywhere else in the region. Not only do the armed forces refrain 
from using child soldiers, but additional protections for children are present. Above, I 
examined the group goals of Somaliland and by comparison the goals of its 
contemporaries. These alone sufficiently explain the high rates of variation between the 
groups.  
Somaliland cares about the international community; this is the key to their 
ultimate success. While they emerged from the repressive state in 1991, they avoided the 
factional fighting that plagued the south and maintaining a focused strategy on gaining 
international support. Even though independence has thus far eluded them, support has 
come in many shapes and sizes. Some NGOs, like UNICEF, recognize the gains 
Somaliland has made in human rights, openly support independence claims, and call for 
the world community to reward their behavior. The treatment of children is consistent 
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with the goals of the group. Employing an army of child soldiers might allow the 
government to finally bring an end the simmering fight over the Sanaag and Sool regions. 
Conceivably, the armed forces might more successfully strike the TFG in the south if its 
forces were enlarged with a cadre of underage troops. However, though this might further 
entrench military victory, it would effectively eliminate any chance of gaining the 
necessary support of the international community. Thus, given its goals, Somaliland's 
best strategy is to continue its charm offensive, strengthen its democratic institutions, and 
above all, maintain the standards set forth in the UN and AU charters and widely touted 
by the international NGO network. Without the support of these actors, no matter how 
many military victories it achieves, Somaliland will never truly win.   
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Figure 10: Map of Somalia Showing Republic of Somaliland 
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Source: National Public Radio 2010.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Opportunism in the Colombia and Afghanistan Civil Wars 
7.1 Introduction 
In Pueblo Rico, Colombia, six children between ages 6 and 10 years old were 
killed on August 15, 2000. Thinking they were a group of guerillas, the National Army 
attacked and killed them before realizing their mistake (Coalition 2001: 13). In 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the American military had to create an entire compound to 
house the growing number of children detained in the War on Terror. Camp Iguana, as it 
was called, housed children less than 18 years old, including one Afghan boy, 
Mohammed Jawad, who was imprisoned at age 12 (Salahuddin 2009). This reflects the 
reality of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Colombia, and highlights just how far the 
recruitment strategies of the primary insurgents are from international standards.  
These stories are not surprising given the frequency with which insurgents in the 
theatres of Colombia and Afghanistan use underage combatants. Other than the RUF in 
Africa, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Taliban represent 
two of the worst perpetrators of child soldiering in my dataset. But apart from this 
similarity, they have little in common. They are from entirely different regions. One is 
religious, the other is secular. One is from an area once occupied by Britain, but was 
largely free from colonial control, and the other is a former Spanish colony. Afghanistan 
has seen almost no democracy in its long history and remains impoverished, while 
Colombia has been a democracy since the 1960s and while poor, by international 
standards, it has avoided many of the economic crises that befell its neighbors. Why then, 
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would these groups, with so many differences, share a trait as important as recruitment 
decisions?  
 In the previous chapters, I argued that opportunistic rebellions are more likely to 
use child soldiers because they care less about winning and more about maintaining the 
conflict. The limited capabilities of children are more than enough to accomplish this 
task. Children cost less to employ than adults, can be manipulated, and can be more 
easily kept from the revenue of the group. Examining these cases as most-different-
systems, the hypothesis is supported. While different in almost every way, the Taliban 
and FARC are notorious violators of child rights. They also profit considerably from the 
status quo and adopt tactics that are aimed at continuity rather than victory.  Limiting 
costs is more valuable than combat capabilities. Their recruitment profiles reflect these 
priorities.   
 
7.2 The Cases 
FARC 
When the Spanish relinquished control over the colony of Colombia in 1810, 
many people desperately hoped that the new state would shrug the socio-economic 
institutions that divided the colonists. Unfortunately, tensions between landed elites and 
peasants, routine throughout Spanish rule, remained long after independence. Impasse 
over land-rights led to a large-scale civil war known as La Violencia that engulfed the 
country for 10 years (1948-1958). It was a partisan fight, liberals against conservatives, 
that was mainly fought in the countryside and pitted rural peasants against peasants 
backed by elites. The outcome of this struggle was inconclusive. The same dominant 
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classes ruled, a polarized electoral system emerged, and institutionalized violence was 
legitimized as a political reality (Richani 2002). From this emerged the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). With others, FARC grew out of the peasant-defense 
organizations in the 1960s. It was both peasant-based and driven by concern for the 
safety and well-being of the poor peasants. However, FARC evolved in both tactics and 
motivations, such that its humble origins and goals of social justice have largely been 
discarded. Through the routine and severe recruitment of children, along with gluttonous 
involvement in the global drug trade, FARC demonstrates its goals of peasant-ownership 
of the land and redistribution were corrupted.     
Colombia has a history of conflict over land. The current crisis began as just 
another iteration of this struggle. The Hacienda system, inherited from the colonial 
system, was relatively productive, but was dependent on servile labor. At first, Spanish 
elites used Indian labor known as resguardos. Mixed-Native and European populations 
(Mestizo) were also unable to own land and perpetuated the aristocratic system. This 
unequal labor system, coupled with the existence of large tracts of land (latifundios) that 
were difficult to patrol and monitor, resulted in a class of squatters known as colonos. 
Colonos worked and developed small plots of fallow land (minifundios) that were not 
their legal property. A growing number began to call for some measure of redistribution 
that would see their efforts rewarded with acquisition of land. Landowners resisted these 
calls and political parties emerged to represent these competing interests.  
However, this does not reveal the full picture of self-interestedness on the part of 
Colombian political parties. The Conservative Party did speak on behalf of the landed 
elites, but many supporters of the Liberal Party championed peasant interests only as a 
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way to protect themselves from massive redistribution from an inevitable populist 
revolution if such demands were ignored. When the Liberal Party dominated the 
executive branch from 1930-1945, they passed a series of land reforms. However, they 
were ultimately unsuccessful at quelling the tension between the land-owners and 
peasants. The land laws that made up the Liberal Party reforms of the 1930s included 
community-based expropriation procedures. They also sought to establish a land-title 
system. They pushed for land-judges to be assigned in disputed areas (virtually all of the 
countryside) in order to hear claimants' cases. The Conservative Party, along with 
conservative elements of the Liberal Party, succeeded in challenging and undermining 
these reforms. A new land law passed in 1944 scaled back the provisions in the prior set 
of reforms (Vertinsky, Geffner and Fox 1972). This had the effect of rendering the first 
reform package ineffective and exacerbated the tumult throughout the country.  
The first Colombian civil war was a product of the partisan divide and legislative 
gridlock in Bogotá. Facilitated by a plurality electoral system, fractionalization within the 
Liberal Party paved the way for the Conservative Party candidate Mariano Ospina Perez 
to win the 1946 election. Election-related violence gripped the countryside and only 
subsided when the Liberal Party united around the populist champion of non-violence, 
Jorge Gaitain. Almost guaranteed electoral victory, his campaign was cut short when an 
assassin's bullet sparked the civil war that would engulf the country for over a decade. La 
Violencia was largely fought in the countryside and pitted Liberal peasants against 
Conservative-backed peasants. Two days of large-scale "looting, killing, [and] raping" 
led the Conservative government to reorganize the urban police forces that circumscribed 
city-violence (Bailey 1967: 567). In rural areas, land-owners hired Los Pajoros (the 
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birds) as private militias to challenge the armed peasant groups and communist party 
locals (Kreutz 2007). Local interests heightened the scale of the fight and personalized 
the violence (Richani 2002).  
The war ended through a rapid succession of events. A military coup in 1953 
ended the civilian administration. Gustavo Rojas began negotiations with the warring 
factions but was himself deposed in a coup in 1964. This transition led to a one-year 
military junta the emergence of a bipartisan coalition, the National Front, made up of 
moderate elements of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties. In the end, between 
200,000 and 300,000 people died, over 500,000 were injured, and over 1 million were 
displaced (Bailey 1967). The formation of the National Front ended the violence, but 
tensions remained alongside feelings of vulnerability on all sides. In the late stages of La 
Violencia, peasants formed defense organizations to protect themselves from elite 
domination, encroachment, and to express their collective interests. 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia were a direct extension of these 
peasant defense organizations. Towards the end of the conflict, peasant self-defense 
groups organized themselves into administrative blocs and operated nominally 
independent of Bogotá. With assistance from the United States, the Colombian military 
violently retook these regions alienating the local population and emboldening the 
peasant organizations. In July 1964, remnants of these groups formed the "Southern 
Block," united in armed opposition to the government. At a second meeting, they adopted 
the name Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarieas Colombianas (FARC) (Garcia-Duran 
2004).  FARC shared many attributes with other guerillas emerging at the time. First and 
foremost, they offered defense to the colonos. FARC prevented landowners, and later 
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cartels and cattle-ranchers, from expanding onto peasant land. Acting as an alternative 
administration, they also offered a range of public services from financial and market 
assistance to local conflict resolution, including settling marital disagreements (Richani 
2002: 70). In addition, the guerillas coordinated school-funding through progressive and 
luxury-goods taxation.  
FARC's structural evolution began in the late 1970s when, eager for funds, they 
decided to tap into the transnational marijuana trade. Creeping authoritarianism in Bogotá 
coincided with a growth in the marijuana industry. FARC served as the middle-men 
between Colombian growers and Mexican and American distributors. Proceeds provided 
the group with the means to entrench their interests, but most of the profit went to the 
distributors. At this time, the allure of cocaine profits pushed Latin American drug cartels 
into FARC's and other guerillas' territories, creating an additional dimension to the 
conflict. At first, FARC was content with merely taxing these new elites, as they had the 
traditional landowners, but the narco-bourgeoisie began to assert their power and hired 
private militias as a counter to the guerilla forces.  Using the by-now, well established 
networks of growers, transporters, and distributors, FARC had established itself as a 
major player in the international drug trade.  
--Figure 11 here-- 
FARC began with humble, arguably noble goals, that gave hope to the powerless 
peasants that numerically dominated the countryside. The voiceless masses, not 
represented in Bogotá, were at least able to avoid repression thanks to their guerilla 
defenders. However, the increasing production of illicit goods, first marijuana and then 
cocaine, polluted the goals of FARC. The effects of this contamination became apparent 
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quickly. After the 1970s, FARC grew ever more powerful, but victory and institutional 
changes in favor of the peasants seemed to lessen in importance. Along with the strength 
of the guerillas, the appeal of the status quo grew exponentially. This is evident in the 
recruitment decisions of the group. In comparison with potential competing explanations, 
funding and motivational shifts can best account for the recruitment and use of children 
as soldiers. 
 
Taliban  
The Taliban emerged from the ashes of the final proxy battle in the Cold War. 
When it came on the scene, it was little different than other radical Islamic organizations 
jockeying for position in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. After a series of victories (and 
many defeats), it came to control a majority of the country. To many commentators, the 
Taliban remains a perfect example of an insurgency that is based on radical ideology and 
will stop at nothing to achieve total control. This perception is wrong. Were it not for the 
Taliban's indirect role in the September 11th terror attacks, their true motivations would 
not be questioned. It is without question that the Taliban is/was a terrorist-harboring 
organization. However, its ignoble goals are more traditional and mundane than that 
espoused by the transnational network of Jihadist groups. From the beginning, the top-
Taliban commanders have demonstrated their desire to capitalize on the Central Asia 
opium trade. Their history, recruitment practices, and strategy reflect the centrality of 
profit in the organization. 
Contemporary chief executives of Afghanistan have been ephemeral. On July 17, 
1973, the 39-year reign of King Zahir Shah ended in a bloodless coup while he was in 
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Italy for eye surgery. The former Prime Minister and cousin of the king, Mohammad 
Daoud Khan, became president and abolished the monarchy. Shortly thereafter, his brief 
but brutal dictatorship was overthrown in another coup in 1978. Even though Daoud was 
an avowed socialist, his foreign policy emphasized non-alignment and Afghanistan grew 
closer to other Middle-East countries, especially Egypt, during his reign. This estranged 
the Soviet Union that previously supported Daoud in hopes to expand its sphere of 
influence in Central Asia (Tanner 2002). Fractionalization within the communist Peoples 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) amid increasingly high levels of dissent 
resulted in the arrest of several leaders of two military factions. In response, PDPA 
military officers assassinated Daoud and Nur Mohammad Taraki (one of those arrested 
by the government) became president. Factionalism remained, and Taraki was himself 
arrested in yet another coup and executed. One of his chief-PDPA rivals, Hafizullah 
Amin, assumed the office next.  
In late 1979 Amin alienated his Soviet patrons. In December, they secretly 
deposed his government and proclaimed Babrak Karmal the new president. These events 
coincided with a massive increase in Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. It was there 
ostensibly to fight the insurgency that began under Daoud's rule that has continued in 
some degree to the present. In 1987, Karmal was quietly dropped in favor of Mohammad 
Najibullah, head of the KGB-inspired KHAD (Afghan secret police). Najibullah would 
remain president until 1992 when a temporary alliance of rebels brought an end to 
communist rule in Afghanistan. Of all the executives since King Zahir's ouster, Babrak 
Karmal's brief tenure (6 years) would be the longest for any sitting executive in 
Afghanistan until Hamid Karzai in 2004.  
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During the jostle for power in Kabul, a wide-scale insurgency challenged each 
government. Known collectively as the Mujahedeen (those engaged in Jihad), they 
tapped into a network of regional and international allies, each with their own designs on 
Afghanistan. Collectively, from 1980-1992, the Mujahedeen received and estimate $10 
billion from its international backers. Spurred by a fear of Pashtun nationalism espoused 
by Daoud, Pakistan housed the various opposition forces. Additional support for the 
Mujahedeen came from the United States determined to make Afghanistan "The Soviet 
Vietnam" (Yousaf and Adkin 1992: 159). They channeled supplies through the Pakistani 
intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This process allowed the ISI to 
determine which groups received support and which were neglected, contributing to the 
confusion and instability in the region. The ISI favored the Islamic groups over others. 
Chief among these was Hizb-i-Islami, the party of Gulbaddin Hikmatyar (Rashid 2010). 
The Soviet Union, facing a seemingly never-ending war and mounting domestic 
problems, withdrew in 1989. After the Cold War, the US stopped funding the 
Mujahedeen. The support was carried on by wealthy elites from the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, and especially Saudi Arabia. These funds were largely channeled to 
the more radical Wahhabi-based groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The insurgency 
maintained ideological unity against the atheist Soviet forces, but showed remarkably 
little operational cohesion.  
Surprisingly, the Najibullah government was able to rule for a further three years 
without Soviet support. This was due in large part to fractionalization within the 
Mujahedeen (Tanner 2002). There were 7 major groups, all Sunni, operating from bases 
in Pakistan. Of these, four were Islamists and were both anti-communist and anti-
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monarchy. The remaining 3 groups were also anti-communist, but promoted customary 
law and were open to a return to the monarchy. These groups were more tolerant to 
ethnic minorities as well. Additional parties represented the Shi'a minorities in Hazarat. 
Like the governments in Kabul, the opposition had their own shifting roster of leaders 
and parties. After the coup against King Zahir, Karmal, at the behest of the new Daoud 
regime, attempted to crush a budding Islamic movement.  
The leaders of which fled to Peshawar in Pakistan. From among these refugees 
would emerge three high-profile figures in Afghanistan's history: Ahmed Shah Massud, 
Gulbuddin Hikmetyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani. In truth, many individuals comprised 
the resistance, including army deserters, religious leaders, students, opportunists, and 
countless others alienated by the communist regime. In fact, from 1978 to the time of 
Soviet withdrawal, the National army of Afghanistan shrank from a height of 108,000 to 
approximately 30,000 by the end of the 1980s (Sathasivam 2007). In addition, fighters 
from all over the Muslim world came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The period 
1982-1992 witnessed an estimated 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 countries join the 
resistance (Rahsid 2010). From this theatre emerged the Taliban.  
 Immediately before the rise of the Taliban, Afghanistan was in a period of "virtual 
disintegration" with factional fighting and warlord rule throughout the country (Rashid 
2010:22). Najibullah's rule came to an end on April 26, 1992. The government 
succumbed to a lack of funds and pressure from the United Nations. Najibullah agreed to 
a UN brokered peace deal (the Peshewar Accords) and stepped down; he sought refuge at 
the UN compound in Kabul until his death in 1996. The agreement called for the 
formation of an interim government. The powerful Gulbuddin Hikmatyar took advantage 
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of his position near Kabul to seize the capital for himself. As the recipient of a large 
amount of Pakistani military equipment, he was in a position to challenge the other 
groups. The interim government appointed Ahmed Shah Massoud (of the Jamiat-i-Islami) 
as defense minister. He was tasked with ousting Hikmatyar from Kabul, to which he 
obliged. Fierce urban warfare continued in Kabul as forces aligned to the different parties 
jockeyed for power. Ultimately, Hikmatyar received the position of prime minister in 
1993 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. One year later, opportunist as he was, 
Hikmatyar allied with former Pro-Soviet Abdul Rashid Dostum and again tried to seize 
Kabul. This time, Massoud's forces succeeded in repelling the temporary alliance. In 
addition to these primary groups, regional players further contributed to the disunity. 
Saudi Arabia backed the Wahhabi Ittihad-i Islami faction, which was at odds with the 
Iran-backed Hizb-Wahdat. Displeased with the total disintegration of the brief 
Mujahedeen alliance and angered by Hikmatyar's personal role in its failure, Pakistan, 
still anxious to extend its influence, saw the southern Taliban movement as another 
potential client organization.  
The Taliban began as a small religious movement in the anarchic southern regions 
in 1994. The Mujahedeen quickly demonstrated that they were not up to the task of 
maintaining control of Afghanistan, something for which many Afghans were desperate. 
Believed to be outside the interest of the major factions, the south, including the second 
largest city in Afghanistan, Kandahar, was ravaged by looters and clashing warlords. 
Disturbed by this lawlessness, many Afghans either fled to or remained in Pakistan, 
studying in the numerous madrassas that previously helped feed the ranks of the 
Mujahedeen. Among them was a small cohort of extremists under the leadership of 
 192 
 
Mullah Mohammed Omar, a seasoned veteran in the war against the Soviet Union. 
During the war he fought with the splinter Hizb-i-islami under Maulvi Younis Khalis. 
Two years after the fall of Najibullah he returned to Afghanistan and founded a madrassa 
in a small village near Kandahar. There, with around 40 students ("Taliban" in Pashtun), 
he claimed to be able to offer an end to the corruption, violence, and suffering of 
Afghanistan through a strict form of Sharia law.  
Mullah Omar and his Taliban developed a "Robin Hood" reputation by 
confronting petty thugs in Kandahar. One story holds that the Taliban stopped two rival 
commanders from raping a young boy. Another tells that they rescued two girls from 
being raped by soldiers. Contributing to the allure, Omar reportedly asked for no reward 
(Rashid 2010: 24). By the end of 1994, with a supportive following, the Taliban largely 
controlled the city of Kandahar and began their northward expansion.  
Like the Mujahedeen before them, the Taliban received considerable support from 
Pakistan. The group served three purposes for Islamabad. Supporting the Taliban would 
prevent a strong nationalist government in Kabul in favor of a relatively weak, compliant 
regime.  
Pakistan initially saw this possibility in the Mujahedeen, however, the leaders proved 
more consumed with their own individual designs on the country. Hikmatyar's actions, 
and his close ties to Pakistan, made it more likely that if a rival came to power they 
would be antagonistic towards Islamabad. The Taliban proved willing servants at first 
when, on October 1994, a Pakistani convoy had been hijacked by warlords. The Taliban 
were tasked with freeing it, and they did. Second, the Taliban unofficially served the 
interests of the powerful Pakistani transportation mafia, who were eager to dredge the 
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roads of superfluous Mujahedeen checkpoints. They also wanted to open a route from 
Quetta to Kandahar, now under Taliban control. These transporters would be key early 
financial backers of the Taliban (Rashid 2010: 25). Finally, Pakistan was committed to 
"[recreate] a Sunni Muslim space between infidel 'Hindustan,' 'heretic' (because Shi'a) 
Iran and 'Christian' Russia" (Roy 1999: 8). Supporting the Sunni Taliban offered a way to 
continue Islamabad's neo-imperialist adventure. This was a natural extension of their 
decades-long support of the Mujahedeen in general, and of Hikmatyar in particular. 
Despite considerable backing by Pakistan, the Taliban asserted their independence. In 
November 1994, a Taliban spokesman demanded that Pakistan not make deals with 
individual warlords. Also, to the ire of the transport mafia, the Taliban proclaimed that 
Pakistani trucks could not carry goods through Afghanistan.  
The Taliban spread quickly throughout the mid 1990s, capturing many southern 
posts from powerful warlords. After seizing Kandahar, the Taliban accessed a huge 
stockpile of weapons, including Mig-21 fighters (Rashid 2010: 29). Flush with resources, 
they expanded from Kandahar and slowly took important cities and strongholds from 
rival factions. Their victories were not militarily impressive. Taliban tactics remained 
poor with little effective chain of command and weak formations (Rashid 2010: 40). 
Using a tactic they would rely on throughout their existence, they routinely bribed 
commanders into joining their forces. This they practiced during their initial march 
northward, only attacking forces that refused their financial enticements. For most, 
including many of Hikmatyar's top commanders, money was enough incentive to switch 
sides suggesting that during its initial drive to Kabul, the Taliban were allying with 
opportunists whose goal was money rather than control. In early 1996, Massoud halted 
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their drive outside Kabul. A concerted effort by the Taliban and a series of promised 
bribes failed to overcome Massoud's superior military prowess. The commander at 
Jalalabad accepted the Taliban's bribe, opening up an eastern front to Kabul (Peters 
2009).37 On September 26, 1996, Massoud abandoned the city and retreated north. Far 
from consolidating their control, the Taliban commanders remained relatively entrenched 
in the capital, and proceeded to press their efforts to resistant factional commanders 
around the country. This situation existed until September 11, 2001.   
The Taliban emerged similarly as the other armed groups in Afghanistan before it. 
It was not even the only radical Jihadist organization active at the time. Benefiting from 
connections with powerful external backers and bribery-over-combat tactics, it largely 
succeeded where others had failed. It took the capital and declared victory well before it 
had consolidated its rule. Even on September 11th, Kabul was being shelled by groups 
resistant to Taliban rule. After the US-led liberation of Afghanistan, the Taliban did not 
change course. Rather, it fell back to its base in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. As 
with most rebel groups, its actions fail to live up to their rhetoric. One of the earliest 
actions involved rescuing children from abusers. They then became the abusers. They 
pledged to combat the plague of poppy ravaging the region. Before, during and after its 
height, the Taliban was heavily involved in the drug-trade. Analyzing the tactics and 
strategy of the group, its soldiers, and commanders, reveals the extent to which the 
former is a product of the latter.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Some suggest Osama bin Laden put up the $3 million needed to pay off the remaining warlords (Peters 
2009: 79).  
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7.3 Child Soldier Use 
FARC 
It is not uncommon for the stated goals and policies of an armed group to differ 
from its practice. However, with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the 
rhetoric is so far removed from reality that it difficult to understand why the pretense is 
maintained. In addition to being infamous for their involvement in the cocaine-industry, 
FARC is also notorious for its indiscriminate use of child soldiers. They are known as 
"little bees" for their ability to "sting" the enemy or "little carts" because they often ferry 
drugs and ammunition (Coalition 2001: 119).  By volume, approximately 40% of FARC's 
forces were recruited under the age of 17 (Gutierrez-Sanin 2010). By severity, children as 
young as 6 are used as porters, spies, and as direct combatants (Human Rights Watch 
2003). FARC routinely violates international norms by recruiting children in high 
numbers and disturbingly low ages.  
FARC claims to respect international norms regarding children and child soldiers, 
but in practice it routinely violate these policies. In 1999, FARC publicly stated it would 
not allow recruits under age 15 to join their forces. This pledge was made to the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Questions 
about under-15s evoke denial and assurances that such volunteers are returned to their 
families (Coalition 2001: 121).  Despite these hollow assurances, monitoring groups 
report a near unanimous position identifying egregious use of underage soldiers. The 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers regularly notes the widespread use of child 
combatants in Colombia and routinely identifies FARC by name in their annual reports. 
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General also highlights the widespread 
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use of under 18s. In 2003, Human Rights Watch compiled a 150-page report outlining the 
abuses in Colombia, of which FARC figures prominently. When confronted by reporters 
about such allegations and calls to stop using children, FARC leader at the time, Manuel 
Marulanda, responded succinctly, "They're going to stay in the ranks" (Reuters 2000). 
Child soldiers comprise a substantial portion of FARC's  troop strength reflecting 
the routine violation of international norms. Exact numbers of children employed cannot 
be known, but estimates reveal a very high ratio of children to adults. Human Rights 
Watch (2003) estimates that between 20 and 30 percent of the regular forces are underage 
at any given point in time. A conservative estimate yields at least 3,600 children, and as 
many as 5,400 in the regular forces. However, the urban militias allied to FARC provide 
another large number of combatants and recruit heavily among youths (Human Rights 
Watch 2003). Assuming an additional 10,000 supplementary forces from these areas and 
further assuming a higher proportion (35%) of these are children, FARC's total estimate 
of children is between 7000-9000. These numbers make up a substantial portion of the 
estimated 14,000 child soldiers recruited by all armed groups, including paramilitaries in 
Colombia (Coalition 2004: 125).  
Beyond basic counts and ratios, FARC is notorious for recruiting very young 
children. As of the late 2000s, FARC operated in over 60 active combat zones throughout 
Colombia. A sizeable minority of children under fifteen years old are used on nearly all 
of these (Human Rights Watch 2003: 24). Conscription of all males between 13 and 15 
was mandated in the Putumayo Department near the Peru-Ecuador border (Coalition 
2001: 121). In the municipality of Cunday (Tolima), FARC demanded that all children 
over the age of 12 would be forced to join the group (Coalition 2004: 126). In the 
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demilitarized zone, FARC conscripted "all persons between the ages of 13 and 60." In 
truth, though, there is no lower-bound age to FARC's recruitment efforts. Children are 
often "born into armed groups because their parents are members" (Coalition 2001: 119). 
A FARC training video shows children around the age of 11 contributing to the war 
effort (Coalition 2001: 122). On April 17, 2003, a boy was killed trying to deliver a bomb 
to a military checkpoint. He was 10 years old (Coalition 2004: 125). Of the 112 former 
child combatants in Colombia interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2003, 71.25% 
were recruited by FARC. Over 70% were recruited before their 15th birthday. Finally, 
32.5% of these children were recruited when they were under the age of 13 (Human 
Rights Watch 2003: 144-149).   
Despite a pledge to follow international commitments towards children, FARC 
does not. Not only do they routinely violate the rights of children, but they do so on a 
massive scale. Some of the most vulnerable members of society, the very young, are 
indiscriminately recruited by the guerillas to be serve a variety of roles. The use of child 
soldiers by FARC, both in both number and severity, coupled with the realization that 
children make weak soldiers, offers a clear indication that their recruitment practices are 
not driven by pursuit of victory on the battlefield.    
 
Taliban 
The first US casualty in Afghanistan was at the hands of a 15-year old Afghan 
sniper. Taliban's history of child soldier use is consistent and extends to their early days 
when they would empty madrassas in Pakistan of students to fill their ranks against the 
warlords in the south. During their brief reign in Kabul, they denied the regular NGO 
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reports that said they recruited children. Following the US intervention, the Taliban 
largely ended this charade and their abuse of children was widespread and visible. 
Showing complete disregard to both international norms and children's rights, the Taliban 
not only regularly use child soldiers but do so at very-young ages and in extreme ways.   
 The Taliban consistently bolsters its forces with children, but surprisingly makes 
some effort to hide this fact. When the UN Secretary General reported that between 2000 
and 5000 children served on the frontlines for the Taliban in their struggle against the 
Mujahedeen, the leaders denied the report and invited monitors onto the frontlines to 
verify (Coalition 2001). In the Taliban Rule Book, Rule 19 states " Mujahideen are not 
allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield…" (Schuster 2006). As 
far back as 1998, Mullah Omar warned of "severe punishment," for those that recruited 
(effectively) under-18s (BBC 1999). However, in practice these proclamations are 
routinely broken. In 1994, the interim government ratified the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The Taliban annulled this when they took Kabul two years later 
(Coalition 2001: 29).  
The Taliban made use of child soldiers from the start. They used the network of 
madrassas in Pakistan and called on local mullahs to meet troop quotas, often filled with 
child conscripts (Coalition 2001: 32). During their occupation of Kabul, the Taliban 
regularly called on Madrassa students to fight against the Northern Alliance (as 
Massoud's forces were then known). An estimated 5000 students, some as young as 14, 
were called to action, forcing many schools to close entirely (Galpin 1999).  Child 
soldiering remains problematic throughout Afghanistan, but is especially bad in the areas 
where the Taliban is active and maintains their strongholds. Allegations of child 
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recruitment is highest in the South, Southeast and eastern regions of the country, 
particularly in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces (UNSC report 2008: 7). Other noted 
offenders include the Haqqani network, closely aligned to the Taliban, and sometimes-
ally/sometimes-enemy, Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. These groups and these regions are 
also in areas most heavily involved in the poppy-trade.  
With increased attention following the US occupation, the Taliban's crimes 
against children have become more apparent. Young children are used as spies, 
messengers, and human shields. In 2009, the Washington Times reported that children as 
young as 7 were being "purchased" by Taliban leaders to serve as suicide bombers. 
Another report documented a 6-year old caught wearing an explosive vest at a Coalition 
checkpoint. Thankfully, the vest was defused and no one was injured (Guardian 2007). A 
12-year old boy beheaded a man accused of being a spy in a video released by the 
Taliban. "We want to tell the non-Muslims that our youngsters are also Mujahideens 
[holy warriors] and fight with us against you… These youngsters will be our Holy War 
commanders in the future and continue the jihad for freedom," said Taliban commander 
Mullah Hayatullah Khan (Reuters 2007).  
Unlike many other armed groups, the Taliban has access to tens of thousands of 
battle-hardened veterans proficient in guerilla fighting. They even have experience 
fighting a better trained, better-armed superpower. Despite this access, they use children. 
What is more, they put a premium on recruiting children, and use them at very young 
ages. Child soldiers serve little tactical advantage and their combat effectiveness, even as 
suicide bombers is limited. Taken together, these facts suggest that military victory is less 
valuable than maintaining the fight.   
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7.4 Importance of Funding 
FARC 
FARC began with 44 members vowing to protect the peasant from state and elite 
encroachment. Four decades later, the group stands at 18,000, the largest guerilla 
movement in Latin America, with an annual income of around $300 million (Kreutz 
2007). If it were a country its economy would rank approximately 43rd in the world 
putting it ahead of Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Mexico. Founded on principles of protection 
and delivery of public services, the local peasants supported FARC with donations, 
supplementing additional income gathered through taxation, extortion, bank robbery, and 
ransom. The contemporary stated goals of the rebellion are indicative of these roots, but 
motivations have evolved as conditions have changed. Beginning first as a rural/peasant 
protection organization, the rise of the narcotics industry has polluted FARC's original 
foundation and the pursuit of profits has altered the political calculus of the organization.  
In the early years of the insurgency, FARC relied on contributions from locals and 
a progressive taxation system that targeted the landowners, but turned to the illicit 
economy following economic and demographic shifts in the 1970s. Throughout the 
decade they had relied on the standard portfolio that most Latin American guerillas 
enjoyed. The rural peasants (campesinos) supported FARC with donations in return for 
protection. At this time, the organization engaged in small-scale predatory actions such as 
kidnapping and bank robbery (Cook 2011). Though not under their direct control, FARC 
also received donations from Russia and Cuban communist groups. The guerillas first 
began their foray into the illicit economy by taxing the marijuana trade in the 1970s. 
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Cartels settled in guerilla-held areas by agreeing to pay protection taxes. This was 
estimated to be approximately 10% of all transactions (Joyce and Malamud 1998:69). 
The funds allowed FARC to expand its operation and increase the number of fronts in the 
civil war. However, it also resulted in more autonomous commanders with some actively 
involved in the narcotics trade (McDermott 2004:29). The profitability of the trade in 
marijuana was limited compared to cocaine. First, the profits were primarily enjoyed by 
the Mexican and American distributors rather than the growers in Colombia. This limited 
the tax revenue claimed by FARC. Second, a combined US and Colombian anti-
Marijuana policy in the 1980s aimed to curtail the trade. Unlike the coca plant, marijuana 
is distinguishable from other native flora and was thus more easily targeted by anti-drug 
forces. Third, cocaine is agriculturally efficient. It grows well in inclement conditions and 
poor soil. Unlike other crops, including marijuana, it does not need large-scale irrigation 
or fertilization (Cook 2011). Finally, cocaine-paste can be derived, extending the storage 
life of the final product indefinitely. All of these features, coupled with growing North 
American and European demand, altered FARC's funding profile and offered the 
resources to expand their operations considerably.  
Moving into the cocaine industry proved highly lucrative for the group. FARC 
initially resisted entry into the market. In 1982 at the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, 
leaders weighed the decision against their ideological position. By this point, FARC 
leaders on the Caqueta front had already tapped into the cocaine industry. Ultimately, 
they determined that the benefits (expanded operations) outweighed the costs (reduced 
ideological purity) and a Financial Commission emerged to direct the proceeds (Marcy 
2010). At first the profits were limited, as FARC instituted a 10% tax on growers 
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(gramaje). Involvement grew quickly. Using new international narco-trafficking 
networks, FARC moved into sales and market manipulation (Ribetti 2007). In the early 
90s, the group was bringing in $60-100 million per year from the drug trade. By early 
2000's the organization is estimated to have made around $300 million per year, with 
60% of the total coming exclusively from the drug trade (Richani 2002). This 
profitability changed the FARC's strategy and allowed it to expand its operational reach 
considerably. In the 1980s, insurgents maintained a presence in just 17% of the country. 
By 1995, this had grown to 58% (DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean 2007). FARC 
maintained just 27 military fronts in 1983. After adopting pro-cocaine policies, this more 
than doubled with the group operating on over 60 fronts by 1995 and over 70 by 2000 
(Kreutz 2007: 273).  
The financial prospects of FARC continued to rise as the US War on 
Drugs took its toll on the more vulnerable narco-traffickers in the late 1980s. The 
death of Pablo Escabor in 1993 and combined US-Colombian financial warfare 
on the Medellin and Cali Cartels strengthened FARC's position as a powerhouse 
in the global narcotics industry. Using profits from the cocaine-trade, it grew to 
considerable proportions and pushed the weak Colombian military out of 
important agricultural sectors. This in turn offered more drug-related profits. In 
fact, by July 1999, 65% of Colombians thought that the state was apt to fall to the 
insurgency (DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean 2007). Despite this surge in 
resources and strength, FARC never successfully challenged state hegemony or 
made a drive for Bogotá or other major cities. Instead of capitalizing on their 
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newfound prosperity, FARC maintained the conflict-status quo. It was good for 
business. 
 
Taliban 
Like their contemporaries, the Taliban reaped reward from Afghanistan's 
principle crop, the poppy. Many actors, both individuals and groups, not only got rich 
from the global heroin trade, but were also intertwined with the Taliban. From the 
beginning, it was an organization centered on the poppy plant. This has not changed, and 
the industry has only gotten more lucrative under the heightened conflict conditions 
following the Taliban's ouster from Kabul.   
The Taliban's key financial allies depend on the drug trade. An early financier of 
the Taliban's operations was the Pakistani transportation mafia, which made big profits 
smuggling opium from Afghanistan to distributers around the world. Before 1996, the 
Quetta-Kandahar trucking mafia provided and estimated $450,000 over two days for the 
organization to open up trade routes to Iran (Peters 2009: 76). Some suggest they deserve 
more credit than the ISI in getting the Taliban started. The World Bank estimates that the 
profit from the narcotics trade approaches $1.25 billion annually.  
The trucking mafia is not the only beneficiary conflict perpetuation. Hikmatyar, 
as mentioned earlier, was an early dominant party in the narcotics industry. When his 
Hizb-i-Islami party was allied with the Taliban, he paid up to 25% of his profit to the 
Taliban for security. His organization was a "full-fledged narco-terror organization," 
trading in heroin, gemstones and timber (Peters 2009). Another Taliban ally, the Haqqani 
group, was also tied into the smuggling trade. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
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fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern alliance in the mid-90s. They are a key 
heroin distributer in Central Asia. Haji Bashir Noorzai was an huge profiteer from the 
drug trade with tens of thousands of acres of poppy farmland. He was arrested in 2008 on 
heroin charges in the US. He was also one of Omar's original sponsors, working with the 
trucking mafia and sponsoring Madrassas in Quetta, Pakistan (Peters 2009: 75).  
  There is overwhelming evidence that the Taliban profits considerably from 
narcotics trafficking and by extension, the conflict situation in which it thrives. The 
heroin-opium-poppy capital of the world is located in the Taliban-held areas. In 1999, 
75% global poppy-crop came from Afghanistan. Given the level of Taliban occupation, it 
is not surprising then that 97% of this was grown in areas under Taliban influence or 
direct control (Peters 2009: 81). Even after Coalition forces removed the Taliban from 
power and scattered their troops, in 2007 80% of the opium produced in Afghanistan was 
from Taliban regions (see Figure 13). In 2008, drought reduced the poppy crop by 19%. 
However, at this point 98% was cultivated in insurgent-areas of the Taliban, the Haqqani 
network, and Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. The Executive Director of the UN Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in 2009 that Afghanistan does not have an opium 
problem, rather "a southern opium problem," Furthermore, approximately 60 functioning 
heroin labs are believed to be in the Taliban-strongholds of Helmand and Nangarhar 
provinces alone.  
From this control comes considerable wealth. According to the US Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), 70% of the Taliban's financing comes from drugs (Peters 
2009: 14). In 2001, the estimate for Taliban and al-Qaeda profits from the drug trade 
reached $1 billion. The figure for all traffickers in 2007 was $4 billion. Approximately $1 
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billion moves through the hawala dealers in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar 
alone. Taliban-collected drug taxes garnered approximately $56 million at the farm level 
in 2007 (UNODC 2008). From heroin refineries they garnered an additional $133 million 
per year. They collected a further $250 million in protecting drug shipments.  
--Figure 13 here-- 
 In its earliest stage, the Taliban was dependent upon and intertwined with the 
international narcotics trade. Early financiers were archetypal drug warlords and drug 
smugglers. It was they who profited from the Taliban's takeover, and maintained strong 
incentives in the chaotic situation that has reigned in Afghanistan since the 1970s. Drugs 
fueled the Taliban's rise to power in other ways by allowing their militarily inept forces 
and leadership to co-opt rivals, thereby supplementing their forces and expanding their 
territory. The massive profits reaped to the Taliban and its allies by their involvement did 
not change after September 11th.  
 
7.5 Causal Mechanisms 
FARC 
FARC and other actors in Colombia's civil war have adapted to the political 
economy of the insurgency. Richani (2002) argues that the primary actors, guerillas, 
military and paramilitaries, benefit from the stalemate presently reached. Analysis of the 
profits available to the FARC supports this notion. FARC's recruitment practices reflect a 
rational change from an overt political strategy to one of profit.  
 Tactical decisions indicate a priority towards financial-security rather than 
military success. A surge in strength and capability coincided with an incredible 
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expansion of territory, although these acquisitions focused on protecting valuable drug-
producing areas. In addition, FARC went on the offensive and challenged military 
positions more directly than they had in the 1970s. However, despite these gains, 
decisions reflected the increasing importance of income over military victory. The troop 
strength increased exponentially from 1990-2002 (see Figure 12). However, the estimated 
battle-deaths at this same time suggest that, rather than using increased forces to engage 
the military, the conflict status quo was maintained. Were FARC interested in using their 
new wealth to further the revolutionary cause, not just engagements, but high-intensity 
maneuvers would be evident. This has not been the case.  
--Figure 12 here-- 
Recruitment and indoctrination patterns indicate a pollution of FARC's original 
goals. 
 Low level soldiers in the group are often admittedly driven by economic or selfish 
motivations. Former FARC guerillas interviewed in 2000-2001 revealed that they were 
not even aware of the group’s ideological goals (Ribetti 2007: 716). This lack of 
commitment did not change as many members left the group when the promised 
economic resources were not given. Increasingly autonomous commanders are active in 
the drug trade, making economic rather than military decisions. Middle Rank (Mandos 
medios) are known to pocket the gramajes tax money defying the leadership which lays 
claim to all resources. At least $2 million has been lost through embezzlement at the 
middle-ranks in 2000 alone (Ribetti 2007). FARC leadership appears increasingly 
removed from the ideological underpinnings of the rebellion's origins. FARC 
commanders often do not explain to members what would be different if it actually won. 
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Interviewed former guerillas indicated that they "did not perceive leaders as caring, 
committed or just" (Ribetti 2007: 71). Further, internal disagreement remains about 
whether winning is a desirable strategy (Kreutz 2007:287). This fractionalization has 
routinely led to breakdown in peace negotiations. On November 4, 2011 the leader of 
FARC, Alfonso Cano, was killed by targeted air strikes. The timing of the offensive was 
somewhat surprising because Cano had begun to engage the government in peace talks. It 
was perhaps less surprising when it was revealed that Cano's own inner security circle 
had provided the necessary intelligence for the operation (Hinchliffe 2011).  
Using child soldiers supports this changing set of priorities. Beber and Blattman 
(2010) suggest that 15 represents the age of higher combat effectiveness for children. 
However, FARC withholds these troops for other duties and instead uses the very 
inefficient younger children for combat. Using data from Human Rights Watch, younger 
child soldiers are statistically more likely to have seen combat than their older comrades. 
Contrary to what one might expect, children over 15 are less likely to be involved in 
higher levels of combat. This is true even when controlling for the number of months 
served.38 Also, those involved with this group are less likely to see high levels of conflict 
compared to their non-FARC peers. Children under the age of 15 have a .118 likelihood 
of avoiding combat, compared to .3 for those 15 years or older. They are also 21.7% 
likely to have been in combat between 10 and 20 times. This is only 11% for those 15 or 
over. Finally, children over 15, those Blattman expects to be more capable, only see 
                                                 
38 I estimated an ordered logistic regression where the dependent variable is categorical and records combat 
involvement (Table 7.1). Here, "0" means the child did not see combat; "1" means they saw it less than 10 
times or "a few times;" "2" means between 10 and 20 times or "several times;" and "3" means they saw 
combat more than 20 times or "many times." The independent variables include a dichotomous age 
variable, 15 years or older, months served in the organization, voluntary recruitment, and a dichotomous 
variable for having at some point been a member of FARC.  
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combat "over 20 times" or "many times" at a rate of .06. For children under 15, this 
increases 140% (.15).39 These data are only suggestive at this point, but they do point to 
routine decisions to send ineffective, very young children into combat over older, more 
capable (though still not as capable as adults) child soldiers.40   
--Table 6 here-- 
FARC's decisions reflect an organization that is more concerned with economic 
gain than social justice. Exploring the tactical decisions, FARC failed to capitalize on its 
growing strength, and the weak position of the government, opting instead to maintain its 
hegemony in the lucrative coca-producing regions. Furthermore, the individual 
motivations of low, middle, and high-ranking members reveal the level of distortion that 
drug-profits has brought. The decision to use child soldiers and the way in which they are 
used illustrates just how far FARC has come from its humble origins. Despite strong 
ideological, popular and populist beginnings, it is now the quintessential opportunistic 
rebellion. Under these circumstances, using child soldiers is a rational decision by FARC 
leaders and commanders. This is consistent with the theory.   
 
Taliban  
The Taliban benefits financially from the conflict situation in Afghanistan. Group 
tactics denote a strategy that is aimed more at profit than outright victory. Even when 
                                                 
39 Predicted probabilities were estimated at the 95% confidence level using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and 
King 2003).  
40 Looking at the bivariate relationship, compared with how well we can predict a child's combat 
experience, knowledge of their entry age improves this by a substantial 28% (somer's d = -.28; p-value 
.012). In comparison, a similar model considering the months served only improves our prediction by 54% 
(p-value .000).  
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they held control of the capital, running a functioning state was not important. Rather, 
they maintained and expanded involvement in the most profitable sector of their internal 
economy: the opium-trade. Consistent with the theory, Taliban behavior before, during 
and after their occupation of Kabul is rational based on the political economy of the war 
system.  
 Having largely achieved control of the country by 2001, it could be argued that 
the Taliban did, in fact, care a lot about winning. This is not the case. Despite overtures to 
gain international recognition for their government, they routinely flaunted international 
public opinion, enraged the United Nations, and alienated other Muslim countries. The 
Taliban routinely illustrated their disdain for world opinion with several high profile acts. 
When they entered Kabul, their earliest acts showed how little they cared about 
international opinion. On September 27, 1996 at 1:00 am, they entered the UN compound 
in Kabul, severely beat, castrated, and then drug the former President Najibullah to his 
death (BBC 2001). This immediately signaled that diplomatic territory would not be 
respected. Even Islamic countries that had been less hostile to the Taliban's strict 
interpretation of Islam denounced their actions. After formal condemnation by the UN, 
the Taliban responded by issuing additional death sentences for Dostum, Rabbani and 
Massoud (Rashid 2010: 50). In a further display of a lack of respect for diplomatic 
protection, the UN staff pulled out of Kandahar in 1998 after staffers were beaten and 
threaten by senior Taliban officials (Rashid 2010: 70). The Governor of the city threw a 
table and chair at one UN official. The bodies of Afghan UN aid staff were found, with 
no explanation for their deaths, followed shortly after with the secret execution of 11 
Iranian diplomats in the town of Hazarajat. Poor treatment of women took on diplomatic 
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importance when female aid agency staff were first forbidden to be in public without a 
related, male escort, which was almost impossible for many staffers. They even forced a 
female UNHCR lawyer to speak from behind a curtain when meeting with low-level 
Taliban officials (Rashid 2010: 65). Taliban treatment of women received high profile 
critics. For example, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright said, "We are 
opposed to the Taliban because of their opposition to human rights and their despicable 
treatment of women and children " (Rashid 2010: 65). International Women's Day 1998 
was devoted to the plight of Afghan women. Further acts scorned world opinion. In 2001, 
Mullah Omar ordered the ancient Buddha status at Bamiyan dynamited. Of course, after 
the US embassy bombings in Africa, the Taliban rebuffed all diplomatic efforts to turn 
over Osama bin Laden. In the end, only Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi 
Arabia ever recognized the Taliban government. By 2001, the Saudis had already 
rescinded this recognition.  
The Taliban depends on the poor security that conflict conditions create. The 
Taliban has proven especially hostile to global humanitarian efforts to alleviate poverty in 
the areas they control. In addition to the above anecdotes, the head of UN humanitarian 
aid operations was refused entry to visit Kabul in 1998. Further, the Taliban closed all 
NGO offices in Kabul and forced them to move to an old college on the outskirts of the 
city, one that had been all but destroyed in the fighting for the capital (Rashid 2010: 72). 
Two Afghans that were working for the UNHCR and World Food Program were 
kidnapped and executed in Jalalabad. The harsh tactics and human rights violations 
prompted the EU to suspend all aid to areas under Taliban control. The presence of 
Western aid agencies would have jeopardized the Taliban's primary source of income. 
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Poor farmers grow poppy because it is one of the only things they can do. If aid agencies 
and national stability were present, they would be able to offer the citizens alternatives. 
The Taliban did not want humanitarian assistance threatening their economic system. The 
restrictions and poor treatment appeared to be working. The Assistant to the Secretary 
General Brahimi, who was tasked with brokering peace negotiations with the groups in 
Afghanistan, went public about his frustrations: "This is an organization that hands out 
edicts to us that prevents us from doing our job. The Taliban must know that not only is 
there a limit to what you can stand but that there are growing pressures on us - in 
particular form the donor community to say that there's a limit" (Rashid 2010: 72). UN 
accommodations, including bringing in female Muslims to work at UN healthcare 
facilities, proved too patient and compromising for the Taliban. Clearly not taking the 
hint, on July 20, 1998, the Taliban ordered all NGO offices closed and removed the staff 
by force. This effectively ended humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan under Taliban 
rule. Lasting peace and the presence of aid agencies is bad for business. Ashraf Ghani, 
the former finance minister of Afghanistan put it succinctly; "Drug smugglers do not 
want to see this country become stable" (Peters 2009:5).  
 In practice the Taliban indicate a preference for profits over military or political 
victory. They use tactics that favor the narcotics industry rather than retaking Kabul. For 
example, Deh Rawood fell to the Taliban in February 2009. The target did not have 
military value. However, it is one of the most important smuggling routes in the Uruzgan 
province (Moore 2008). Taliban tactics changed from trying to gain tactical advantage to 
protection and diversion (Peters 2009: 116). Major offensives on security checkpoints 
take place during covert drug transportation. Even September 11th can be seen not as a 
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political blunder, but an investor's careful, calculated action. Before September 11th, the 
regional price of a kg of opium hovered around $35. In 2001, this soared to over $300/kg 
before settling to around $100/kg in 2004 (UNODC 2008). In 2009, diplomatic cables 
revealed that the Taliban use opium stocks as a sort of illicit stock exchanged. Stockpiles 
for commanders, including Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, reached considerable 
heights during their five year reign. Figure 14 shows how high their stock prices got in 
2001. With such considerable profits at stake, there is little distinction between the 
commanders and the drug traffickers. Said one UN official, "What is the Taliban? They 
are gone now. What we have now is people working together just to make money." 
According to a survey of 350 people working in the drug trade along the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 81% said the Taliban commanders' first priority was to 
make money (Peters 2009: 13). Thus, the Taliban bears little resemblance to the 
organization that resides in popular perception. 
--Figure 14 here-- 
Using child soldiers, particularly in the way that they are deployed by the Taliban, 
is not a tactic for victory. It can, however, maintain instability, insecurity, and prove 
nurturing to conditions most enjoyed by narco-traffickers. It is a tragedy that children are 
used as suicide bombers and a blessing when they are intervened, defused, and 
reintegrated into peaceful society. However, it is telling that so many of them are 
unsuccessful. Contrasting this with other suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories 
reveals that if the Taliban was serious about winning, it would use older, more capable 
bombers.41 The Israeli Security Services (Shin Bet) collected data on all Palestinian 
                                                 
41 Palestinian goals are different and this likely determines their tactics of avoiding underage suicide 
bombers. Of course the theory presented in this project would predict this outcome for two reasons. First, 
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suicide bombings since 2000. The average age for bombers was 22, and a plurality (38%) 
had completed more than 12 years of education (Yom and Saleh 2009). Further, of the 
159 suicide bombings between 2000-2005, 151 were committed by individuals aged 17 
or over.  
 While similar to the other Islamic groups active in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the 
Taliban shared one impressive difference: they managed to achieve a degree of success 
by taking Kabul in 1996. Even though they largely succeeded, government control was 
never the goal. The Taliban made overtures in a half-hearted effort to achieve 
international recognition. For example, they officially banned opium in 1999. However, 
this only succeeded in driving prices higher, benefiting the leadership financially. Instead, 
tactics, strategy, and recruitment practices from 1996 to the present provide evidence 
that, rather than an organization the truly believes in establishing a particular ideology 
across Central Asia, the Taliban is, and has always been, a greed-based rebellion.   
 
Summary 
 In Chapter 3, I argued that rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to use 
child soldiers. Opportunism creeps into the organization and regardless of stated motives, 
there is value in maintaining the conflict status quo. Insurgents will use child soldiers 
because they can artificially inflate the size of the organization, encouraging conflict 
conditions and keeping the rebellion active, and they are less expensive than adults and 
easier to keep from sharing the spoils of war. At the same time, children are less capable 
                                                                                                                                                 
many Palestinian groups aim to have their own state. Therefore, they need international support and should 
refrain from using youths. Second, absent evidence to the contrary, most Palestinian groups are free from 
the opportunism that is present in other groups. Therefore, a political victory is desired over the conflict 
status quo. They want to win.  
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and having child soldiers risk international scorn. Neither of these drawbacks should 
discourage opportunistic rebellions because they do not care about the international 
community, and they put a low premium on winning.  
This process was seen in both FARC and the Taliban. FARC appeared to desire 
victory when it began as a peasant-based organization. However, when it became 
involved in the international drug industry, the link to the people was distorted by illicit-
market incentives. They now command a small fortune and ending the conflict either 
through victory or defeat is being avoided at all costs. The use of child soldiers by FARC 
is expected. They keep expenditures low, and they allow the army to operate over a wide 
territory. At the same time, they also do not risk "accidentally" winning.  
Similarly, the Taliban maintained links with the illicit economy from the 
beginning of their movement. Calling itself a religious organization, their actions portray 
a group more in-tune with the underground economy. The economic activities of 
commanders alone would be enough to suggest ulterior motives. Their motivations are 
betrayed even further by looking at the powerful financial backers of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Taliban decisions reflect a preference for conflict. Using 
child soldiers is rational because they make they reduce overhead, distract coalition 
forces from targeting their financial installations and keep the world's attention on the 
region. All of which produce high profits for the Taliban.  
 
7.6 Competing Factors 
 Beyond the opportunism/demand argument presented here, additional factors may 
explain flagrant child soldier use in these cases. Ever-present in the discussion is the 
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possibility that culture regarding child rights is lower in some cases than others. 
Additionally, Achvarina and Reich (2006) argue that refugee and IDP camp protection 
limits how many child soldiers can be used. Finally, state-level features of economic 
development and poverty might explain some instances of child abuse by rebellions. 
However, none of these can adequately explain the similar recruitment patterns of FARC 
and the Taliban.  
The two groups are from very different cultural environments. Both are from a 
culture that maintain respect for child rights and condemns child soldier use. Colombia 
has adopted many child rights provisions. Due to public backlash, other child rights 
abusers like the AUC, have released many child soldiers. Stories of FARC's child rights 
violations are believed to alienate the population to the point that their political goals are 
threatened (Gutierrez-Sanin 2010). In 1998, in the largest voter turnout in Colombia's 
history, citizens voted in favor of the "Citizens' Mandate for Peace, Life and Liberty." 
This referendum called on armed groups to stop involving children in the war (Bellamy 
2000). In Afghanistan, 89% of respondents to a Red Cross survey believed that "no one 
should take up arms for combat before the age of 18" (Greenberg 1999). A further 76% 
said the minimum age should be 20 years, and fully 19% favored a 21-year limit for 
combat. Further, UN efforts to demobilize and rehabilitate child soldiers have been met 
with support by local tribal leaders (Coalition 2004:163). In addition, the groups 
themselves hold very different religious and ideological positions. The Taliban is a 
radical religious organization. Ostensibly Islamic, for many Muslims, the group's strict 
interpretation is in truth a perversion of the religion. Conversely, FARC is a secular 
organization active in a largely Catholic country. 
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 Also, public expression of faith are suppressed and "there is little tolerance of religion or 
spiritual needs" (Human Rights Watch 2003: 51).   
  Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) protection is at first a plausible 
explanation for the high levels of rights-violations by these groups. While the number of 
refugees is low in both countries, Afghanistan and Colombia have a high number of IDPs 
due to the ongoing conflict. In 2000, UNHCR estimates that over 750,000 Afghans, 3% 
of the population, were displaced. By 2005, this had dropped to around .5%, but 
remained close to 1% displacement in 2009. Colombia too has had a high number of 
IDPs. Nearly 5% of the population was reported displaced in 2000 (950,000). This soared 
to over 3 million in 2009 (7.2% of the population). However, despite such similarly high 
figures, there is variation in the degree of both international and national protection. All 
297,000 IDPs were assisted by UNHCR in Afghanistan in 2009 compared to just 17% in 
Colombia. In addition, considerable funds are available thanks to the presence of 
Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The budget (largely based on donations) in 2009 was 
nearly $5.7 million for Afghanistan. Nearly $1.3 million was devoted exclusively to 
protection. In Colombia, less than half the Afghan total is allotted ($2.3 million). This 
equates to about $7 of assistance per person compared to nearly $200 in Afghanistan. Of 
course, available assistance does not equate with IDP protection. UNHCR is only able to 
reach about 51% of Afghanistan's population, while in Colombia most IDPs (~82%) are 
settled in large urban centers where they are largely protected from abduction by 
government forces (UNHCR 2009: 317-318). High concentrations of vulnerable youths 
still play a role in the levels of child soldiers observed in the FARC and Taliban. The 
Taliban and other groups are known to recruit heavily from youths studying at madrassas 
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in Pakistan. Further, FARC will target schools during their recruitment drives. However, 
the level of protection for these concentrated youths varies to a considerable degree. 
Teachers in Colombia have increasingly been victim to armed attacks due to resistance to 
guerilla recruitment drives (US State Dept. 2000). This suggests that while far from 
secure, there is a degree of resistance from administrators in Colombia's schools. In 
Pakistan, it is often the heads of the schools themselves that recruit on behalf of armed 
groups in Afghanistan. In 1997, after his father brought the incident to the High Court in 
Karachi, a boy returned from Afghanistan. "I was persuaded to go to Afghanistan by the 
nazim of the school," he said. He was one of 600 recruited that day (Amnesty 
International 1998). Thus, while both the Taliban and FARC have a large number of 
potentially vulnerable youths housed in both IDP camps and education centers, variation 
in levels of protection limit this as an appropriate causal explanation for the high rates of 
abuse observed in these groups. While very plausible, few conclusions can be reached in 
these cases regarding the relationship between child protection and likelihood of 
recruitment.  
At the state-level, the rebellions face very different antagonists. Both countries are 
very different economically. Colombia represents one of the regional economic 
powerhouses in Latin America. One of the few countries to withstand the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, Colombia averaged 1.75% growth rate. Since 1990, GDP per capita has nearly 
doubled from 4370 in 1990, to 8379 in 2007. Conversely, growth in Afghanistan 
remained stagnant coming from decades of instability and strife. From 1990-2001, the 
economy consistently retracted, reaching a trough of -26.78% growth in 1994. Since 
2003, growth has been positive and averaging a healthy 6.9%. However, the average 
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GDP per capita was only $535 in 1990. In 2003 it had only reached $548. After positive 
growth since the Taliban's ouster, GDP per capita remains a worrisome $797. Further, 
Colombia maintains a relatively diverse economy with only 18% of the labor force 
employed in the agricultural sector. Fully 68% of the labor force is employed in the 
service-sector. Unemployment was 11.2% in 2011. In comparison, Afghanistan is reliant 
on agriculture (78.6%) and unemployment reached 35% in 2008. The differences are 
equally stark when exploring political indicators. Using the Polity IV scores, when FARC 
began in 1968 Colombia was already establishing its democracy (+7) and was improving. 
The regime officially crossed into the "democracy zone" in 1957 and has never dropped 
below a +7 in Polity. Subsequent Afghan regimes have never reached above a -7 since 
1973. The current administration does not receive a value from Polity researchers 
because of the conflict situation, though subjective accounts tell of corruption and 
nepotism that challenges new democratic institutions. Exploring these state level features 
reveal very different political and economic indicators. Thus, these features cannot 
adequately explain the variation in recruitment profiles by the Taliban and FARC.  
 The FARC and the Taliban represent two insurgencies with varied features. They 
vary considerably on nearly every factor. They differ in terms of stated goals, religion, 
culture, geography, history, and even the targeted governments are very different. 
However, they share funding profiles that, contrary to what one would expect has not 
resulted in an increase in capabilities and troop quality. Instead, they are both engaged 
heavily in the recruitment of low quality, but inexpensive child soldiers. Commentators 
on both groups suggest ulterior motives based on the profit of the illicit economy. In 
short, they have an incentive for conflict, but not to win the conflict. Recruiting children 
 219 
 
can accomplish this feat. Maintaining a set level of violence and insecurity is good for 
business. Children are easily recruited, easily manipulated, and cheap. They may not fight 
well, but that is not what the recruiters are after.   
 
7.7 Conclusion  
Systematic comparison of the FARC and the Taliban supports the secondary 
hypothesis presented in chapter 3. The funding profiles of rebel organizations can 
influence their decision to use child soldiers. The pursuit of profit and the level of 
opportunism in an organization influences how the decision is weighed. The trade-off of 
using children comes down to a question of costs and capabilities. Children are cheaper 
but less capable soldiers. The evidence presented here suggests that where costs are more 
of a concern, children are more likely to be used. Profit-seeking rebellions-those financed 
by illicit funds-benefit from the status quo. More than motivating takeover, the conflict 
scenario is necessary to take advantage of a climate that is conducive to illegal trade. 
Comparing two rebel organizations reveals that while different in almost every way, the 
Taliban and FARC insurgencies share a disregard for children's rights. They also appear 
to be highly influenced by involvement in the drug-trade of their regions. Such 
involvement appears to pollute their motivations and tactical decisions. While it cannot 
be attributed to any single factor, the evidence presented here supports the idea that the 
decision to use child soldiers is strongly influenced by the value of victory. When 
winning means and end to lucrative drug profits, cheap soldiers will be used.  
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Table 7.1 Impact of Age and Affiliation on Level of Combat Experience 
Table 6: Impact of Age and Affiliation on Level of Combat Experience 
 Combat 
  
Over 14 years old -1.128* 
 (0.619) 
FARC -1.169** 
 (0.521) 
Months Served 0.0795*** 
 (0.0222) 
Voluntary 0.815 
 (0.794) 
Cut1 -0.446 
 (0.770) 
Cut2 2.200*** 
 (0.827) 
Cut3 3.421*** 
 (0.792) 
Observations 84 
Wald chi-squared 25.85*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.263 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 11: Map of Colombia Indicating FARC Areas 
 
  
Source: BBC 2002 
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Figure 12: FARC Troop Strength and Estimated Battle Deaths (1990-2002) 
 
 
Source: Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2004; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). 
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Figure 13: Regional Opium Cultivation and Production in Afghanistan, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National Monitoring System Implemented by UNODC (2009). 
 224 
 
 
Figure 14: Opium Prices at Harvest Time (1994-2008) 
 
Sources: UNODC (2008) Opium Surveys, 1994-2008 (Annual Village Survey) 
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Chapter Eight: 
Legitimacy Constraints and the SPLM/A 
8.1 Introduction 
 John Garang died in an accidental helicopter crash on July 30, 2005. He had 
successfully led the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) through 22 years of 
conflict against the government of Sudan. Before taking the reins of leadership, he served 
as the head of the Army Staff College for Sudan. He arrived here after earning 
progressively higher rank in the Army. Eleven years earlier, Captain Garang began his 
career with the Sudanese army after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement that 
brought to a close the first Sudanese Civil War by reintegrating the southern rebels into 
the Khartoum government. Ten years before that, he enlisted with the rebels. He was 17 
years old. 
 That the leader of the group had been an underage fighter makes it unsurprising 
that SPLM were known for routinely recruiting child soldiers. What is surprising is that 
this same group led South Sudan to independence in 2011. The theory presented in 
Chapter 3 argues that separatists should be less likely to use child soldiers because of the 
weight of legitimacy in the international community. However, this is a case where a 
seemingly secessionist group both achieved independence with international support, and 
used child soldiers. On its surface, my theory fails. A closer look at the case, however, 
reveals that the SPLM and the independence of South Sudan is much more nuanced than 
can be captured with quantitative data.  
--Figure 15 here-- 
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 In this chapter I offer an explanation for how my theory accurately captures the 
behavior of the SPLM. First, the low- and mid-ranking SPLM commanders maintained a 
strong degree of autonomy. They lacked the awareness of international standards 
regarding recruitment (UNSC 2007:5). This alone would not account for child soldiering 
if it had not been coupled with undetermined goals. In the second section, I discuss the 
evolution of group goals within the SPLM. Secession remained an undercurrent 
throughout the various southern rebel movements since the end of the first civil war in 
1972. However, the SPLM, specifically the leadership of John Garang presented 
inconsistent goals. This rift even led to fractionalization that plagued the group 
throughout the 90s. The third section presents evidence that, far from being out of touch 
with the international community, the SPLM had strong awareness of the importance of 
international opinion. Consistent with predictions of the theory, this was weighed most 
heavily by those pushing for independence. Finally, when both the norm against 
recruitment of child soldiers solidified in the 1990s and the group coalesced around the 
idea of independence for the South in the 2000s, it was then that the strong forms of child 
protection become routine.  
 
8.2 Child Recruitment by the SPLM 
One defining feature of the second Sudanese civil war was the severe 
humanitarian crisis. The civilian populations were targeted and were treated as resources. 
This is true of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), government-aligned militias, various 
southern rebels and even the SPLM. One particular problem was the routine abduction 
and conscription of children. The famed "Lost-Boys of Sudan" are depicted in various 
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media. Over 20,000 children displaced from the fighting ended up in refugee camps in 
Ethiopia, asylum in Western countries, or, as child soldiers in southern Sudan. Even 
though it is justified on the grounds that they are recruited for their own protection, it 
cannot be denied that the SPLM used child soldiers at high volumes and at disturbingly 
young ages.  
Like the FARC and the Taliban, the SPLM is another high-profile recruiter of 
child soldiers. In southern Sudan, the policy of boy soldiers is historic but before the 
second civil war (1983-2005), it was limited. Children were used as military slaves 
before Sudanese independence in 1956.  These "gun-boys" were active in the 19th 
century (Johnson 1992). Even during the first civil war (1955-1972), boy soldiers were 
not uncommon, but role was largely limited to ferrying weapons and they rarely saw 
actual combat (Johnson 1989). In the 1980s, the SPLM recruited children in droves. This 
policy was institutionalized in 1987 (Human Rights Watch 1994).In the SPLM-
administered refugee camps in Ethiopia they maintained a separate camp for boys. An 
estimated 17,000 boys were housed and trained in such camps. Unlike other groups in the 
south during the 1980s and 90s, the SPLM never cooperated with reunification efforts by 
relief agencies (Rone 1995). When the camps were closed in 1991 after the collapse of 
the Ethiopian Derg regime, many refugees relocated to Kenya. The SPLM took several 
thousand of the boys back into the South Sudan. More recently, the number of underage 
recruits remained high. In 2001 there were an estimated 7000 children still enlisted 
(Coalition 2001). This number was cut nearly in half by 2004, but remained between 
2,500 and 5,000 children (Coalition 2004). Even in 2006, there were still reports of 
student conscription in southern Sudan (Coalition 2008).  
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Not only were child recruits maintained at high volumes, but the age of the 
children was very low, even by local standards. Adulthood in southern Sudan had been 
around 15-16 years old. This is the age at which ritual scarification occurred. Since the 
1980s, the age for the ritual dropped to around 13-14 years out of fear that the practice 
would soon be banned in a wave of modernization (Human Rights Watch 1994). The 
SPLM was known to recruit children as young as 9 (UNSC 2007). Since its foundation, 
there have been consistent reports of children under 15 being used. Many of these serve 
in menial roles rather than in direct combat. They were often used as bodyguards for 
officers or as prison guards. They were also kept off the front line and served as defense 
forces for liberated areas (Human Rights Watch 1994). However, active duty was always 
a possibility. In the first few years, battalions of children known as the Jesh Amer (Red 
Army) were used on the front line, but were "always massacred" (Human Rights Watch 
1994: 15). In the final days of the Ethiopian Derg regime they demanded additional 
troops from the SPLM to fight the advancing Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, in 
exchange for years of support. The SPLM sent many of their untested child recruits some 
as young as 11. In 1991, the SPLM split into (at least) two factions. Since the fighting 
took place within previously "liberated" areas, many of the combatants were underage 
boys.  
The response to allegations of child soldiering by the SPLM included both denial 
and justification. Several high profile members of the SPLM denied using child soldiers. 
One commander told Human Rights Watch that even though they sometimes trained 
youths aged 15-18, they did not serve in combat (Rone 1995). If such recruits made it 
into the ranks because of poor birth records, they were removed and sent back to live 
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with their families. John Garang himself was quoted as saying, "Our cutoff age is 
eighteen and above" (Sharp 1991). Some officials were more candid and instead of 
denying the policy, they offered rationalizations for breaking international standards. 
Some suggest that joining the SPLM offered education opportunities that were not 
available elsewhere (Human Rights Watch 1994). During an interview with one South 
Sudanese representative, I was told that the children were recruited for their own good. 
You have these people from eleven years old to eighteen that were sometimes left in the 
village. If you left them in the village they would be captured by Khartoum. The only 
way to keep them away from the enemy is to keep them near to you." These competing 
responses indicate that even though the SPLM recruited young children by the tens of 
thousands, some commanders knew this was a risky move.   
Many armed groups in Sudan during the 1980s were recruiting children. Everyone 
was doing it and the SPLM was not the worst. Still, such behavior went against 
international norms and many within the movement believed it would threaten 
international support for the group. But, as the theory points out in Chapter 3, the degree 
to which international support is crucial to reaching goals varies depending on the 
ultimate goal. It is also important that everyone for all commanders to know the official 
group position regarding recruitment.  
 
8.3 Local Commander Autonomy 
I discussed the internal-discipline explanation of civilian abuse in Chapter 2. 
Where internal discipline is low, civilian abuse should be high (Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2006). In Chapter 5, child soldiering, as an extension of civilian abuse, did not 
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appear to have empirical support. In the case of the SPLM, a dual process is likely at 
work. Opportunism surely drove some child recruitment, but many local commanders 
also were so isolated from the political center they might not have known their behavior 
was inappropriate. Decentralization of the SPLM command, along with a lack of 
understanding of world opinion present in the low- and middle-ranking officers, can 
partially explain the recruitment behavior  
The leadership of Garang and his closest advisers coordinated policy, but the 
SPLM remained a decentralized rebel force. The geography of southern Sudan made 
coordination difficult and isolation of divisions likely. The equatorial climate promoted 
dense forest cover and swamps are a regular ecological feature. The Imatong Mountains 
and related hills limit the road network throughout the region. Finally, the White Nile 
River effectively cuts the territory in half. Factionalism limited the effectiveness of the 
southern rebellion in the first civil war (1955-1972), the Anyanya. Garang and his 
commanders were determined not to let the same thing happen to them (Johnson 2003). 
Offering limited policy direction through radio broadcasts from Ethiopia, Garang left 
issues such as administration, taxation and, notably, recruitment in the hands of local 
commanders (81). Rampant factionalism, especially after 1991 shows that this strategy 
was not altogether successful. Such decentralization left Garang open to criticism about 
the behavior of the rank and file and several middle-level commanders.  
Some commanders used the tumult in the south to pursue self-interested ends. 
Begun in 1986 with the government-backed Murahalin raiders, many groups, including 
those aligned with the SPLM engaged in cattle raids. Thousands participated. Murder, 
rape and slavery by these bands became routine (Johnson 2003). Child abduction often 
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took place during such raids (UNSC 2007). In response, many new groups sprung up as 
self-defense organizations. Groups such as the Mundari Forces, the Didinga and Boyya 
militias and the Murle all organized to defend against looting and raids by SPLM-aligned 
forces (Institute for Security Studies 2004). These opportunistic individuals are likely to 
engage in child soldiering even if it went against the overall best interests of the SPLM. 
While it was not always clear that the SPLM leadership thought that child 
soldiering was an issue that needed to be addressed, many of the low level troops did not 
even seem to be aware that there were standards. Some senior commanders appear 
knowledgeable about child rights. This was certainly true of those that were most in-
touch with the international community including Riek Macher and Lam Akol. These two 
commanders later launched a move to oust Garang in 1991. Riek Macher was married to 
an NGO worker, Emma McCune that worked with children in the refugee camps and met 
with him personally to discuss their plight (Scroggins 2002).  Lam Akol was the Director 
of External Relations for the SPLM and negotiated with UN personnel including the 
Executive Director of UNICEF (Akol 2005). Low ranking officials on the other hand 
seemed less aware of international norms regarding children. As recently as 2007, during 
a UN mission to report on the progress of the SPLM, many junior officers did not know 
what was expected (UNSC 2007: 5). The rift between international standards and local 
customs is great. As previously mentioned, many local tribes conferred adulthood at 13 
years old. Given the high level of autonomy granted to low-ranking officers, it is 
unsurprising that they would not follow international norms. The disconnection between 
high-ranking officers in-tune with global opinion and local commanders following their 
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own customs is a partial explanation why child soldiers were so often observed in the 
SPLM ranks.  
Geographic and political features forced the SPLM into a decentralized structure 
where many local leaders enjoyed considerable autonomy. Like Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2006) suggest, this led to opportunistic behavior at the lower ranks. However, 
the local commanders also failed to understand what was expected. This is true in two 
respects. First, they did not appear to be aware of international standards. Second, they 
did not always know the exact goal they were fighting for.   
 
8.4 Explanation 2: Undetermined Goals 
From the inception of the SPLM in 1983, to his death in 2005, John Garang 
maintained a policy known as "New Sudan." His goal was unity, not separation. This 
alone might explain why the theory superficially fails. However, the story is more 
complex. Some within the leadership wanted secession, while Garang and others did not. 
The compromise was self-determination. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a nebulous 
concept that can be very subjective. Thus, the SPLM suffered an identity crisis with 
respect to group goals. Despite ending with an independent South Sudan, throughout 
most of its history the SPLM held only underlying sentiments of separatism. Officially, it 
was a national liberation movement seeking regime change in Khartoum and unity within 
a federal state. Therefore, they had less of a reason to show the world community they 
could follow standards. Instead, they just had to project enough force to pressure 
Khartoum into changing policies.  
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Separatist sentiments were strong in southern Sudan even before independence. 
The southern Sudan rebellion began in 1955. It emerged from a separate identity that 
began in the early 19th century. Sudan was first ruled by the Ottoman Empire through an 
Egyptian administration. The British later set up an administrative arrangement with 
Egypt and ruled Sudan jointly until 1956. At this time, Islamic nationalism grew in the 
north and a greater connection with Arab culture emerged (Thyne 2007). The southerners 
felt alienated. When the agreement for Sudanese independence was made in 1953, it was 
clear the British would make no effort to adjudicate between north/south divisions. The 
southerners rebelled. Through 17 years of fighting, many groups emerged in the south but 
coalesced around the policy of separatism. In 1963, a prominent Sudanese officer, Joseph 
Lagu, defected to the south. Through political maneuvering against exiled politicians he 
became the unified commander of the guerilla movement that would be known as the 
Anyanya (Johnson 2003). The position of Anyanya improved in the late 1960s. Sudan 
was publicly in support of the Arab forces against Israel in 1967. In response, the Israelis 
sent money through Ugandan connections, and offered training to Anyanya officers. 
Sudan was supporting Eritrean separatists in Ethiopia. In response, Haile Selassie began 
supporting the southern Sudanese rebels. Facing a strengthened rebel army and dwindling 
diplomatic support, Khartoum made peace in 1972. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
South Sudan would become an autonomous region of Sudan. Also, the guerilla forces 
were to be integrated with the northern army.  
This arrangement brought a semblance of peace and security to Sudan, but the 
underlying grievances remained. The autonomous arrangement was not acceptable for 
some of the Anyanya rebels that wanted political separation. Many in the guerilla army 
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did not accept integration and moved across the border into Ethiopia. There they would 
continue low-intensity actions in the name of an independent South Sudan. Nor did it 
quell the Islamic nationalism that was the source of southern grievances in the first place. 
The Sudanese President Nimairi faced opposition by those that felt the Addis Ababa 
Agreement gave up too much. The autonomous arrangement allowed a non-Muslim 
minority equal status in an Islamic state. Nimairi dealt with this sentiment the old-
fashioned way, he arrested Hassan Al Turabi of the Muslim Brotherhood party and 
compelled Umma Party leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi into exile. However, economic crises in 
the early 1970s, and two Muslim coup attempts in 1975, and 1976, forced the president to 
bring his opponents into a governing coalition as a move to quell instability. Their 
demands were not satiated and they felt as though they were not bound to the Agreement 
because it was made by a dictator. They continued to push Nimairi to the religious right. 
Succumbing to political pressure, poor health, isolation and paranoia, Nimairi passed the 
September Laws which made Sharia law applicable to the whole of Sudan (Johnson 
2003: 56). This move flared the smoldering grievances in the south. 
A second civil war launched in 1983 but had a new leader and new demands. 
When a group of integrated southern soldiers refused transfer to the north and mutinied, 
the government sent John Garang to negotiate. Unbeknownst to them, Garang was one of 
many southern sympathizers within the SAF and police forces. Instead of quelling the 
mutiny, he took over their command and led them to Ethiopia to rendezvous with the 
remnants of the Anyanya forces to form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. 
Garang maintained a policy of unity with the North. He called for a "New Sudan" that 
would end the dictatorship of Khartoum and establish a secular state. This clashed with 
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the old Anyanya leadership and exiled politicians that maintained a call for 
independence. Garang enjoyed many strengths that would lead to his dominance of this 
new rebel force.  But they were all of secondary importance because he had the backing 
of Ethiopia. The southern rebels depended on Ethiopia as a host for their bases and a 
regular supplier of arms and other resources. Since Addis Ababa faced their own 
separatist rebellions, they were anathema to such a position and supported a policy of 
national liberation. In July, the SPLM issued a Manifesto listing their grievances and 
policy platform. They rebelled against a policy that kept peripheral regions 
underdeveloped. They also rallied in opposition to Arabization and Islamicization 
practiced by Khartoum. They wanted change, but did not call for independence. This 
platform won Garang and the SPLM supporters throughout the country; however, the 
disavowal of independence was not shared by all of the SPLM leaders.  
Garang's goals often put him at odds with other southern rebels. Many early 
leaders in the SPLM wanted independence. The resistance to Garang's leadership by the 
Anyanya rebels was a direct result of his policy of unity. Throughout the 1980s, the 
SPLM splintered over this policy. In particular, groups in eastern Equatoria were in 
immediate opposition to Garang's "New Sudan" platform. Disagreements reached a 
pinnacle when, in August 1991, the SPLM split in two. Three commanders, including one 
former Anyanya Major declared an end to Garang's leadership. Among other things, they 
declared South Sudan should be independent. One leader, Riek Macher, hoped that by 
pushing for independence they could encourage mass desertions from Garang's forces. 
 This did not work, but not because the sentiment was not shared by the 
southerners or the rank and file. Instead, many southerners felt that Garang was their only 
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hope to exercise self determination. They doubted his policy commitments and hoped 
that if the SPLM got to the negotiating table, then the issue of independence could be 
raised again. Even those southerners that stayed in Garang's SPLM began to feel that 
independence was the only way forward. Within the leadership there were those that 
supported independence but did not raise the issue for fear of dismissal. Notably, Salva 
Kiir was a known separatist that enjoyed the position of deputy, and would later go on to 
lead the organization after Garang's death.  
There are even doubts over whether Garang was really for unity at all. The "New 
Sudan" policy won Garang support throughout Sudan. Northern opposition groups 
supported the SPLM because they would have enjoyed being free from Islamist rule in 
Khartoum. Secession of the south would not have improved their standing in the North 
and would have cost crucial support throughout Sudan. Along with Ethiopia, the African 
Union, as a rule, did not support separation for sub-colonial units. On the other hand, 
throughout the continent there was support for National Liberation. In addition, I was 
told by a 20-year veteran of the SPLM that Garang's actions all along showed his true 
separatist tendencies, but they were hidden. Garang wanted to secure the south. His call 
for autonomy of security forces and administration would set up the institutions that the 
south needed to rule itself. Garang was personally instrumental in establishing foreign 
liaison offices that would become the South Sudanese embassies around the world. Even 
after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that would bring a close to hostilities, 
Garang refused the offer to use Sudanese embassies as diplomatic offices for the 
autonomous south. In fact, early in the SPLM, diplomatic chapters were established and 
officers were sent to South Africa to train as future diplomats. While the civil 
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administrative capacity of the SPLM remains in doubt (e.g. Young 2003), much of this 
account is corroborated by the secondary source material. Frequent radio broadcasts 
focused on Jallaba (Arabs) which situated the southerners as distinct from the rest of the 
country. Johnson (2003) maintains that independence was an unspoken/uncoded option 
(65). Through the 2002 peace talks in Garang officially supported unity. However, he 
began to publically admit that without real secularism, independence remained on the 
table. Islam dominated much of the political situation in Khartoum. Garang likely 
expected secularism was unlikely and thus would have sooner or later declared 
independence. 
The preceding section reveals that the path that led to South Sudanese 
independence was contested. While the undercurrent of independence was present from 
the beginning, and there were many in the movement that wanted it, Garang exercised 
considerable control over official the public agenda, and he stressed unity. Divisions 
within the leadership over this policy continued to plague the SPLM through the 1990s. 
This inconsistency in goals is another partial explanation that recruitment practices did 
not match global standards. At the same time, the underlying causal process outlined is 
Chapter 3 is still observed in this case.  
 
8.5 Legitimacy Constraints and the SPLM 
The second Sudanese Civil War took place at the last peak of Cold War rivalry. The 
combatants could not help but be aware of the ever-shifting global allegiances and their 
role in the wider struggle. Many SPLM actions and decisions can be interpreted as a 
pursuit of global support. Interestingly, the moves that seemed to make it most likely to 
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win wide international acclaim were taken by avowed separatists. The SPLM knew its 
place as a minor actor in the global stage, but still valued international support, knew it 
was important, and was wielded most strategically by those that wanted a separate state.  
The SPLM's diplomatic efforts must be interpreted within the world system at the 
time. The 1980s was the last gasp of the Cold War. Far from fading gently, the 
superpowers stepped up their efforts and engaged in continued to fund proxy wars around 
the world. The Sudanese civil war, and the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, took center 
stage. During the 1980s, Khartoum remained firmly in the Western camp. When Nimairi 
came to power through a socialist coup, he was courted by the Soviet Union. However, a 
communist coup attempt in 1971 along with a growing relationship with the Chevron oil 
company succeeded in bringing the regime into the US sphere of influence. Khartoum 
also backed Ethiopian rebels to the ire of the socialist Derg regime in Addis Ababa. 
Washington loved this and reciprocated by channeling money, weapons, and perhaps 
most importantly, diplomatic support to the dictatorship of Nimairi. In 1984, Ronald 
Reagan used continued support of the anti-communist Sudan regime as a point on which 
to campaign. This began to change in the mid-1980s, and the US relationship soured by 
the close of the century.  
After Nimairi, the new regime turned increasingly towards Islamic nations. 
Budding relationships with Iran and Libya resulted in reducing US aid. Support for Iraq 
in the 1991 Gulf War cut ties completely and the growing human rights abuses by the 
Sudanese government were no longer overlooked. By 2001, expansionary Islam was the 
new target in the Global War on Terror, and the Bush administration successfully labeled 
Sudan as a state sponsor of terror. Even though the SPLM was a non-state actor it also 
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traversed Cold War diplomacy with considerable aplomb. The Manifesto released at the 
outset maintained Marxist overtures. It railed against colonialism and neocolonialism and 
called for a "United New Socialist Sudan" (Deng 2009). At the same time, Garang and 
other top SPLM leaders were quietly hedging their bets.  
Sensing accurately that the US was committed to Khartoum, the SPLM bypassed 
the US and went straight to the UN. They used a variety of strategies. The UN had 
followed the US and refused any relief efforts outside government-held towns. UN 
General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar ordered both the UNHCR and the World Food 
Program not to cooperate with the SPLM. The guerillas knew they were under greater 
scrutiny as a rebel organization than the internationally backed Nimairi regime (Johnson 
2003: 147). The abuses by northern-backed militias continued as the SPLM began to 
systematically curtail similar abuses by their forces in 1988. This inspired NGOs to 
circumvent the UN and set up their own relief operations in SPLM areas. This in turn 
inspired UNICEF to set up an NGO-coordinating office in Nairobi to facilitate health 
projects for southern towns. In 1989, Lam Akol, then External Relations Director of the 
SPLM negotiated with UN representatives to open the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). 
The humanitarian crisis could not be ignored, so the UN offered to send food and medical 
supplies to the stricken southern populations. While the UN maintained that it still did not 
recognize the SPLM, the establishment of OLS was accomplished because of a 
successful overture to Western agencies. Akol later recalled that these negotiations set the 
stage for future peace negotiations. "[F]or the first time in SPLM's history, journalists 
were milling around in previously out of bounds SPLM/A administered areas" (Akol 
2005: 54). The talks that led to relief provided "sustained direct access to the SPLM/A 
 240 
 
leadership for the international community and the press" (54). Thus, the SPLM was not 
only aware of the international system in which it operated, but it cultivated relationships 
beyond its operational theatre.  
This is in keeping with a general policy of "informal diplomacy." One 
representative told me that this policy began at the organization's founding. "We 
recognized ourselves in such a way that we were not isolated, that we were in contact 
with the whole world." As previously mentioned, this belief led to the establishment of 
diplomatic training missions in South Africa. Unofficial diplomats were sent around the 
world including to the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany, to try and 
highlight humanitarian issues in order to bring support. John Garang himself traveled 
extensively as chairman and visits were organized through NGO networks. After 2001, 
there was a shift from soliciting humanitarian assistance to highlighting the north's 
position in the GWOT. The SPLM drew attention to the terrorist training camps being set 
up in the south by Osama bin Laden under the auspices of Khartoum. John Garang was 
invited to Washington to discuss anti-terror campaigns with US officials.  
Showing the value placed on international support, this focus on external relations 
was sometimes at odds with the SPLM domestic constituency. One issue, as discussed, 
was the call for a united Sudan. Of course, it is possible that John Garang believed in 
revolutionary change rather than secession, but it is plausible that this was a ploy to 
maintain support from Ethiopia and as a way to avoid further isolation by the African 
Union. Many leaders clearly supported separation and moved to oust Garang believing 
they had the backing of the regular citizens. Further, I was told that "99% of the [SPLM] 
army was for independence."  
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A second issue involved the negotiations themselves. The SPLM received strong 
signals that "the people wanted us to fight until the end, but whenever there was an offer 
by the international community to come and sit, we go and put our ideas on the table." 
"This readiness was to show the whole world our good will." In another example, many 
in the south called for "houses of nationality" which would create a parallel assembly of 
at least 66 southern tribes. The SPLM believed that such a move would create confusion 
abroad. Again, a fractionalized rebel organization was a constant fear of the SPLM, and 
they wanted to cultivate the image of a united front for the global community to see. 
Therefore, even when it conflicted with domestic wishes, the SPLM leadership opted for 
diplomacy, indicating they were under some degree of legitimacy constraints. However, 
at this point, such constraints were not aimed at changing their recruitment policies.  
In 1991, three prominent members of the SPLM moved to oust John Garang. They 
were the individuals most in-tune with the international community, wanted 
independence, and specifically drew attention to issue of child soldiers. The leaders of the 
movement were Lam Akol, Riek Macher and Gordon Kong. Kong was a former Anyanya 
commander and while not instrumental in the drafting of the declaration, was a high-
ranking supporter. He was later considered more of a short-sighted opportunist and made 
several attempts to dominate the southern Sudan oil fields. Akol and Macher, however, 
maintained long-term goals. By 1991, the SPLM was still tarnished in the eyes of the US 
as being an extension of the communist Derg regime in Ethiopia. The US hindered UN 
relief operations and drew attention to the plight of child soldiers in the SPLM ranks.  
In a move specifically designed to curry favor with the US, Riek and Lam used this 
issue as an opportunity to push for Garang's ouster (Johnson 2003: 95). Responding to 
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back channel chatter by US organizations, the two commanders interpreted covert US 
support for their human rights platform as a green light for the move (96). On August 28, 
1991, they used the two-way radio network to denounce Garang as a dictator and called 
for greater democracy within the leadership and pledged themselves to human rights 
"especially in regard to the release of political prisoners and a halt to the recruitment of 
child soldiers" (97). They also officially changed the policy of SPLM to independence 
rather than unity. Nasir Declaration's ultimate byproduct was a fractionalized SPLM 
under two factions. Garang maintained leadership of what came to be known as SPLM-
Torit or SPLM-Mainstream, and Akol and Machar's SPLM-Nasir, splintered into many 
groups over the course of the 1990s. Regardless, the Nasir Declaration and the behavior 
of Akol and Machar illustrate precisely the causal mechanisms of the constraining power 
of legitimacy as presented in Chapter 3.  
Lam Akol was an avowed separatist and was very much aware of the shift in global 
opinion towards human rights in the late 1980s. As External Relations Director of the 
SPLM, he was instrumental in projecting the movement beyond their regional ally in 
Addis Ababa. He worked with the UN to organize OLS. Coincidentally, the first major 
meeting between the SPLM and the international community was with Lam Akol, and the 
Executive Director of UNICEF, James Grant (Akol 2005). As a leading figure in 
UNICEF during the drafting of the CRC, Grant himself was convinced of the political 
power of a rights-based approach that focused on child protection. At least as early as 
1987, Grant believed that adherence to the CRC could bring legitimacy and support to 
UNICEF's operations (Oestricht 2007: 31-33). Akol's focus on the particular issue of 
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child soldiering in his call for independence is telling. In the Nasir Declaration, drafted by 
Akol himself, he noted:  
The People in liberated areas send their children to refugee centres in order to get proper basic 
education that Garang had failed to provide at or near home. While undergoing education this 
heartless dictator takes them out of schools and recruits them into the army. Such an odious act is 
contrary to all accepted norms and is an abuse to the confidence the parents put in the Movement. 
Juvenile soldiers, traumatized by the experience, become a constant menace to themselves and to the 
society. This is a gross and serious violation of human rights. (Akol 2003: 311) 
Specific references to "accepted norms" along with a call for independence by the chief 
diplomat of the organization suggest that Akol knew that this was an issue that 
mattered.42 
The second leading figure in the Nasir faction was Riek Machar. After OLS 
opened, NGO's flocked to the town of Nasir where Machar was the commander. This put 
him in a new, diplomatic position (Johnson 2003: 95). But his indoctrination to the value 
of international norms was much more personal. In January 1990, Machar met a British 
NGO worker named Emma McCune. She was part of the OLS and was opening schools 
in refugee camps. McCune confronted Machar about child recruitment by the SPLM at a 
hotel in Nairobi. He listened, responded candidly about the recruitment practices, and 
ultimately gave her a signed permission slip to work with children in the areas he 
commanded. McCune fell in love. The two would go on to marry and work together to 
draft many of the documents Machar would tout as the constitution for an independent 
South Sudan (Scroggins 2002). This account coincides with Machar's early push for 
children's rights within the SPLM. In 1988, he had been pushing for education in the 
camps (Human Rights Watch 1994: 10). He confronted Garang about training and 
recruitment of boys and felt that this brought bad publicity to the group. Later, as leader 
                                                 
42 Akol would later serve as Foreign Minister of Sudan until 2007. He now leads the opposition party 
SPLM-Democratic Change in the new Republic of South Sudan. 
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of the South Sudan Defense Forces he continued to highlight the connection between 
separatist goals and adherence to international protection norms. While the SSDF were 
known to use child soldiers, this is likely a product of the same decentralization that 
plagued the SPLM. Forces under Machar's direct command participated in UNICEF 
reunification efforts that saw thousands of boy soldiers repatriated to their families. In 
one incident, one of the SSDF commanders went through a line of 500 boys set to be 
airlifted back to their families. He was selecting those he thought fit enough to serve. 
UNICEF personnel protested directly to Machar. The commander was dismissed, and 
quickly defected to another faction (Rone 1995). Like Akol, Machar was a separatist and 
was made quickly and personally aware of the value of child rights to the international 
community. His position regarding child rights and his efforts to combat child 
recruitment illustrate the process by which such long-term considerations can change 
short-term behavior.43  
Two major shifts in the international system took place during the life of the 
SPLM. The Cold War first put the rebellion at odds with the West. They were able to 
maneuver this position to draw in a degree of international support. In the 1990s, the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the rise of new international standards regarding child 
recruitment pushed the SPLM to again show its diplomatic skill. The Nasir coup against 
Garang failed, but it shows how those within the movement that sought secession were 
the first to see the changes in the system as potentially valuable and necessary for support 
of their desire for independence. Later, when both the norms against child soldiering 
                                                 
43 Machar later became Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan. 
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solidified and the SPLM coalesced around the idea of independence, the Theory 
presented in Chapter 3 functions as expected.   
 
8.6 When Norms and Goals Come Together  
The norm against child soldiers grew well before the UN CRC came into effect in 
1989. However, as with nearly all norms, it took time to solidify. In the SPLM, as was 
seen with the Nasir Faction, there were some early responders, but it was not until the late 
1990s that Garang was affected. In pursuit of international support, the SPLM released 
some child soldiers and made overtures of support to the CRC. By 2005, the idea of 
separatism was the new goal of the SPLM. With it came a host of child protection 
measures in preparation for a drive for independence. The change in behavior moved 
slowly even as the norm against child recruitment solidified; when combined with a 
SPLM goal of secession, this trickle became a flood.  
Before 1989, child recruitment was not on the main stage of global discourse. The 
idea of international child protection standards began largely in 1979 during the 
International Year of the Child. However, many delegates to the UN did not expect a 
change in accepted standards (Cohen 1993: 11). Quibbles over definitions, expectations, 
and the extent of governmental responsibility limited the unity of signals regarding child 
protection throughout the 1980s. Thus, many rebellions opted to focus on their role in the 
Cold War ideological struggle rather than to highlight their individual actions towards 
policies championed by the international community. At this time, the SPLM's diplomatic 
efforts centered on rhetoric rather than demonstrated respect for international standards. 
As mentioned, they espoused ideology that they thought had cache in the global 
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community. They adopted a policy of national liberation at a time when many 
governments in Africa had come to power under just such a banner. Playing into the Cold 
War dichotomy, the SPLM officially announced Marxism, but quickly and continuously 
downplayed such a position when Khartoum successfully used it to garner additional 
support from the US. This tactic would slowly change as the world shifted to rights-based 
approaches to diplomatic support after the Cold War.  
After 1989 and the passage of the CRC, child recruitment began to figure 
prominently in discussions on conflict resolution. As a result, some within the SPLM 
aware of this and felt as though international support was valuable, began to reevaluate 
the groups' recruitment practices. The Nasir faction was a direct challenge this policy. 
Others made quieter attempts. In 1992, a sign proclaiming a boys camp as the "Jesh 
Amer"44 was removed after bad publicity (Human Rights Watch 1994: 22). By this time, 
what had long been and open practice, became went underground. There were some mid-
level commanders that did not follow suit and openly admitted using child soldiers 
(Singer 2005: 25). Many others especially those in contact with the international 
community were more careful. "Diplomatically, we have been denying it," said one 
veteran, "saying 'we don't recruit children,' we have been saying it, knowing all along that 
we had." Such denials were made after direct questioning by the NGOs. 
The stigma of child recruitment continued to plague the SPLM as the group 
pivoted towards a policy of independence. At the close of the 20th century, the group 
made halfhearted and uninspired commitments to stop using child soldiers. By this time, 
they admitted using child soldiers and promised to demobilize them. At one high-profile 
                                                 
44 Red Army. This was the name given to the all-child battalions used early in the conflict.  
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event in 2001, the SPLM "demobilized" 3,500 child soldiers to an audience of UN 
observers and international media. However, those demobilized turned out not to have 
been soldiers at all (Singer 2005: 145). Such duplicitous demobilization schemes 
continued and delays and unmet goals were commonplace. The first phase of 
demobilization ended with less than 1000 confirmed children (Coalition 2004). By 2004, 
the end of the second phase of demobilization, approximately 12,000 child soldiers had 
been demobilized. Still, several thousand remained. In addition, under Garang's 
leadership, the SPLM concluded a series of peace negotiations by signing the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which effectively ended hostilities with the 
north. Among many other points, the agreement called for "the demobilization of all child 
soldiers within six months of the signature of the CPA (CPA 2005 Part III, 24.9: 32). 
Noble efforts to comply were made, but underage recruiting still being reported. Thus, 
during the first 5 years of the new century, the SPLM shifted its child protection policies 
to those more in line with international standards, but efforts remained limited.  
Real change took place under Garang's successor, both in terms of child 
soldiering and with regards to unification. Upon Garang's death in 2005, the known 
separatist Salva Kiir took over leadership of the SPLM. With this change also came 
renewed and demonstrable commitments to stop the recruiting child soldiers. Under his 
leadership demobilization efforts expanded. In 2006, the Juba Declaration brought in 
several thousand SSDF fighters into the SPLM forces. Many tried to inflate their strength 
by quickly abducting children pressing them into their ranks. Under Kiir's leadership, 
these children were demobilized, and nearly every year, credible commitments to 
demobilize child soldiers were made. Ever smaller numbers were reported as hostilities 
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drew to a close. Notably, these efforts coincided with fears of renewed conflict as the 
referendum on independence, promised under the CPA, approached; precisely when 
having a reserve of inexpensive soldiers would have been most valuable. Like 
Somaliland, the nascent South Sudan state drafted official documents affirming child 
protection. A Child Protection Bill easily passed in the South Sudan National Assembly 
in 2006 (UNSC 2007). The subsequent Child Protection Act passed in 2008 offered very 
specific provisions. It limited recruitment to persons over the age of 18, in line with the 
highest accepted international standards (Child Act 2008: section 31 part 1). The new 
Republic of South Sudan's Constitution passed in 2011 reiterated this standard by 
defining children as persons under age 18 (Republic of South Sudan Constitution 2011: 
section 17: part 4). Furthermore, new laws make child recruitment a crime punishable by 
10 years in prison and a fine. The first decade of the 21st century saw a dramatic change 
in the recruitment practices and child protection efforts of the SPLM. These happened at 
the same time as the group changed from a policy of revolution to secession; one that 
depended on international support for their claims.   
In the previous section I demonstrated that the SPLM was aware of the external 
environment. In this section, I showed that they responded according to the degree they 
cared about this support. Garang wanted support, and made rhetorical overtures to 
Western humanitarian standards. As pursuit of independence rose, however, child 
protection became a serious publicity problem that the SPLM had to address. They did 
so. Through mass demobilization efforts, and child protection standards that rival any 
developed country, the SPLM and the new South Sudanese administration demonstrated 
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their outlook towards global opinion. They were forward-looking and when the future 
showed child protection as a crucial asset, they acted accordingly.  
 
8.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored the role of international legitimacy on the SPLM. Even 
though it ended as an independent state, it was not always a separatist movement. This 
alone might explain the superficial failure of my theory. However, as shown, there is 
much more to the story. Just as group goals were not static, neither were the low levels of 
child protection. The only constant was the awareness of international opinion. 
Commanders knew it was important, but how it mattered changed depending on the 
individual's outlook. Garang wanted support, but since he was not a secessionist, his 
pursuit of support was short-term and strategic. Separatists within the SPLM recognized 
the long-term importance of international legitimacy, and sought to curb egregious 
human rights violations. However, by the mid-1990s, the changing world system coupled 
with an entrenchment of norms of child protection and a stronger sense among the 
southern Sudanese civilians that independence was the best option promoted recruitment 
behavior designed for an external audience.  
This reminds us that while cross-national comparisons are useful, there is still 
something to be gained from a closer look at individual cases. This qualitative analysis 
reveals that far from being a deviant case, the SPLM and their recruitment patterns 
largely follow that which is predicted by my theory. Child Soldiering is a long-term 
decision related to group goals. Secessionists within the SPLM and those that were aware 
of international norms sought restraint. Diverse elements within the group either did not 
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want independence, or were not aware of the norm. What is clear, when the norm had 
solidified in the 1990s, and separatism was the goal in the mid-2000, the SPLM faced the 
same legitimacy constraints as do Somaliland. Their behavior towards child recruitment 
changed accordingly.  
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Figure 15: Map of South Sudan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Trace Cody Lasley 2012 
Source: Ogle Earth 2011. 
 252 
 
Chapter Nine: 
Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
 Throughout this project, I have argued that rebels will consider the effects of their 
actions in the long-term. Using the issue of child soldiers, I argued that rebel commanders 
will evaluate the impact this will have on their prospects for achieving victory. In the 
short-term, child soldiers are less expensive and can enhance the total size of one's forces. 
In the long term children are not only less effective, but they risk tarnishing international 
reputation.  
 I also argued that the value placed on these short-term and long-term features 
determine when children will be used. Separatists depend on international support and 
will therefore be constrained in a pursuit of international legitimacy. Opportunistic 
rebellions on the other hand will not be constrained and will discount the reduced 
effectiveness because conflict perpetuation is more important than military victory. This 
cost-benefit analysis continues as the war progresses. Rising costs can undercut concerns 
over legitimacy, but because the rebellions that want independence cannot succeed 
without recognition, they will resist the appeal of inexpensive children.  
 In this chapter, I will review the findings uncovered by the systematic comparison 
of 103 rebellions active from 1998-2008. I will also briefly review the value-added by the 
qualitative exploration of the four rebel groups active in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan 
and Sudan. In the second section, I will discuss how these finding contribute to the 
broader field of international relations and comparative politics. I conclude the project by 
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discussing how the results and unique insights revealed in this project can be used by 
policymakers.  
 
9.2 Findings 
Quantitative Analysis 
 Statistical tests in Chapter 5 revealed empirical evidence for legitimacy 
constraints. When rebels have long-term goals of independence, they are less likely to 
break international norms by using child soldiers. These rebel leaders are aware of the 
community of states to which they want to be a part. They evaluate the long-term costs 
and modify their recruitment practices as a result. Conversely, rebels whose funding 
profiles include conflict diamonds and involvement in the drug trade are also aware of the 
long-term implications of their actions, but are not driven by the same motivations as 
insurgents without opportunistic insurgents. Using children is less costly, and the reduced 
operating costs in an asset to them. Furthermore, using children ensures the conflict will 
continue providing another gain for greed-based rebellions.   
 The quantitative results also revealed that the short-term cost savings can be 
valuable for rebellions that have been fighting for decades. Longer rebellions were shown 
to be much more likely to use child soldiers than shorter rebellions. At the same time, 
these effects were conditioned by rebel goals. The groups most resistant to the increase in 
costs are the same ones that most value international opinion.  
 The empirical results findings in Chapter 5 were not without limitations. Taking a 
10-year snapshot of rebel behavior failed to capture temporal variation in regards to both 
recruitment and goals. Also, in order to maintain objective, unbiased coding, I was forced 
 254 
 
to rely on brief accounts of child soldier use (or non-use) which did not capture the 
variation in recruitment rates or level of child protection. These weaknesses large-n 
analysis is a strong reason to examine cases in more detail. To address some of the 
empirical limitations of quantitative research, I designed three qualitative case studies.     
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 The Statistical analysis revealed which variables were statistically correlated with 
child soldier use. However, from such an analysis, it is impossible to show why they are 
correlated. I still was not sure the extent to which rebel leaders were forward-thinking. I 
could not determine if alternatives might better explain the relationship between child 
recruitment and both secessionist goals and opportunism. In order to show legitimacy 
constraints in action, I explore the case of the Somali National Movement which became 
the Republic of Somaliland. Using a most-similar systems design, I was able to rule out 
alternative explanations, most notably, that of culture. In this case, the best explanation 
for Somaliland's unusually high rates of child protection is the value they place on global 
opinion related to the goal of recognition.  
 In the second case, I explored the impact of illicit funding on two rebel groups in 
very different circumstances. On the surface FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan represent two near-diametrically opposed groups that happen to demonstrate 
the same recruitment behavior. I thoroughly explored their sources of funding and the 
imputed nefarious motivations this imparts. In so doing, I revealed that these groups are 
not concerned with the international community; they are also more interested in 
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continuing the conflict. Through a most-different systems comparison I was able to rule 
out competing explanations for extreme norm abrogation for these two groups.   
 Finally, the case of the SPLM in Sudan offered an initial challenge to my 
proposed theory. This group gained independence but also had a reputation of severe 
norm-violation with respect to child recruitment. A more nuanced look at the SPLM 
revealed that separatism was not the original goal and only emerged late in the rebellion. 
At the same time, some elements within the SPLM did want independence and they were 
revealed to offer some child protection and be the most concerned with garnering 
international support. In this deviant-case analysis, I showed that with a more thorough 
look the case of the SPLM supports the theory.  
 These cases revealed the nuances in the relationship between goals and 
recruitment behavior. First, goals can change. The Somali National Movement was not an 
avowed separatist group. However, by most accounts, including those derived from 
personal interviews, this was their goal all along. Conversely, the SPLM also changed 
goals, but the policy of unification was dominant throughout the duration of their 
movement. When the goal changed, so did their commitment to international norms. 
Also, disputants to the party line, at both low-levels and high-ranking officers were 
important in this case.  
 Opportunism was revealed to infiltrate organizations and alter their goals. The 
FARC began as a peasant-rights organization but devolved rather quickly into a large-
scale insurgency built around the cocaine-industry. At which point, the recruitment of 
children became commonplace and sending very young soldiers to their deaths against 
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fully-trained Colombian soldiers was routine. The Taliban was an opportunistic rebellion 
from the beginning, and its use of child soldiers was likewise immediate.  
 The qualitative analysis suggests further refinements for future research. The 
importance of temporal variation is extremely important and, in light of the evolving 
nature of group goals and recruitment behavior, it deserves closer attention. Similarly, 
these results reveal the importance of exploring splinter groups. Internal disputes can 
reveal a greater degree of variation than group profiles provide.  
 
9.3 Implications for International Relations Theory 
 The conclusions reached by the theoretical and empirical contributions of this 
project speak to a variety of areas in conflict studies. First, by exploring individual 
preferences and beliefs about the international community, this project contributes to the 
bridging of the rationalist-constructivist divide. Adopting the rationalist formula reveals 
beliefs held by a certain class of non-state actors, separatist rebellions. Second, allowing 
for variation in desired outcomes challenges assumptions about universal goals of 
rebellion. Finally, the theoretical argument reveals a new interpretation of the life cycle 
of international norms. Going beyond the 'norms matter' paradigm, I show how norms 
matter for non-state actors as well, and this takes on a similar, but unique pattern 
compared to that of states.  
 The results uncovered here contribute to recent efforts to bridge the theoretical 
schools of rational choice and constructivism (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein, 
Keohane, and Krasner 1999). Rebel leaders engage in rational behavior in a norm-
constrained world. I employed the standard rationalist formula where preferences plus 
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beliefs equal actions. The preference for secessionists is to win statehood, so their actions 
will be to try to win. Simple enough, but when their beliefs are taken into account, they 
do what they think is necessary to achieve their definition of victory. Empirical evidence 
presented here suggests actions can be explained in reference to beliefs about the 
international system. From the interviews and a thorough review of the secondary 
literature, I found that separatists are aware of many international norms. In this project, I 
focused on one such norm, children's rights. The statistical analysis goes beyond the 
anecdotal support to provide further empirical evidence that such norms matter in 
determining behavior. Separatists are willing to do what it takes to be welcomed into the 
community to which they want to belong.  
This project contributes to conflict studies in a number of ways. First, it 
challenges the notion that military victory is the universal goal of rebellions. Secessionist 
rebellions cannot truly succeed unless they end up with their own state. Greed-based 
rebellions may not even care to win at all if winning means ending the conflict (and the 
business). Part Two and Three of this project reveal that far from being universally short-
sighted and of a single mind, rebel groups exhibit remarkable variation in their short and 
long-term calculations. Perhaps most importantly, that they maintain both short- and 
long-term goals at all is a step forward in better understanding rebel behavior. This 
project reveals that there are different goals with short- and long-term goals varying by 
group type.  
A second way in which my work contributes to conflict studies is by adding to the 
collective understanding of how natural resources can influence rebel behavior. 
Opportunism in the ranks can shape recruitment patterns. It might also influence 
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deployment and engagement tactics. Building on the finding that lootable resources 
increase conflict duration (Fearon 2004), the evidence uncovered in this project extend 
the argument that some rebels learn to value conflict in and of itself. Finally, my work is 
able to test the assumption that children make poorer soldiers. Rebels with the most 
incentive to keep fighting but not necessarily win are more likely to use less effective 
younger children. This is supported empirically. In other words, those groups who are 
least likely to need effective troops are the ones statistically more likely to use less 
effective, and less expensive, child soldiers.   
A final conclusion reached by the project is to add a new understanding of how 
international norms develop and change. In a classic approach to the life cycle of norms, 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that norms evolve through a three-stage process. 
This begins with norm emergence through the work of entrepreneurs who hold strong 
beliefs about certain actions or behavior. Second, norms are institutionalized through a 
cascading process where important states adopt the precepts of the norm. Finally, they 
become the social reality when they are internalized by a majority of the state actors in 
the system. This project suggests a similar life cycle of international norms for separatists 
eager to join the international system. For them, however, norm entrepreneurs do not 
begin the process; rather, the norm emerges in the second and third stages of the state-
centric process. That is, would-be state actors receive their cues when state-actors react to 
the new environment, thus leading to the perception by non-state actors that this is what 
must be done to belong to the community of nations. Thus, they use behavior as a signal 
that they know how to act and should therefore be looked upon as equals.  
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My research shows that the stronger support for international standards regarding 
conflict behavior can be influential to conflicting parties, even when those parties are not 
states. Typical debates about the role of human rights norms focus on state compliance 
and abrogation of treaties and are replete with examples from the realist and 
constructivist camps. Non-state actors are traditionally believed to operate outside the 
jurisdiction of international norms. Evidence uncovered here suggests otherwise. 
Building on the constructivist school of thought, this project supports the idea that it can 
be in the best interest of actors to abide by the perceived norms of the system. In a novel 
contribution, I show that international norms and opinions can shape non-state actor 
behavior as well. Signaling norms come about once state leaders have internalized and 
become acclimated to their new environment. Like state leaders, rebel leaders react to 
changes in the environment. They make decisions that weigh the external costs associated 
with violating perceived international norms. Some rebels can see the benefits of abiding 
by systemic norms and this can be an effective motivator. For separatists, this often leads 
them to avoid using children as combatants.  
 
9.4 Implications for Policymakers 
 In a more practical sense, my work offers comfort to the advocacy community in 
their drive to improve the conditions of children around the world. Condemnation works. 
Rebel leaders operate in the same social sphere as states and some, though by no means 
all, value being seen as legitimate administrators. Thus naming and shaming should 
extend to non-ratifiers to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other human 
rights agreements on which there is consensus.  
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Moreover, rewards for compliance need to be offered. Of course, all separatists 
cannot be recognized. However, a willingness to observe the rules of war and accepted 
international standards should be met with stronger negotiating positions. In effect, this 
would offer rebels incentives for restraint. Condemnation and high profile convictions are 
important sticks, but to be most effective, diplomatic carrots should be offered as well.   
Third, counterinsurgency strategists should more effectively consider the role of 
funding and rationality in their efforts to understand their adversaries. The findings 
presented here offer greater support to the idea that illicit activity is unlikely to be a 
means to an end, rather it becomes an end in itself. Strategists should use this information 
to avoid overlooking financial centers in favor of military targets.45 It would also put 
military personnel on higher alert for distractions. When a guerilla force strikes, it is 
important to remember what else they might be doing. Finally, the variation within an 
organization opens the door for effective targeting of dissidents. Instead of trying to 
weaken an organization militarily, careful appeals and negotiations can promote new 
leaders that will offer greater protections for human rights even in the middle of conflict.  
 The rebellions analyzed here offer one final conclusion. Some rebel leaders are 
open to playing by the rules. Far from being an irrational act of malevolence, child 
soldier use can be systematically explained. If it can be explained it can be targeted; if it 
can be targeted, it can be curtailed and hundreds of thousands of the world's most 
vulnerable populations can be better protected. I hope this project makes some effort 
towards this end.  
Copyright © Trace Cody Lasley 2012 
                                                 
45 This was a big complaint lobbied at US forces in Afghanistan (e.g. Peters 2009).  
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Appendix: Child Soldier Use by Rebel Group 
Country Rebel Name 
Child 
Soldiers Lowest Age 
Child 
Soldiers 
15 
Child 
Soldiers 
Ordinal 
Afghanistan Taliban 1 6 1 2 
Afghanistan UIFSA 1 14 0 1 
Algeria FIS 1 15 0 1 
Algeria GIA 1 12 1 2 
Angola UNITA 1 8 1 2 
Angola FLEC 1 8 1 2 
Burma KNPP 1 14 1 2 
Burma MTA 1 . 0 1 
Burma KNU 1 . 0 1 
Burma SSA 1 . 0 1 
Burma UWSA 1 12 0 1 
Burma BMA 0 . 0 0 
Burundi Palipehutu-FNL 1 . 0 1 
Burundi CNDD 1 13 0 1 
Burundi Frolina 1 10 1 2 
Burundi CNDD-FDD 1 15 0 1 
Cambodia 
Khmer 
Rouge/PDK 1 5 1 2 
Central African 
Republic 
Faction of 
Francois Bozize* 0 . 0 0 
Central African 
Republic Military Faction* 0 . 0 0 
Chad MDJT 1 . 0 1 
Chad MDD [-FANT] 1 . 0 1 
Chad FARF 1 . 0 1 
Colombia FARC 1 10 1 2 
Colombia ELN 1 9 1 2 
Comoros MPA 0 . 0 0 
Congo-Brazzaville Ntsiloulous 1 . 0 1 
Congo-Brazzaville Ninjas 1 14 1 2 
Congo-Brazzaville Cocoyes 1 . 0 1 
Congo/Zaire RCD 1 9 1 2 
Congo/Zaire MLC 1 13 0 1 
Congo/Zaire AFDL* 0 . 0 0 
Congo/Zaire RCD Faction 1 12 1 2 
Egypt Tala i al-Fath 0 . 0 0 
                                                 
* Not mentioned in Coalition Reports directly, but unnamed armed groups known to use them. 
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Egypt 
al-Gamaa al-
Islamiyya 0 . 0 0 
Eritrea EIJM 0 . 0 0 
Ethiopia ARDUF 0 . 0 0 
Ethiopia OLF 1 11 1 2 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami 0 . 0 0 
Ethiopia ONLF 0 . 0 0 
Guinea RFDG 0 . 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau Military Faction 1 14 0 1 
India PLA 1 . 0 1 
India BLTF 1 . 0 1 
India Naxalites/PWG 1 8 1 2 
India NSCN 1 13 0 1 
India UNLF 1 . 0 1 
India 
Kashmir 
Insurgents 1 10 1 2 
India ATTF 1 . 0 1 
India MCC 1 8 1 2 
India UFLA Faction 1 13 1 2 
India NLFT 1 . 0 1 
India KNF 1 . 0 1 
India BDSF/NDFB 1 . 0 1 
Indonesia Fretilin 1 10 0 1 
Indonesia GAM 1 14 0 1 
Iran 
Mujahideen e 
Khalq 1 17 0 1 
Iraq SAIRI 0 . 0 0 
Israel PNA 0 . 0 0 
Israel Hezbollah 1 16 0 1 
Israel PFLP 0 . 0 0 
Israel Hamas 1 15 0 1 
Israel AMB 0 . 0 0 
Israel Fatah 0 . 0 0 
Israel PFLP-GC 0 . 0 0 
Ivory Coast MPCI 1 10 1 2 
Ivory Coast MPIGO 1 10 1 2 
Ivory Coast MJP 1 10 1 2 
Lesotho Military Faction 0 . 0 0 
Liberia LURD 1 10 1 2 
Liberia Ulimo-J 1 . 0 1 
Macedonia 
Ushtria Clirimtare 
Kombetare 1 14 0 1 
Nepal CPN-M/UPF 1 8 1 2 
Niger FDR 0 . 0 0 
Niger FARS 0 . 0 0 
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Niger UFRA 0 . 0 0 
Pakistan MQM 1 15 0 1 
Papua New Guinea BRA 1 13 0 1 
Peru Sendero Rojo 1 . 0 1 
Philippines Abu Sayyaf 1 15 0 1 
Philippines MNLF (Faction) 1 . 0 1 
Philippines MILF 1 10 1 2 
Philippines NPA 1 11 0 1 
Russia 
Republic of 
Dagestan 1 . 0 1 
Russia 
Republic of 
Chechnya 1 12 0 1 
Rwanda 
Opposition 
alliance 1 8 1 2 
Senegal MFDC 0 . 0 0 
Sierra Leone AFRC 1 . 0 1 
Sierra Leone Kamajors† 1 7 1 2 
Sierra Leone RUF 1 10 1 2 
Somalia SRRC 1 10 1 2 
Somalia USC Faction 1 . 0 1 
Sri Lanka LTTE 1 9 0 1 
Sudan SPLM 1 9 0 1 
Sudan Faction of SPLM 1 10 1 2 
Tajikistan 
Mvmnt.  Peace in 
Tajikistan 0 . 0 0 
Tajikistan UTO 1 12 1 2 
Turkey PKK/Kadek 1 7 1 2 
Uganda WNBF 1 . 0 1 
Uganda ADF 1 . 0 1 
Uganda LRA 1 5 1 2 
United Kingdom Real IRA 0 . 0 0 
Uzbekistan MIU 1 . 0 1 
Yugoslavia UCK 1 14 0 1 
 
                                                 
† Technically a rebellion, but only because RUF rebels controlled government for a brief time. The 
Kamajors were a former government-allied militia, known to use child soldiers.  
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